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The 9/11

Graham Report

The True Story of

Three 9/11 Hijackers who were Reported to the F. B. I. Ten months before 9/11

DR. DAVID M GRAHAM


Part I CONTENTS

PICTORIAL and MAIN CHARACTERS


*SECTION 1: Habeeb at Dr. Graham’s Clinic

  • SECTION 2: Day 1: Alhazmi, Almihdhar, and Banihammad
  • SECTION 3: Day 2: Fear of Barksdale AFB Flight-line Bombing
  • SECTION 4: Airline High vs. Evangel Christian Football Game
  • SECTION 5: Day 3: Graham Meets Alhazmi and Banihammad
  • SECTION 6: Jamal Befriended at Church
  • SECTION 7: Graham’s First Corroboration
  • SECTION 8: Richard Clarke vs. Clinton Cabinet; the “Gorelick Wall”
  • SECTION 9: 1 Nov 2000: 1st Graham Report to Shreveport FBI
  • SECTION 10: 7 Nov 2000: Graham Report to U.S. Secret Service

PART II

*SECTION 11: September 11, 2001

  • SECTION 12: Graham Calls FBI Hotline
  • SECTION 13: 2 Oct 2001: Re-Report to Shreveport FBI
  • SECTION 14: 5 Oct 2001: Graham Identifies 9/11 Ringleader Alhazmi
  • SECTION 15: Dallas FBI Arrests Jamal in East Texas
  • SECTION 16: Terror Puzzle Becomes A Picture
  • SECTION 17: National Security Leak
  • SECTION 18: FBI Turns Deaf Ear
  • SECTION 19: 31 Jan 2002: Manuscript to Shreveport FBI
  • SECTION 20: 7 Feb 2002: Report to FBI Agent Spoon
  • SECTION 21: 22 May 2002: Spoon’s Six Surprises
  • SECTION 22: 2 Jun 2002: Report to Joint Select Committee on Intelligence

PART III

*SECTION 23: 24 Jun 2002: First Corroborating Videotape

  • SECTION 24: Report to McCrery to Saxby to Intelligence Committee
  • SECTION 25: Congressional Hearings & Aftermath
  • SECTION 26: 8 Mar 2003: Second Corroborating Videotape
  • SECTION 27: FBI Allegedly Arrests Habeeb
  • SECTION 28: Shreveport – Al Qaeda Connection
  • SECTION 29: Joint Select Committee on Intelligence’s 9/11 Report
  • SECTION 30: Sept 2003: Alhazmi and Almihdhar declared “9/11 Ringleaders”
  • SECTION 31: 9/11 Commission: Hijackers’ Entry into U.S.
  • SECTION 32: 9/11 Commission: Three 9/11 Hijackers
  • SECTION 33: Justice: Jamal and Habeeb
  • SECTION 34: FBI Calls Graham to Testify & INS Surprise
  • SECTION 35: Wrap the Case
  • SECTION 36: Potential Witness List
  • SECTION 37: List: Where 29 Graham Reports were Provided
  • SECTION 38: Sworn Affidavit & Agreement to Testify


The 9/11 GRAHAM

REPORT

The True Story of Three 9/11 Hijackers who were Reported to the F. B. I. Ten months before 9/11

PART I

MAIN INDIVIDUALS in this story (as seen in preceding Pictorial):

Mohammad Jamal Khan (aliases Mohamad Jamal, Mohammad Jamal, Jamal Khan, Muhammad Jamal Khan, others) and (hereafter may be referred to as JAMAL or KHAN)

As of 12 May 2004, Jamal is WANTED as a FEDERAL FUGITIVE by the U.S. Marshals Service for allegedly failing to appear at a recent hearing related to his federal supervised release. JamaL allegedly violated his federal supervised release when, on April 10, 2004, he was arrested by the Bossier City, LA police for allegedly soliciting an undercover female police officer for prostitution. Graham repeatedly advised authorities to arrest Jamal in lieu of allowing him to run the streets while awaiting deportation hearings. Anyone having information about Jamal’s whereabouts should report such information to 1-318-676-4200.

Jamal originally arrived in Houston or NY in 1995, then flew to Los Angeles and, on advise of Jamal’s Saudi Arabian contact, a Dr. Rudas, traveled to Redding, CA where Jamal took airplane flying lessons. Months later, Jamal settled in Shreveport and Bossier City in northwest Louisiana, home of Barksdale Air Force Base’s Eighth Air Force Headquarters, the Second Bomb Wing with the mighty B-52, and the 917th Air Force Reserve Wing. Jamal hustled mayors of both cities for business letters of recommendation, in turn hustling Dr. Graham for an investment. Graham visited Jamal’s Eastwood on the Bayou townhouse whereupon he met several suspicious visitors, reporting same to Shreveport FBI on November 1, 2000

and re-reporting to Shreveport U.S. Secret Service on or about November 7, 2000. After 9/11, Graham identified Jamal’s suspicious visitors as 9/11 hijackers.

In November, 2001 Dallas FBI agents arrested Jamal in Tyler, Texas for a firearms violation that was later dropped and Jamal pled guilty (along with his partner Saeed A. Tanoli) of depositing/wire transferring $9,999.00 at the request of Liaquat Ali during the structuring of fifty thousand ($50,000.00) dollars.

Graham has discovered from very reliable sources that said $50,000.00 was transferred to an individual(s), or organization, in Pakistan. After spending about one year in jail (and/or prison), six months of said jail term being for said illegal wire transfer/structuring $50,000.00, Mohammad Jamal Khan was turned over to custody of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) for deportation.

However, Jamal’s Criminal Case No. 02-50014001, under District Judge Tom Stagg of U.S. District Court, Western District of LA, on 19 April 2002, in Jamal’s PLEA AGREEMENT (Section 3) states the following:

“Except, in no case does the United States Attorney for the Western District of Louisiana and the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Texas agree that there will be no prosecution of the defendant for any crimes concerning the hijacking of any airline or attack on any building or deaths that occurred on or about September 11, 2001...”

Beginning in November, 2002 (and continuing as of of 22 April 2004), Jamal was out on $10,000.00 immigration bond and living across the Red River (from Shreveport) in Bossier City, Louisiana.

Beginning in July, 2003 Jamal unsuccessfully attempted to get his Ark-La-Tex Tires & Accessories business up and going (first on Youree Drive about one block from the Islamic mosque, Masjid Al-Noor (though he avowed to have converted from Islam to Christianity), then moving business to 3117 W. 70th Street) over a period of several months. Since Jamal’s INS (Oakdale, LA) deportation hearing has been Continued (a second time), as of early May, 2004 Jamal sold vehicles at United Dodge on Bert Kouns Industrial Loop in Shreveport, LA for several weeks, until he was fired after being arrested in May, 2004 in Bossier City for alleged prostitution solicitation. As stated earlier, Jamal is now a Federal Fugitive.

The “Graham-Jamal Corroborating Videotape of March 8, 2003” corroborates major portions of the Graham Reports while allegedly implicating Jamal and Habeeb as aiding and abetting at least two terrorist hijackers (9/11Ringleader Nawaf Alhazmi and Fayez Banihammad; and potentially the other 9/11 Ringleader, Khalid Almihdhar), with national security footage being “Redacted.”

IMPORTANT: Mohammad Jamal Khan must not be confused with another resident of Bossier City, Louisiana who is a Palestinian named Mohammad Azmat Khan (who also may be known as Mohammad A. Khan). Mohammed Habeeb Ahmed, MD (alias: Mohomed Habeeb Ahmed, MD) and (hereafter referred to as “HABEEB”)

David Malcolm Graham was an eye-witness to Habeeb escorting 9/11 terrorists Nawaf Alhazmi and Fayez Banihammad into Jamal’s townhouse, and further, Graham’s film termed “Graham-Habeeb Corroborating Videotape of June 24, 2002” which was filmed at Graham’s clinic reveals that Habeeb gave, or loaned, Jamal five hundred ($500.00) dollars to help Jamal support 9/11 terrorists Nawaf Alhazmi and Fayez Banihammad, and additionally (but not limited to), said videotape allegedly further corroborates much of the Graham Report and allegedly implicates Jamal and Habeeb as aiding and abetting at least two 9/11 hijackers, Nawaf Alhazmi and Fayez Banihammad.

According to reliable sources, Mohammed Habeeb Ahmed, MD was arrested by the FBI in the summer, 2003; however, the FBI will not confirm this fact (since a new FBI policy only infrequently releases the names of arrested individuals).

IMPORTANT: Mohammed Habeeb Ahmed, MD should not be confused with following individuals:

(1) former LSUMC nephrologist Dr. Mohammed I. Ahmed; (2) Christus-Schumpert Hospital’s former Shreveport medical doctor, Dr. Mohamed A. Ahmed; potentially a third (3) Dr. Mohammed Ahmed in Shreveport, LA (unsure of exact name spelling).

Saeed A. Tanoli (not pictured), Jamal’s partner pled guilty to similar a felony as Jamal’s in the depositing and wire transferring nine thousand nine hundred and ninety-nine ($9,999.00) dollars while structuring fifty thousand ($50,000.00) dollars that was sent to individual(s), or an organization, in Pakistan.

Liaquat Ali (not pictured) turned evidence and pled guilty for his part in requesting that Jamal and Saeed A. Tanoli deposit and wire transfer nine thousand nine hundred ninety-nine ($9,999.00) dollars while structuring $50,000.00 which was forwarded to individual(s), or an organization, in Pakistan (according to a very reliable source).

MAIN CHARACTERS (in preceding Pictorial ~ either dead or captured):

Nawaf Alhazmi (hereafter may be referred to as NAWAF or ALHAZMI), hijacker of American Airlines Flt 77 which hit the Pentagon in Washington DC, and, after the Associated Press story on 16 Sep 2003, Nawaf is deemed as “9/11 Ringleader” along with Khalid Almihdhar, the other 9/11 Ringleader. On or about 7 Oct 2000 Graham met Nawaf Alhazmi in Shreveport, LA and reported Alhazmi to Shreveport FBI Agent Steve Hayes face-to-face on 1 Nov 2000, over ten months before 9/11. Alhazmi died on 9/11 during his participation in the reign of terror by crashing into the Pentagon.

Fayez Banihammad (hereafter may be referred to as FAYEZ or BANIHAMMAD) was a hijacker of United Airlines Flt 175 which hit World Trade Center south tower in New York City on September 11, 2001. On or about 7 Oct 2000 Graham met Fayez Banihammad in Shreveport, LA and reported Banihammad to Shreveport FBI Agent Steve Hayes “face-to-face” on 1 Nov 2000, over ten months before 9/11. Banihammad died on September 11, 2001 during his terrorizing of WTC 2 (south tower).

Khalid Almihdhar (hereafter may be referred to as KHALID or ALMIHDHAR), hijacker of American Airlines Flt 77 which hit the Pentagon in Washington, DC, and after the Associated Press story on 16 Sep 2003, Almihdhar is deemed as “9/11 Ringleader” along with the other 9/11 Ringleader Nawaf Alhazmi. Graham never met Almihdhar but Almihdhar’s name was written on a box on Jamal’s kitchen floor and Graham reported Almihdhar to Shreveport FBI Agent Steve Hayes “face-to-face” on 1 Nov 2000. Almihdhar allegedly died on 9/11 in the Pentagon crash (though at least one Muslim newspaper claimed, a few weeks after 9/11, that Khalid Almihdhar was alive).

Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Al-Qaeda No. 3 and so-called Mastermind of 9/11, was captured in spring, 2003 in Pakistan and interrogated in secret location by U.S. security agents. According to a September 16, 2003 Associated Press (AP) report in USA Today, Mohammed’s interrogation revealed, in part, that Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar were more important than Mohamed Atta (who was previously thought to be the “9/11 Ringleader”). Other portions of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed’s interrogations later on.

Mohamed Atta was the lead hijacker of American Airlines Flt. 11 which hit World Trade Center north tower. For many months after 9/11, U.S. security agencies believed Mohamed Atta to be the “9/11 Ringleader.” It now appears that Atta was meeting with Nawaf Alhazmi “face-to-face” in the months preceding 9/11 in order to receive and/or discuss messages that “9/11 Ringleaders Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar” had received from Khalid Shaikh Mohammed through coded chat room Internet messages. Mohamed Atta died on September 11, 2001 when terrorizing WTC 1 (north tower). SECTION 1 Habeeb at Dr. Graham’s Clinic

BACKDROP: A KEY THOROUGHBRED

By the early 80’s I had been breeding and racing thoroughbreds for over ten years, beginning with my first racehorse purchased in California. Paging the Class broke his maiden (his first win) at Hollywood Park by ten lengths while injuring his front left ankle. My local trainer mistakenly thought “three-legged Page” could win with help from a Louisiana Downs veterinarian. So I partnered on the big gelding, primarily due to his bloodline flowing with Khaled, the sire of Kentucky Derby winner Swaps. No pictures at the finish line, but the California stallion named Khaled remained a key to our terrorist account over twenty years later. We will soon go there.

REPORT BEGINS AT CLINIC The official Graham Report is written in third person for accuracy, such as follows:

On March 15, 2000 one of Dr. David Graham’s dental patients, Mohammed Habeeb Ahmed, MD, a cardiology resident from LSU Medical Center in Shreveport, agreed to join Dr. Graham and Phil D. Mayers, DDS, MS in their research study “Gum Disease Potentially Linked to Cardiovascular Disease.” Habeeb also moonlighted in cardiology at the VA Hospital, where upper-floor (eastside) veteran patients have a view of Red River, which meanders between Shreveport and Bossier City

Author’s comments will appear in bold italics, such as follows:

My early opinion of Habeeb was quite positive. Early on, Habeeb befriended my dental staff when he began seeing LeeAnne Scruggs, my dental hygienist. Standing slightly over six feet, Habeeb had typically black hair, medium complexion, and sported a full beard ~ and most women labeled Habeeb a handsome dude.

NAME CLARIFICATION

Since another LSU Medical Center (LSUMC) resident doctor, in nephrology (kidneys) was named Mohammed I. Ahmed, MD, in order to avoid confusion upon paging the doctors at LSUMC, Mohammed Habeeb Ahmed, MD was paged as “Dr. Habeeb.” And, Dr. Habeeb asked most folks to simply call him by “Habeeb.” So I am not being insensitive to the medical doctor throughout these pages when referring to Habeeb.

OUR RESEARCH STUDY Having already partnered oral research with another LSU doctor from India, I considered Habeeb an ideal addition to the team. Then, too, my co-researcher, Dr. Phil Mayers, was extremely excited upon learning that we had a cardiologist on board.

At this point, hold your thoughts on Habeeb until later in the story. HOW DR. GRAHAM MET JAMAL

A couple of months later, Graham ran into an old acquaintance, Tom Collins (name changed), at Murrell’s Grill, a well-known Shreveport greasy spoon located a stone’s throw from Dr. Graham’s dental clinic. Tom looked somewhat depressed, so Graham invited him to the dental clinic to chat. While at the clinic, Tom asked about getting his teeth restored, and they agreed on a plan.

Two weeks later, Collins was quite pleased with his new smile, so he asked Dr. Graham if there was anything he could do in return. David thought a minute, then asked Tom to look for an investor in Graham’s upstart vitamin-dental product company named AdvaLife. Collins smiled broadly, then said he’d see what he could do.

Quite honestly, I did not expect Tom to locate a sophisticated investor, meaning an investor who has a knowledgeable understanding of the business and who has sufficient funds to invest (preferably a healthy net worth) without suffering a dramatic lifestyle change should the venture fail. After Collins had not called for two months, my expectations dwindled even more.

SIDEBAR: GRAHAM’S “COUNTERATTACK” INVESTIGATIONS

While this may appear to be chasing rabbits, my background as an investigative media reporter through my call-in radio show “CounterAttack” on Shreveport’s 50,000 watt KEEL will provide a backdrop for my tenacity when confronted with the alleged Shreveport terrorists. Why would anyone follow through on a situation which, early on, indicated potential danger ahead? Perhaps the answer lies somewhere between a naïve desire for a utopian political system, on one hand, to human nature’s hunger for the simple truth.

Though KEEL’s “CounterAttack” covered a variety of topics ranging from politics to health to political corruption, the latter was my favorite. My investigative reporting of corruption led to citizens calling in with leads of sundry political implications and, on occasion, serious factual evidence surrounding well-known politicians and their cronies. Numerous exposures of wrong-doing sent several politico-types back to the private sector on Vote Day. And there were others.

If it happens to be one’s forte, helping to trap corrupt politicians can become downright infectious. On one occasion, after being body wired, I taped a former drug dealer saying he had paid a former Bossier City five thousand ($5,000.00) dollars to have his drug bust dropped. Other District Attorney across-the-river Shreveport unmentionable evidence has been safely stored (far and wide) in the event certain cases are brought to trial.

THE TEXAS HUNT

A certain young woman, a needed witness named Natalie Preston (name changed), had moved away to the backwoods of a small Texas town with a name that sounded like Ko- mah-neal. No one had any idea where this town was located in the state of Texas. I was asked to locate this woman. Wow! Texas is not Rhode Island.

Well, Natalie was known to hang out with unsavory characters and to be a coke-head. She had been run out of Caddo and Bossier Parishes by Satanic cult leaders who accused Natalie and her girlfriend of ripping off their Satanic paraphernalia. They chased the two women into Texas at a high rate of speed, then lost them. Natalie’s distant relative received a whispered phone call months later with a mention of the small town (phonetically) named Ko-mah-neal ~ somewhere in Texas. Thanks a lot.

TOM AT SINAGRA’S RESTAURANT

It had been a rewarding, yet tiring Friday with a major dental cosmetic case at the clinic. Though I had planned to start my Texas Hunt at 3:00 pm, the temporary crowns kept me busy till 4:15. Taking westward toward Texas out of Shreveport, I stopped off at Sinagra’s Restaurant for a quick coffee pick-me-up. Since owner and my buddy Frank Sinagra was busy making crawfish fettuccini, big Tom Matlock gave me an arm-wave to join his table.

After hearing where I was headed, Tom reminded me that he had been a Texas State Trooper a few years back. Tom was intrigued by the name Ko-mah-neal, and after short contemplation, said he thought the little town was located over half-way to Houston down Texas 59, probably off to the East. Texas just got smaller! Out the door I dashed

.

THE SEARCH FOR “KO-MAH-NEAL”

Taking the eastern route off of 59, shortly after 11:30 pm I came upon a group meeting on an outdoor lot. Since it appeared to be a church group outing, or some such, I parked my Stealth 2000 and strolled over for directions. It became immediately obvious that this was no church group, but rather, a Mexican-American bunch who were good-n-drunk by now. Surprisingly, a muscular friendly drunk knew exactly how to get to Ko-mah-neal, even sharing that they had a clean Ramada Inn.

It was 1:10 am and the Ramada Inn was full due to a high school reunion. Put toothpicks under the eyelids and head back to that $21.00 @ day winner. And, boy, was it ever a winner. The motel manager said I should park close to his window to protect my new Stealth sports car. Encouraging. Then all night I was getting knocks on my door for solicitations, ostensibly the sexual variety. Early the next morning, the $21.00 room showed its colors when the sloped, undulating wooden floor caused me to fall flat on my face half-way to the bathroom.

LOCATING THE TOWN KNOW-IT-ALL

Best time to locate someone in a small town is during breakfast. Every town has a Breakfast Club which can be found in small towns by looking for the greasy spoon with the most trucks out front. Simple. Then, figure out which old geezer at the most populous table seems to know everything about everything. That’s the guy you want!

My geezer-club know-it-all was about 75 years young, wore a bright yellow shirt covered with Lee overalls, and sported a serious demeanor accented by deep, vertical lines between the eyes. After my asking about Natalie, the gentleman’s left eyebrow darted skyward, bellowing in major bass tones that he hoped I was the law coming to pick her up because she had gotten his granddaughter into lots of trouble with drugs. I wasn’t about to ask him if his daughter had any complicity in the matter. He said Natalie lived in “the first trailer on the right in that trailer park about one mile back up the road.”

Know-it-all was right on. For one hour and thirty minutes, my body-wire recorded Natalie motor-mouthing about a certain Judge and his heavy involvement in drug trafficking. Forty-five minutes had passed, so I took a bathroom break in order to spin the tape over. All this time, Natalie’s disturbingly mean-spirited, pint-sized boyfriend was staring across the table exclaiming that Natalie should stop telling me all this stuff. It was a relief to feel the tape recorder click on my left thigh as the tape ran out. I had heard more than enough.

Back home, the attorney could not believe what he was hearing. And, oh yes, I had been in the middle of an enormously rough crowd. You see, several months later talkative little Natalie took a shotgun and killed el boyfriend, which sent her to prison for several years. He apparently had been quite abusive, but back in those days one went to prison for shooting an abusive spouse.

Well, I said all that to say this. Between Vietnam and the CounterAttack radio show, my former experiences had placed me in more than one dangerous predicament. Therefore, though a dentist by profession, investigative work was apparently lying dormant in my bloodstream waiting to be discovered. This explains why there was no quit in me once the association with Mohammad Jamal Khan began to snowball into potentially serious security threats. SECTION 2

Day One & The Three Boxes: Alhazmi, Almihdhar and Banihammad

BACKDROP

Mohammad Jamal Khan (aliases: Mohamad Jamal; Muhammad Jamal; Jamal Khan; and hereafter also referred to as “Jamal” or “Khan”) is an albino Saudi-turned-Pakistani (Jamal now says he is German descent) who, in 1995, arrived in Houston, Texas (despite Jamal saying he arrived in New York City) from flights originating in Pakistan. Shortly afterwards, according to Jamal, he flew to Los Angeles. Influenced by a “Dr. Rudas,” Jamal’s Saudi contact, Jamal traveled to Redding, California where he took flying lessons.

Around 1996, Jamal arrived in Shreveport and Bossier City, Louisiana, cities nestled on adjacent banks of Red River, and soon to be home to five riverboat gambling casinos in the heart of the Bible Belt. Sprawled next to Bossier City is Barksdale Air Force Base, home of Eighth Air Force Headquarters, the 917th USAF Reserve Wing, and the Second Bomb Wing’s mighty B-52s.

The charismatic Jamal was quick to coddle up to Bossier City Mayor George Dement to manipulate the mayor’s letter of recommendation for potential investors in Jamal’s Bossier City textile company, named Sunrise Textiles, Inc., which proved to be short- lived. Next came a small jewelry venture, with Jamal’s jewelry becoming his carrot for dating Barksdale women who escorted him all over the massive base. Scary thought.

Jamal was bent on becoming a well-known businessman around Shreveport-Bossier City, as witnessed by his debonair photograph, with charismatic smile and arms crossed, which appeared in Shreveport’s Gannett daily, The Times.

First came the press coverage of Jamal’s jump off the Red River bridge and swimming ashore. Demonstrating strength and resilience? More striking, however, was Jamal painting his eyelids with black, kohl eyeliner as a daily regimen, which he continued until after 9/11 (Graham later discovered that many of the Taliban used black kohl eyeliner, and Jamal came from Northwest Pakistan where the Taliban originated. Hmm).

Jamal rented an upscale townhouse at the gated complex Eastwood on the Bayou, dressed conservatively in dark suit and tie, wore black shiny shoes, socialized readily, and was extremely paranoid about Graham giving out his new cell number. The scene was set for Jamal to promote his purported second textile company, Global Textile Industry Inc., making sheets, pillow cases, and such, purportedly with his father supplying fabric from Pakistan. Then entered Dr. David M. Graham who was searching for an investor in his upstart nutrition-dental product business named AdvaLife International, Inc. Mid-September, 2000: GRAHAM MEETS JAMAL Dental patient Tom Collins (name changed) provided Mohamad Jamal’s name to Dr. Graham (Jamal was not disclosing his last name as KHAN at this time and was spelling Mohamad with only one “m”), Collins saying that Jamal was a strange looking albino Arab with heavy black eyeliner, but talked big money so he might become an investor in AdvaLife. Frankly, Graham could not care less whether Jamal was Muslim or, for that matter, what he looked like. Graham merely viewed Jamal as a legitimate potential investor in AdvaLife.

On or about September 20, 2000: When Graham called Jamal to set a business appointment, Jamal was unusually coy about meeting for breakfast at Murrell’s Grill, or

George’s Grill, or the University Club, and Jamal even rejected meeting for coffee at Barnes & Noble Booksellers. Graham sensed that Jamal was avoiding the public spotlight. The only place Jamal wished to meet was his townhouse at (garage entrance is official address) 3521 East Lake Drive, Shreveport, LA 71105 (front entrance: 3521 Eastwood Drive) in the Eastwood on the Bayou gated complex, located on Knight Street about 3⁄4 mile south of Shreveport-Barksdale Highway.

I must admit, due to such an unusual telephone introduction to Jamal, I was ambivalent about whether or not to accept Jamal’s invitation. Things just didn’t seem right. But since Tom Collins recommended Jamal as a friendly sort, I accepted.

LEGAL ACCURACY BEGS FOR REPETITION

The reader is asked to indulge several redundant statements in The Graham Report, such as the following repeat of Jamal’s address. Such repeats were legally pertinent to the official Graham Report which I hand-carried to the U.S. Congressional Joint Select Committee on Intelligence in Washington, DC on June 4, 2002 when I personally gave the Graham Report (with the heading “CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY REPORT”) to JSCI Counsel Steven A. Cash.

Later, I personally hand-carried an updated Graham Report (including the “Graham- Habeeb Corroborating Videotape of June 24, 2002”) to U.S. Congressman Jim McCrery on August 16, 2002, followed by McCrery presenting the updated report (with corroborating videotape) to U.S. Congressman Saxby Chambliss, who, in turn, presented said report (with corroborating videotape) to U.S. Congressman Porter Goss, Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence for consideration as the committee actively pursued its investigation into the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States of America.

RED FLAGS GALORE Shreveport : On or about September 26, 2000: Dr. Graham met with Jamal at Jamal’s rented townhouse at 3521 East Lake Drive in the Eastwood on the Bayou Subdivision. Graham received other red flags from Jamal, such as:

1. Graham’s discernment caused him to be suspicious of the three brown boxes on Jamal’s kitchen floor. Applied with a black magic marker, each box had one name hand- printed in ENGLISH capital letters, the names being (1) NAWAF ALHAZMI; (2) KHALID ALMIHDHAR; and (3) FAYEZ BANIHAMMAD. On each box, the letters were approximately two inches in height, and the letters were centered horizontally on one side of each box. When Jamal took a bathroom break Graham recorded the names by using his ballpoint pen to print each name on the palm of his left hand.

Without good reason, I was immediately drawn to the names on the three cardboard boxes (one name being on each box). As Jamal and I were talking in his living room, I would glance back into the kitchen and see the boxes. My plan was to outlast Jamal on taking a bathroom break, then jot down the names. An hour or so later, Jamal excused himself to the bathroom.

With note pad out of reach, I quickly jotted each name on the palm of my left hand. The name “KHALID ALMIHDHAR” was a bit clumsy to copy, because of it having few vowels, and I thought perhaps “FAYEZ BANIHAMMAD” was a woman. And I considered the name “NAWAF ALHAZMI” as being equally Middle-eastern as the other two. The reader will soon learn about my discovering Fayez to be a man ~ a very disturbing man. At the same moment, one of the other boxes also intrigued me.

My being a former breeder and runner of thoroughbred horses, the name “KHALID” recalled the stallion named “KHALED,” who was bought many years ago by the Ellsworths from the Aga Khan (of the Mideast) to stand stud in California. Khaled’s son Swaps had won the Kentucky Derby, so in a whimsical way, I looked at Khalid Almihdhar’s box on Jamal’s kitchen floor as if it were a horse stall. (Months later, my being familiar with the stallion Khaled made it easier for me to recall the name Khalid Almihdhar shortly after discovering his name in the 5 Oct 2001 issue of USA Today.)

To this day, I do not know the contents of the three boxes. Frankly, I feared being caught if taking the time to open the boxes (i.e., I had no way of knowing exactly how long Jamal would take on his bathroom break). Hopefully, one day the exact nature of the contents will be revealed during testimony, should the Department of Justice decide to bring Jamal and/or Habeeb to trial for allegedly aiding and abetting the 9/11 terrorists, in lieu of potential deportation(s).

Merely speculating, the mystery of what was in the three boxes could prove to be a shocking eye-opener, if, after interrogations of Jamal and Habeeb, the boxes were proven to be packed with terrorist bomb explosives. On the flip side, contents of the boxes may turn out to be dirty socks and underwear, or reminiscent of Giraldo Rivera opening the secret room of Al Capone ~ empty!

2. Even though the appointment was made for Jamal to be Graham’s potential investor, after five minutes into the conversation, Jamal told Graham to forget his AdvaLife business and invest $25,000.00 to 50,000.00 in Jamal’s textile company. Jamal emphatically said that Graham would have to do no work, but surely would make lots of money. Unbelievable deal. Again, the flag was red.

With this third whammy, I suggested to Jamal that we meet several times to inquire about each other’s investment opportunity and one of us would likely invest $25,000 to $50,000 with the other (even though I had no intention of either “giving or receiving” funds with Jamal; I merely wanted to scrutinize this strange man). Jamal liked the idea of meeting often for business talk. My idea was to set the stage for further evaluating the early red flags and determine if I was merely being paranoid about Jamal. By hanging out with Jamal, I felt confident that a relationship would develop whereby I could delve into his past, then play it by ear. My early discernment said this guy must be approached very circumspectly. The investigative wheels were rolling.

3. Jamal hung out daily at the USA CASH store, owned by Ray Hughes, Jr., and said he methodically emailed around the world to his contacts in the Mideast, Europe, and Africa. Jamal said he was a very important person, and that his father also had influential global contacts, even in Saudi Arabia. USA CASH was located at 779 Shreveport-Barksdale Highway, Shreveport, LA 71105, same address as Jamal used on his Global Textile business card.

Jamal’s statement about emailing around the world got my attention. That cinched it. Now my suspicions were flying off the chart! I knew I must hang around Jamal for least several days. One never knows what could develop. And little did I know that Jamal was allegedly, at the least, being used by Al-Qaeda.

4. Jamal’s previously failed Bossier City textile business was named Sunrise Textiles, Inc. Jamal’s new business card featuring “Global Textile Industry, Inc.” with a listed the address of 779 Shreveport-Barksdale Highway, Shreveport, LA 71105, which is the same address as Ray Hughes’ USA CASH, and Jamal’s business card listed Jamal’s Fax number as 318-219-2114. The business card spelled Jamal’s name as “Mohammad Jamal,” even though Jamal had told Graham on the phone to spell his name “Mohamad Jamal.” When asked about the card, Jamal said it made no difference how his name is spelled. When pressed about his name, Jamal said that “Mohammad Jamal” was his full name (i.e., claimed “Jamal” was his family name).

Well, many people would think something is fishy if a new acquaintance is misleading concerning the spelling of his name. It was like Jamal was having trouble remembering which lie he told. This first day with Jamal quickly engendered tons of suspicion.

5. Jamal’s gated entrance into Eastwood on the Bayou townhouse complex is about one mile from Barksdale Air Force Base west gate, which will have more significance later.

Since I thought it might come in handy down the road, I wanted to know where Jamal’s family lived in Pakistan. I mentioned my travels while in the U.S. Air Force by getting free “hops” (free plane rides during free time) all over the world: Grand Bahamas; Puerto Rico; overnight in Tripoli, Libya; Germany; Hawaii; Guam; Japan; Philippines; Taiwan; Thailand; and Vietnam R & R (rest and relaxation) in Australia.

I told Jamal that while hopping around the world, I never had the opportunity to see Pakistan. Then I asked Jamal to please take me on a tour of Pakistan on his next trip home. Projecting a puzzled look, Jamal initially indicated it was impossible for me to join him on a Pakistani trip.

6. Jamal said his father lived in Pakistan. When Graham insincerely asked Jamal if he could join Jamal on his next trip home, Jamal hesitated, then said his father could have personal guards for Graham. Jamal said his father used “Khan” as part of his name, and that Jamal’s father once owned an extremely large kingdom in Pakistan, but had lost most of it during the political struggles there. Jamal said that his father still had political power in Pakistan and even in Saudi Arabia.

7. Though Jamal is married to a wife in Pakistan, and glowingly showed Graham a picture of his wife and blonde daughter, Jamal dates women from Barksdale Air Force Base and “just loves going to the BX and all over the base”. When Graham asked why he dated women, since he is a married Muslim, Jamal chuckled saying, “I’m not the regular kind of Muslim. My wife is in Pakistan, and I like women, so I date all the time. Besides, I am Americanized.”

For openers, I had never met anyone in my life with as many red flags! There was no way I’d let this guy sell me a used car. Obviously, I was extremely suspicious of Jamal, without a clue as to what he was instigating. But, to say I was intrigued is an understatement. Of high priority, I was quite concerned about Jamal having escorts around Barksdale Air Force Base, home of the B-52s and it being Headquarters for the Eighth Air Force and the 917th USAF Reserve Wing. Jamal had disturbing access to Barksdale.

I’ll go ahead and disclose a couple of important red flags at this juncture, so that the reader has more ”biggies” on the same list.

8. Ray Hughes, Jr., owner of USA CASH, allegedly invested $10,000.00 with Jamal on “other ventures,” and Hughes would invest more, according to Jamal. Hughes owned a black Navigator SUV and would tail Jamal around town. Hughes wanted to buy Jamal a large white moving-size cargo truck, which Jamal later pointed out to Graham on Youree Drive in Shreveport near Squire’s Tux Rental business.

9. Jamal changed his cell phone number frequently and was unbelievably paranoid about giving out his numbers.

Due to the early red flags, Graham’s sole purpose in hanging around Jamal would be to evaluate the possibility of Jamal having sinister plans for Barksdale. Early on, Graham knew for certain that he (Graham) wanted no part in doing business with Jamal, and that meant both not investing in Jamal’s purported business nor receiving any funds from Jamal for AdvaLife.

At this early stage, I was truly mystified with everything surrounding this Jamal character. Everything out of his mouth was strange and was exponentially milking my deepest suspicions. To say I was dubious of Jamal is putting it mildly. The man was completely off the chart! SECTION 3

Day Two: Graham Fears Barksdale AFB Flight-line Bombing

On or about Tuesday, October 3, 2000:

In an effort to further scrutinize this strange Mohamad Jamal, Dr. Graham was determined to befriend Jamal over the next couple of weeks. Graham was playing a charade’s game with Jamal concerning Graham’s interest to invest with Jamal’s new textile company called Global Textile Industry, Inc (this company name only being recalled by Graham in 2002 after seeing Brenda O’Brock’s physical evidence of Jamal’s business card which husband Jim O’Brock located in late January, 2002 wherein Jamal spelled his name differently as “Mohammad Jamal” as opposed to “Mohamad Jamal”).

For a second time, Jamal wished to meet at his Eastwood on the Bayou townhouse. On all three of his visits to Jamal, Graham entered through the parking lot entrance, which is (official address) 3521 East Lake Drive 71105.

JAMAL’S LANDLORDS WITNESS GRAHAM’S VISIT

Graham and Jamal talked business for fifteen minutes or so. Then, the landlords, Debbie and Sam Huggins (fictitious names), entered the townhouse. Sam said he remembered Graham from church a few years ago at The Christian Center. Graham vaguely recalled meeting Sam.

Sam excused himself and Jamal to the kitchen. They proceeded with a quiet discussion while standing next to the three boxes marked (1) NAWAF ALHAZMI, (2) KHALID ALMIHDHAR, and (3) FAYEZ BANIHAMMAD. Debbie and David remained in the living room making small talk for ten minutes; then, Sam and Jamal rejoined David and Debbie. Five minutes later, Sam and Debbie left the townhouse, with a cordial goodbye.

Sam and Debbie dropping by on or about Tuesday, 3 Oct 2000, to visit with their tenant, Mohammad Jamal Khan, carries the importance of corroborating the fact that I was actually in Jamal’s rented townhouse during that time-frame. Having talked with Sam on several occasions since that time, Sam repeats that the entire Jamal episode is quite unnerving to he and Debbie, and he does not wish to discuss it any more because his father (Jewish faith) would be upset if discovering that Sam had rented to Jamal. JAMAL’S ENLIGHTENING CAR RIDE IN SHREVEPORT

Jamal gave Graham a ride around Shreveport, with Jamal devoting a considerable part of the trip trying to convince Graham to postpone starting his (Graham’s) AdvaLife company. Jamal said he could make Graham tons of money by Graham investing $25,000.00 to $50,000.00 in Jamal’s purported textile company without Graham lifting a finger.

En route, Jamal pointed to the large white cargo truck (the size of a large moving truck) marked “For Sale” and parked on the east side of the street in approximately the 3400 block of Youree Drive, Shreveport. Jamal said he needed that truck, but the owner of USA CASH (who Graham later discovers to be Ray Hughes, Jr.) wanted to buy a newer truck as an investment with Jamal.

Jamal said the owner of USA CASH had already invested over ten thousand ($10,000.00) dollars and will provide Jamal with more funds. Hughes lived at 3522 East Lake Drive, Shreveport, LA 71105, across the driveway from Jamal; Hughes’ rented townhouse was owned by Walter and Doris Lang (names changed), who were friends of Sam and Debbie. Graham’s opinion was that both the Huggins and the Langs were fine, upstanding landlords who merely needed tenants.

GRAHAM WORRIES OVER THE CARGO TRUCK

Back to the used white truck Jamal wanted to purchase: Graham immediately envisioned a repeat of the horrific Oklahoma City-style bombing on the Barksdale AFB B-52 flightline, since Jamal had access to Barksdale Air Force Base through his girlfriends stationed at Barksdale AFB, women whom Jamal showered with jewelry (from his former kiosk business at Pierre Bossier Mall in Bossier City).

Additionally, former U.S. Air Force Captain Graham was well-schooled in Vietnam, having seen enemy satchel charges and rockets exploded on U.S. aircraft at Bien Hoa Air Base flight line. Graham did not want a repeat performance with bombings at Barksdale.

JUMPING TO CONCLUSIONS ?

Some weeks later, I discovered that Jamal was also getting dates for “other Arabs” with women stationed at Barksdale, which meant that “more than Jamal” had access to the sprawling U.S. base. Beginnings of some type of plot? Am I merely thinking conspiratorially?

Worst case scenario: Paint a sign on the large truck such as “Barksdale Laundry Service” and check through the West Gate of Barksdale Air Force Base. Ease along at 10 mph straight toward the B-52 flight line. Three blocks away, put the pedal to the metal and crash through the flight line gate at 70 mph. Varoom!! The truck bombing takes out four B-52s, heavily damaging three more, destroys two huge hangars, taking sixteen American lives with eighteen seriously injured! Very scary thought. Today, I understand security is extremely tighter at all entrance gates and near the B-52s.

The truck bombing scenario was envisioned so plausibly, I entertained the thought of immediately calling the Shreveport FBI. As a civilian, I was faced with a heavy decision: Should I hang out with Jamal and dig deeper, since I had established Jamal’s trust, or should I call the FBI at this point. It was apparent that our solid relationship warranted gathering more information; but the thought of seeing a Barksdale truck-bombing on the evening news was giving me sleepless nights.

Well, I made the choice which I would never recommend to another U.S. citizen. I postponed calling the FBI, and was extremely fortunate that nothing happened to Barksdale in the interim. Nervous days followed.

JAMAL HAS ACCESS TO BARKSDALE AFB

Shortly, while on said trip around Shreveport, Jamal got a call from one of the women from Barksdale whom he was dating. The surprise call had Jamal grinning from ear to ear as he whispered sweet nothings. Graham and Jamal proceeded to Jamal’s townhouse in the Eastwood on the Bayou complex, as usual entering through the parking lot entrance. Jamal mentions the noisy, arguing neighbors living in 3519 East Lake Drive; Jamal thinks it may be some guy and his girlfriend.

It was not until October, 2003 that I discovered from 3519 East Lake landlord, Jack Smothers (fictitious name), that one of Smother’s tenants during October, 2000 was allegedly an Smothers also owned the townhouse at 3523 East Lake Drive, located immediately to the west side of Jamal, occupant allegedly being . Since these folks lived next door to Jamal, the FBI is well advised to interview these folks, including Smothers, any of whom could provide valuable information about Jamal’s visitors during October, 2000.

JAMAL: “COFFEE-COCKTAIL” FOR GRAHAM

After Dr. Graham faked some business talk and began to exit, Jamal offered a parting cup of coffee, and Graham accepted. Jamal tossed Graham a magazine at the end of the kitchen table, saying it would only take a few minutes to make the coffee. Buried in his article, Graham paid little attention to Jamal’s small talk as he flapped his jaws while facing the sink. Gently placing Graham’s coffee cup on the table, Jamal then chose to sit at the opposite end of the rectangular breakfast table, causing Graham to wonder if Jamal was going to break out the candles next.

Jamal began to tell how international trade can involve scam artists. Taking a sip of coffee, Graham asked Jamal to provide his best example of an international scam deal. Jamal began by saying that after the product sale is closed, a supplier ships the product after a modest down payment. Graham began to feel drugged after two small sips of the hot coffee. Jamal talked rapidly while flashing a wide grin, saying that the products arrive, but the payment balance is not made immediately.

Graham’s head began to feel heavy, and he said he needed to go. At this point, Graham unquestionably knew he had been sedated. Jamal continued, saying that the third-world country “political appraiser” would devalue the products. The supplier would then be offered about twenty per cent of the original agreement, or the seller had the option to pay for shipping the product back to the U.S. Laughingly, Jamal says most Americans do not pay to have the product shipped home and get screwed out of 80 per cent of the money.

At this point, I was truly baffled. In my drowsy condition, I worried that Jamal could be planning to attack me personally ~ physically or otherwise? How was I to head off Jamal’s ploy? Lord, provide guidance.

Graham had long-since masqueraded drinking the coffee, by only touching his lips to the coffee cup rim and tilting the cup. Suddenly, the answer to Graham’s dilemma! Treat Jamal like you would a growling dog. Jumping to his feet, Graham pointed his finger straight at Jamal’s face and quickly stated that he would call Jamal later about the Friday night Evangel-Airline football game in Bossier City. As planned, Jamal was temporarily startled, and Graham, though groggy, managed to exit quickly while concentrating on every clumsy step out to the parking lot.

THE SEDATION THEORY

David’s friend Steve McCall later theorized that Jamal had in mind copying Graham’s credit cards, after Graham passed out, in an effort to extract funds at a later date. Brother Steve was possibly right on target!

After escaping Jamal’s townhouse, with head spinning, I drove my forest green ’94 Acura the one mile back to my residence. It was a battle just to get myself inside and hit the bed.

The recovery nap lasted almost three hours. Upon awakening, and after shaking the Jamal-inspired sedation, I had lots to think about. For certain, I now knew Jamal was no run-of-the-mill immigrant. He was up to no good – big time no good! I had a choice. Either avoid Jamal altogether, or hang out long enough to see what made this guy tick. I chose to hang out. But since Jamal just drugged me, how could I cautiously travel with him to the Airline High-Evangel Christian Academy football game next Friday night? SECTION 4

Airline vs. Evangel Football Game

October 6, 2000: Airline High vs. Evangel Christian Academy football game: Days before the “coffee-cocktail,” Shreveport’s Evangel Christian Academy (1999 USA

National Champions in football) was the carrot that Graham dangled before Jamal. A FETUS SAVES THE DAY

However, after enduring Jamal’s coffee drugging, Graham was obviously not excited about hosting Jamal to the promised football game. Certainly not alone. Well, Scott Winston (name changed) called Graham on the Friday afternoon of the ball game. Since his wife was sickly from being pregnant, Winston offered to pick up some guys in his Suburban for the game at Airline Stadium in Bossier City.

Since I had avoided contacting Jamal about the game, Scott’s call on Friday afternoon was perfect timing. Safety in numbers!

JAMAL’S FOOTBALL EXPERIENCE

Scott Winston and his cowboy friend dropped by Dr. Graham’s dental clinic to pick up Graham, Michael Steiger (name changed) and Jamal in Winston’s Suburban. At the game, Winston, “Tex,” and Steiger did not wish to be seen with Jamal, with his blondish- dyed albino hair and black eyeliner. In the ticket line, fans were buzzing about Jamal’s strange appearance (with the dark eyeliner). Retired Shreveport Fireman Bud Williams screamed across half the stadium for David to join him for the game. Graham sat directly in front of Bud while Jamal sat next to Graham, in front of Bud’s pal Carter Anderson. Bud, a Jonathan Winters look-alike, wasted no time donning his comedian persona.

Bud Williams had a new butt-of-the-joke victim, and Bud’s victim was Jamal. Corny stuff the English would simply love. Bud began with his double-sided blank business card, telling Jamal that business was slow. Just before half-time, Bud said he forgot his money at home, and asked Jamal to cash a small check. Jamal looked at me in bewilderment as Bud pulls out a copier-reduced check about one inch long by one-half inch. In the Third Quarter, Bud centered on his wife becoming maxed-out-beautiful after forty-five years in paradise with him. And, no, Jamal didn’t slip a sedative in my Dr. Pepper.

JAMAL’S POST-GAME INVITATION

Believe me, Bud Williams had thoroughly befriended Jamal. Before the game ended, Carter invited Jamal and Graham to attend his Sunday morning class at the Friendship House behind First Assembly of God Church. Jamal acted excited about the invitation, so Graham promised Carter that he and Jamal would be there in the next couple of weeks.

After the game, Graham and Jamal were dropped off by Winston at Graham’s dental clinic. Fresh from sampling Jamal’s coffee-cocktail, Graham was skeptical about being with Jamal and made sure that he and Jamal remained outside the clinic for a few minutes of conversation. Jamal then invited Graham back to his townhouse for business talks the next day. At first, Graham had mixed emotions about accepting. But after promising himself not to accept any refreshments or snacks, Graham accepted Jamal’s third invitation to visit at Jamal’s townhouse.

SIDEBAR: BREVITY HAS ITS ADVANTAGES ~ DAD’S REUNION

This being a short chapter coupled with Shakespeare noting that any treatise cries for a bit of comic relief, I relate a short story involving my late father.

In late May, 1981, Dad called me on the tele bright and early one morning to beg me to drive him and Mom to his last reunion at the Mizpah Methodist Church in South Carolina. Dad was 89 years young at the time. Having previously accompanied Dad on several of his reunions, I recalled that the settlement of Mizpah had long-since been deserted by residents.

My mind quickly ventured to the little Methodist church with arched windows and green roof ~ and a porch on both front and back ~ a church build by my Dad’s grandfather. And how could I forget the gorgeous towering, moss-laden oak trees hovering over tombstones of sundry shapes and sizes, sporting numerous family names of Graham and Kirkland.

Then, too, years earlier I had met my gorgeous second cousin from St. Louis. Sure, Dad and Mom, let’s take off for South Carolina!

TWO FIVE-MINUTE TALKS

Mizpah Methodist Church was devoid of air-conditioning and eight large overhead fans stirred the hot air on this June day; but everyone had a wooden-handled hand-fan with a picture of Jesus on a hillside surrounded by white sheep. It was most adsuredly a scorcher inside that little Methodist church, like perhaps 90 degrees. But everyone was smiling ~ and generating lots of carpal tunnel with those hand-fans flappin’.

We were meeting in the church-house to hear three five-minute speeches: a young attorney represented the young people; one of my pretty blonde 50-year-old cousins representing the middle aged; and my father would carry the baton to the finish line while representing the very mature attendees. In creative fashion (tongue in cheek), they were all three asked to speak on the same subject: “What the reunion means to me.” Each speaker was asked to stand next to the pulpit, in succession, where a traditional microphone, with stand, was ready to go. The young attorney was lively, quite amusing, and kept his audience for the full five minutes. My cuz also did a great job, relating how she was astounded by each reunion getting better and better ~ if only we could air-condition this place! Her last statement brought a round of energized applause. By this time, about two hundred aunts, uncles, cousins, and want-a-bees were profusely sweating in their Sunday best. And they were about to endure one more hot 5-minute talk ~ from my Dad.

DAD’S “5-MINUTE TALK”

After being introduced as a successful real estate man from Shreveport who had started countless Methodist churches, Dad, with cane in hand, quite slowly and methodically struggled toward the old wooden altar. The fans fanned faster, and one could almost hear the restless crowd thinking, “Wow, we’ll scorch before old man Graham raps himself around that mike, much less endure his 5-minute talk that will undoubtedly be in a whisper ~ wish I had waited under the old oak tree.”

Dad accepted the mike from the handsome Methodist pastor, looked the crowd straight in the eye for ten long seconds, and surprisingly bellowed in his strong bass voice:

“What the reunion means to me! When a man is 89 years old and travels seventeen hundred miles for his reunion ~ folks, the facts speak for themselves!”

Quickly handing the mike back to the pastor, Dad’s cane first touched the floor as the stunned, yet appreciative, crowd suddenly broke out in thunderous applause.

Morale of the story: In certain situations, brevity can be almost divine. So, please resist demeaning my short chapters. In return, hopefully the reader will find it rewarding.

BACK TO OUR STORY

In October, 2000 it had been disconcerting to envision being the victim of a vicious physical attack by Jamal should he have a pugnacious foray up his sleeve. And, let’s not chase the rabbit dealing with his very strange demeanor of heavy black eyeliner. Quite frankly, the black, kohl eyeliner looked – well, never mind.

FOOTBALL GAME HELPS TO “DATE” THE STORY

Many months later, in the “Graham-Khan Videotape filmed on March 8, 2003,” Jamal agreed with me that the day I met Nawaf Alhazmi and Fayez Banihammad in his (Jamal’s) townhouse was probably the day after the Evangel Christian Academy vs. Airline High School football game which was played on October 6, 2000. Thus, I was able to recall the “on or about 7 Oct 2000 date” for my third business meeting at Jamal’s townhouse. SECTION 5

Day Three: Graham Meets Alhazmi & Banihammad

FLASHBACK: “SENSING THE ENEMY” IN VIETNAM

In any war, one must be able to identify his or her enemy. Sounds easy, but can be one of the most difficult problems facing the soldier, airman, sailor, or marine ~ and, yes, especially today, that includes the Coast Guard. My year in Vietnam was certainly no exception.

In 1967-68, Bien Hoa Air Base was the busiest airport in the world, with a mix of fighting aircraft (C-123s, F-100s, C-130s, C-47s, Huey Choppers, etc.) and commercial airliners transporting troops to and from the U.S. mainland, Hawaii, Hong Kong, Australia, and other R & R locations. I enjoyed the activity ~ not the death ~ but all the action was exciting.

MEDCAP: PACIFICATION PROGRAM

As a dentist attached to the 3rd Air Force Dispensary, one could remain fairly safe, if remaining on base, except for the not-so-uncommon rocket attacks around 10:15 p.m. But my being an inquisitive country boy, the Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP) offered the perfect opportunity for off-base adventure through the Pacification Program with medical treatment for the outlying Vietnamese populace. It was designed to demonstrate to the Vietnamese people that we were their friends.

Housing at Bien Hoa Air Base was reminiscent of a miniature chicken farm, with the screened tin-roofed, shotgun-shaped huts all in a row ~ commonly called “the hooches.” Sitting around our 8’ by 17’ hooch “living room” at night, Dental Commander Major Cecil Brown indoctrinated Captain John Maressa, Captain Bill Keaton, and me on the objectives, procedural guidelines, local customs, and dangers related to being active in MEDCAP.

Cecil emphasized the difficulty in identifying the enemy in Vietnam ~ might even be a young boy who could toss a hand grenade into your slow-moving jeep, if caught up in the frequent traffic jams near bridges. And, of course, friendly Vietnamese in South Vietnam were almost identical to the Viet Cong, except, perhaps the Viet Cong would be wearing more of the black pajama variety of clothing. But the Vietnamese all looked alike facially since they descended from similar bloodlines. A problem, for sure.

MEDCAP: MY FORTE Appointed Chief of Prosthetics early on, I became a MEDCAP leader and had the opportunity to routinely treat patients in eleven hamlets, in two South Vietnamese refugee camps, in two schools, and at Father Berset’s Ben San Leprosarium.

Our Bien Hoa MEDCAP Team traveled to each destination by either Huey Chopper or jeep, with portions of the trip occasionally necessitating a sanpan boating to an island hamlet. Almost without exception, the Vietnamese villagers loved to see us coming ~ lots of big smiles and with excited children grabbing my hand while screaming, “Da- we! Da-we!” which meant “Captain! Captain!”

To me, every MEDCAP trip offered new excitement. If traveling by Huey, the chopper pilots would rock-and-roll us between the palms that lined the Dong Nai River. The object was to keep the enemy off-balance if preparing to take a shot at the chopper. In the process, it made for exhilarating rides over the beautiful, lush countryside ~ that is, where the forest defoliation program had not reached.

FACE-TO-FACE WITH THE “VIET CONG”

This day would bring more excitement than I bargained for. Thirteen miles from Bien Hoa Air Base was our MEDCAP hamlet of Binh Co. The young U.S. Army Warrant Officer had given us a memorable ride. The yellow flared landing area was uncharacteristically almost one-quarter-mile from the village. And, after dropping off my team, the Army chopper darted closely over the bushes as it quickly vacated the area, then shot skyward in one big burst ~ all characteristic of being in a dangerous war zone. The chopper pilots action set the scene for what was ahead.

The Airmen grabbed heavy medical supply boxes and we headed to the hamlet. About fifty yards down the dusty road, black pajamas began to slowly emerge from both sides of the underbrush. Even more young men slivered from the bushes, with glaring eyes and frightful expressions. I could hear mumbling Airmen to the rear. Quick discernment said this was the Viet Cong (VC) ~ named “Charlie” by the Allied Forces. My wheels were turning on how to save my Airmen from certain death.

Airman Second Class Dennis Fisher, a sharp 20-year-old Texan, worked his way to my right side: “Doc, did they leave us in a VC camp?”

“Fisher, sure looks like we’ll spend the day in the big middle of Charlie.” “We won’t be trying to shoot our way out of here, will we?” DEALING WITH “CHARLIE”

“No. No. Look, Dennis, pass the word: No one touches his trigger ~ and every Airman must act unconcerned when we reach the village. The next part will not be easy: Tell Sarge to instruct everyone to lay down their weapons when we reach the hamlet and set up for clinic ~ just like always. That’s our best bet to get out of Binh Co alive. We’re gonna’ beat the VC by treating the VC. Let’s take that chance. Got it?” “Yes, sir. They have us far outnumbered. Sounds like the best thing to do.”

The Airmen followed the plan perfectly ~ looked like they were setting up for a Sunday picnic. As overhead clouds darkened, the Village Chief was reverently presenting the aging papa-san as our first patient. Respect for the elderly. With twisted cane in hand, and goatee reaching his navel, papa-san sat in one of the few village chairs.

As my local anesthetic began to numb his lower lip, large droplets of rain quickly accelerated in rhythm. Without warning, forty mile-an-hour horizontal winds joined the foray! Most everyone took flight to the little thatched houses, but papa-san wanted his treatment ~ now.

In the middle of his dental care, the high winds had papa-san’s long goatee whipping my face like a wet horse’s tail. We were both drenched, but maintained our doctor- patient relationship until, finally, his decayed lower bicuspid decided it was time to give it up.

As the rain subsided, papa-san energetically slapped his cane three times into the mud, and with a nod of his head, said I had performed well and he was ready to go. Walking the old man slowly back, Dennis Fisher opened the front door and began a slow applause. The Village Chief quickly led others into thunderous cheers, with papa-san and I treated like we just won an Oscar.

Fisher then lined up our pediatric patients, utilizing a long cypress log as my dental chair. As per usual with kids around the world, the baby-sans were amused by their numbing lips. Fifty-five extractions later, the horrendous rains returned, sending us for cover.

With time on their hands, the young VC became restless, disturbing frowns filling the rooms. Danger was in the air. And it was almost 1700 hours, and no chopper in sight. The Texan to the rescue ~ in a very simple way. Pulling up his fatigue shirt, Fisher began showing three kids how to rub their bellies while chanting, “HO, HO, HO!” The Village Chief joined, so three minutes later, all but a few sculling VC joined in the chant. Simple, but, thankfully, quite effective for the occasion.

“Flutter ~ flutter ~ flutter” began to dominate the air. Best sounds I ever heard! Opening the front door, the clouds looked like the Red Sea opening for Moses, as the brave pilot brought the beautiful little Huey to our doorstep. Quick load. No shots were fired as we departed. Thank you, Jesus. Glancing down from five hundred feet, I could almost hear the kids screaming “HO, HO, HO” as they rubbed their little tummies. Then it dawned on us. We made it out safely ~ Yes!!

THE CRUEL AFTERMATH War is no playground. War is worse than nasty, it is brutal. Yes, war is hell.

Combined military intelligence deemed that Binh Co had been a significant supply route for enemy transport of Russian rockets already fired on Bien Hoa Air Base and the city of Bien Hoa. Intelligence said that more rockets were heading down Ho Chi Minh Trail. Remedy: The Binh Co Viet Cong ~ the Village Chief ~ Papa-san ~ the women and children ~ the entire Viet Cong camp was eliminated by U.S. firepower. Bottom line: Avoid the horrors of war unless the threat to peace (astronomically) warrants otherwise.

LESSONS LEARNED

Not only is it important to recognize your enemy, it is equally as imperative to know how to deal with him once he is discovered. The saga of Binh Co had taught lessons which would be put to use over thirty years later ~ in our story.

ONE “ BIG DAY” IN OUR STORY

On or about October 7, 2000: Encounter with two (future) 9-11 hijackers and those allegedly harboring and supporting them. This was the “Big Day.” Again, the “business meeting” was at Jamal’s residence, apparently the only place where Jamal was comfortable. Again, Jamal began his diatribe advising Graham that Graham should invest with Jamal, with Graham making big money without lifting a finger, and that Graham should postpone his AdvaLife business.

SURPRISED ARRIVALS

After Graham and Jamal had talked for about twenty minutes, three men wearing turbans and off-color-white Muslim jackets marched (unannounced) through the back door into Jamal’s kitchen. The taller, middle one (of the three) was Dr. Mohammed Habeeb Ahmed, the dental patient of Dr. Graham’s who had shown an interest in being part of the “Gum Disease Potentially Linked to Cardiovascular Disease” study.

Upon seeing his dentist with Jamal, Habeeb was shocked and visibly perturbed to the extent of almost falling to the floor. Habeeb’s reaction led Graham to recognize his patient, but Graham struggled to immediately remember his name. Habeeb finally relaxed after Graham said that he and Jamal were talking business; Jamal chimed in saying Dr. Graham might invest $25,000.00 with Jamal (which Graham had no intention of doing). Graham ignored Jamal’s investment statement, asking Habeeb about his two friends. Notwithstanding Habeeb’s demeanor worrying Graham, he remained excited to meet the two apparent middle-Easterners.

TWO YOUNG ARABS INTRODUCED AS DOCTORS

The two shorter middle-Eastern men were introduced by Jamal and Habeeb as medical doctors. Fayez Banihammad was introduced (Habeeb speaking, with Jamal nodding approval) as a Resident from LSU Medical Center in Shreveport, and Nawaf Alhazmi was introduced (Jamal speaking, with Habeeb nodding approval) as a medical doctor from Chicago who would be staying with Jamal for four to five weeks while taking course(s) at LSU Medical Center. Fayez and Nawaf showed no emotion before, during, or after being introduced, other than Nawaf’s intense, never-ending stare that penetrated straight through Graham.

PRETTY EYES OF INTIMIDATION

Since Nawaf had entered the room following closely behind Habeeb, Nawaf had a clear view of Habeeb’s shocked reaction upon seeing Graham there, so Nawaf apparently took offense to Graham’s presence. Nawaf, whom Graham later refers to as “Pretty Eyes,” could not answer questions posed by Graham, appearing to be unable to answer in English.

After eight to ten minutes of Nawaf Alhazmi’s burning, intimidating stare at Graham, Jamal suggested to Nawaf that he (Nawaf) might want to go upstairs to rest awhile. Nawaf did go upstairs, glaring back at Graham as he (Nawaf) ascended the stairs.

JAMAL’S FATHER VISITED USAMA BIN LADEN

About five minutes later, Jamal looked straight at Dr. Mohammed Habeeb Ahmed and related, speaking loudly in English, that his (Jamal’s) father recently visited Usama bin Laden. With no words spoken, Habeeb disgustingly leaned his head to one side as if to imply that Jamal was the dumbest brain on earth for making such a statement in Graham’s presence. Graham felt in danger, so in order to act neutral, Graham asked Jamal what his family really thought about bin Laden, since television programs said negative things.

Jamal said, “The TV lies. Bin Laden is a nice guy, a great businessman who makes lots of money, and bin Laden has friends and contacts all over the world.”

Added danger gripped Graham, so Graham casually left Jamal’s place about fifteen minutes later for a contrived dental emergency, never to return to Jamal’s townhouse.

Since those hearing this account invariably ask me why did Jamal speak to Habeeb in English when telling Habeeb that his father had visited bin Laden, a bit of explanation is in order. Being a Muslim from India, no doubt Habeeb spoke a dialect only familiar to someone from his area of India (and not on the same page with Jamal). Though Jamal claims to speak several languages, he and Habeeb are quite fluent in English, despite Jamal’s moderately heavy accent. So, Jamal and Habeeb’s best common language was English. And with his charismatic personality, Jamal simply blurted out the reference to Usama bin Laden without thinking. Moreover, I doubt that Jamal thought I had a deep understanding of bin Laden being the founder of Al-Qaeda. Besides, for whatever reason, Jamal apparently trusted me explicitly. It appeared that all the groundwork in befriending Jamal was paying off.

GUESS WHO CAME TO JAMAL’S

Later discovered facts surrounding Jamal and Habeeb’s two Arab friends on or about October 7, 2000:

David Malcolm Graham was an eye-witness to Mohammad Jamal Khan (aliases Mohamad Jamal, Mohammad Jamal, Jamal Khan, others) harboring and supporting Nawaf Alhazmi (hijacker of American Airlines Flt 77 which hit the Pentagon), and additionally, to Jamal harboring and supporting Fayez Banihammad (hijacker of United Airlines Flt 175 which hit the World Trade Center south tower). Mohammed Habeeb Ahmed, MD did recommend for Jamal to harbor Nawaf Alhazmi and Fayez Banihammad as well as Habeeb gave, or lent, Jamal five hundred ($500.00) dollars to assist Jamal in caring for both Nawaf Alhazmi and Fayez Banihammad (and perhaps Khalid Almihdhar).

Jamal harbored American Airlines Flt 77 hijacker Nawaf Alhazmi during October, 2000, and probably well into Nov, 2000, and Jamal harbored and supported United Airlines Flt 175 hijacker Fayez Banihammad on or about 7 Oct 2000 for several days.

HOW HABEEB ALLEGEDLY HELPED 9/11 TERRORISTS

Mohammad Jamal Khan’s friend, Mohammed Habeeb Ahmed, MD (alias Mohomed Habeeb Ahmed, MD), a Cardiology resident at LSU Medical Center (now called LSU Health Science Center), did (but not limited to) refer future hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Fayez Banihammad to Jamal for harbor and support. Both aforementioned videotapes corroborated Habeeb’s referrals of Alhazmi and Banihammad to Jamal, as well as Habeeb giving (or lending) Jamal $500.00 to help take care of Nawaf Alhazmi and Fayez Banihammad. Habeeb states on the Graham-Habeeb videotape that Habeeb had met both Nawaf and Fayez at the Mosque (said Mosque being Masjid Al-Noor, owned by Islamic Association of Shreveport and located at 3769Youree Drive; Shreveport, LA 71109).

FOLLOW-THROUGH ON AN AGREEMENT

Since I had agreed (during the Airline High vs. Evangel Christian Academy football game) to take Jamal to Carter Anderson’s class at The Friendship House, I had to follow through or else Jamal would suspect I was avoiding him. Believe me, at this point it was extremely difficult to stay on course for more information.

After all, let’s review individual situations and statements having taken place in the previous couple of weeks: (1) Jamal was dating women on Barksdale AFB and loved traversing the base; (2) Jamal desperately wanted to purchase a large, white used cargo-style truck with a “For Sale” sign and parked on Youree Drive near Squire’s Tux Rentals; (3) Unquestionably, Jamal tried to drug me with the “coffee mix” drink; (4) After entering Jamal’s townhouse through the kitchen door while escorting two young Mid-easterners, Habeeb almost fainted upon seeing me with Jamal, indicating Habeeb was obviously upset about my seeing him escorting Nawaf Alhazmi and Fayez Banihammad into Jamal’s residence; (5) two young middle-eastern men were introduced as medical doctors and I discerned that neither was a doctor, which meant Jamal and Habeeb had fabricated the “doctor stories” in order to distract me from their true mission; (6) Jamal told Habeeb of his (Jamal’s) father recently visiting Usama bin Laden. Oh, boy ~ the makings of a dangerous relationship.

At this point, I felt as if I was the only person on planet Earth capable of getting more info out of Jamal and Habeeb. And much of what I had already uncovered spelled trouble for U.S. security. There was simply no way I could dodge my responsibility to see it through. Only a few more days, and it’s off to the FBI. The follow-through paid off.

Though Dr. Graham thought he had plenty of information to turn over to the FBI at this point, he decided to befriend Jamal a while longer in order to extract more suspicious information from Jamal. Graham’s persistence was rewarded on several new fronts.

(In retrospect, since 9/11 Mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed stated during his interrogation that he was emailing through chat-rooms to Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar while Nawaf and Almihdhar traveled around the U.S., there is a strong likelihood that Nawaf Alhazmi, and perhaps Khalid Almihdhar, was receiving emails from Khalid Sheikh Mohammed while Alhazmi and Banihammad, and perhaps Almihdhar, were hosted by Mohammad Jamal Khan in Shreveport during the weeks surrounding October, 2000.)

9/11 RINGLEADERS EMAIL AT SHREVEPORT’S “USA CASH”

With almost certainty, emailing was accomplished at Jamal’s favorite business hang- out, USA CASH located at 779 Shreveport-Barksdale Highway in Shreveport, Louisiana 71105. Jamal was hanging out there (with Alhazmi living with him) during October, 2000 and into November, 2000 doing his emailing and faxing “around the world.” Additionally, Jamal was correct when telling me that he was “a very important person.” What a shame that a likeable fellow had such a misguided allegiance.

USS COLE BOMBING INTERRUPTS GRAHAM

Since I was shell-shocked by the events on or about 7 Oct 2000 at Jamal’s, I hesitated to call Jamal for a few days. Then, on 12 Oct 2000, as I was about to give Jamal a shout, lo and behold, Fox News Flash stated the horrific bombing of the USS Cole Navy ship in Yemen’s Aden Harbor. Usama bin Laden was implicated. Man, now I had a renewed interest in being extremely cautious when associating with Jamal.

So, after building my courage over the next couple of days, on or about Saturday, 14 Oct 2000, I called Jamal about joining me to attend Carter Anderson’s class at the Friendship House behind First Assembly. Jamal was excited in accepting my invitation. Neither Jamal nor I mentioned the USS Cole bombing or bin Laden. SECTION 6 Jamal Befriended at Church

A PROMISE FULFILLED

On or about October 15, 2000: Graham and Jamal go to church

CORRECTION: After careful review of sermon tapes of Pastor Denny Duron, this date of October 15, 2000, is the “on or about” date of the Graham-Jamal church visit to First Assembly of God, Shreveport, LA (and not the “on or about Oct 8, 2000 date” which was previously given to agents and/or www.ifccfbi.gov and/or Office of Homeland Security).

Carter Anderson’s Class at the Friendship House began at 8:30 a.m. with highlights of Evangel football. Shortly after 9:00, Graham introduced Jamal as someone having been reared in a much different society, but wanted to keep an open mind today. Jamal nodded in agreement while flashing a broad smile. Carter performed admirably, being quite sensitive toward Jamal. After class, Jamal expressed his appreciation for the cordial guys at the Friendship House. Then, David and Jamal crossed the north parking lot toward the main sanctuary.

JAMAL’S ALLEGED IMPLICATING BUSINESS CARD

Surprisingly, Dr. Graham’s friend Brenda O’Brock was a church greeter on the north entrance of First Assembly, so he and Jamal spent 4-5 minutes conversing with Brenda, followed by Jamal giving her his Global Textile Industry, Inc. business card.

Inside the sanctuary, the Cathedral of Praise Choir was well into the first praise song as Dr. Graham and Mohammad Jamal took their seats. Jamal had been properly welcomed at Carter Anderson’s Class at the Friendship House, so he was at ease in the big church service with over 2,500 in attendance.

PROPHETIC MESSAGE

Ironically, Pastor Denny Duron’s message was entitled “Thou Shall Not Murder.” To paraphrase: Denny began saying murder did not include killing animals for food; we are not commanded to be vegetarians. Forms of murder, Duron emphatically pointed out, would include suicide, euthanasia, abortion, and the killing of innocent human beings. Under certain circumstances, capital punishment is taught in the Holy Bible. He basically said that through salvation offered by Jesus’ sacrifice on the Cross and his Resurrection from the grave, the deeds of an evil heart, and guilt, can be forgiven and be replaced, through the Holy Spirit, with a heart of compassion and love. Pastor Duron’s opening remarks could easily have been his close. Paraphrasing other remarks: “America may be punished for her modern-day sins ... It’s right to fight to stop the spread of evil ... God wants justice in this world ... Justice must be implemented, and it must be swift.”

Looking back, Graham is numbed by the message Jamal heard that day. As Graham and Jamal socialized in the foyer after church, (who was filming the service from overhead platform at the back of sanctuary and spotted Jamal sitting with Dr. Graham), knew of Jamal being a

company, which shall go unnamed), and warned Graham by sending Scott Winston to alert Graham with concerns about Jamal. Graham told Winston to call him later that night, because that morning was set aside for spiritual matters.

Later, in early 2002, Graham obtained five pages of notes made by , as had performed a business investigation for his company, showing several people allegedly (Since Shreveport FBI Agent Ray Spoon again did not return Dr. Graham’s page, highlights of these notes were forwarded by Graham to www.ifccfbi.gov.) business risk (since Bobby had done a 2-day investigation into Jamal’s business dealings months earlier when Jamal wished to do business with his SECTION 7

Graham’s First Corroboration

On or about October 15, 2000: Michael Steiger (name changed) became a corroborating witness

CHILI’S RESTAURANT IN SHREVEPORT

As Graham and Jamal pulled out of First Assembly parking lot, Michael Steiger, a representative who had just left services at Shreveport’s Broadmoor Baptist Church, called Graham on his cell phone and wanted to meet for lunch. Twelve minutes later, Graham and Jamal and Steiger had lunch at Chili’s Restaurant in Shreveport, located at the NW corner of Youree Drive and E.70th Street (Steiger was specific about not using his real name in the book, so, as with several other individuals in this story, Graham is respecting the request to substitute a fictitious name).

As the meal began, and with little prompting from Graham, Jamal told Then, Michael’s eyes

pop out of his head when Jamal tells Michael

CORROBORATION BY SWORN AFFIDAVIT

(NOTE: In spring, 2002, Michael Steiger signed a Sworn Affidavit, witnessed and notarized, stating that Mohammad Jamal Khan did, on or about Oct 15, 2000 in Shreveport’s Chili’s Restaurant, tell

Said Sworn Affidavit was given to a smiling Shreveport FBI Special Agent-in-Charge Mike Kinder in the presence of David M. Graham)

I accompanied Michael Steiger (name changed) to the Shreveport FBI Office in downtown Shreveport the day he turned in his Sworn Affidavit to FBI Agent-in- Charge Mike Kinder. As is the usual procedure, Kinder escorted Steiger and me into a small one-desk room for the interview. After answering a few preliminary questions, Steiger was forthright about his hearing Jamal telling him “face-to-face” that

Steiger was then quick to say that all he knew was in the Affidavit, and that he knew nothing about the rest of my report (which was the truth ~ Michael Steiger absolutely did not know anything else for certain, only what I had related to him during

, which meant that anything else Steiger might say would be “hearsay” and counterproductive in court). his father lives in Pakistan up by the China Wall over by Russia. bin Laden” and that “Jamal’s father lives in Pakistan up by the China Wall over by that his (Jamal’s) father recently visited Love that “Jamal’s father had recently visited Usama Russia”. by Love Jamal’s father had visited bin Laden recently and, additionally, that Jamal’s dad lived in northwest Pakistan.

endless meals during breakfast at George’s Grill on East Kings Highway in

Shreveport). THE QUESTION OF A POLYGRAPH

Steiger then asked Agent Kinder why the Shreveport FBI had not required me (Graham) to take a Polygraph (lie detector) Test, since Steiger said a former FBI agent from Florida had told him that if the FBI did not ask for a Polygraph, they must not believe Graham. Kinder then set the record straight.

Shreveport FBI Agent-in-Charge Mike Kinder smiled while telling Steiger forthrightly that the FBI had no reason to doubt my story and, in fact, the FBI believed The Graham Report to be the absolute truth and that he did not believe I wanted anything out of disclosing the information in my account. I then supported Kinder’s statement, followed by my offering, one more time, to take a Polygraph. Kinder restated that it would not be necessary.

Later, a knowledgeable friend (with former Top Secret clearance) shared the theory that the FBI did not give me a Polygraph Test in order to keep out of the record the fact that I had passed the test. In that manner, security agencies appear less accountable for their inaction in investigating the names (especially the two 9/11 Ringleaders Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar) whom I turned in on my November 1, 2000 Graham Report to Shreveport FBI Agent Steve Hayes (to repeat, ten months before 9/11). Just a thought. You decide, while remembering the CIA was amiss in not placing Alhazmi and Almihdhar on the Watch List when having the chance in both January, 2000 and March, 2000, earlier in the same year of my report.

ONE KEY TO THIS BOOK

Of major significance, on October 17, 2002, National Security Association (NSA) Director Lt. General Michael Hayden testified before Congressional Open Hearings that security agencies had been informed of Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, and Nawaf’s brother, Salem Alhazmi, being in the terrorist group Al-Qaeda months before September 11, 2001.

Perhaps the leading questions of this book: Was General Hayden’s disclosure entered into the FBI computer system long before 9/11 ~ specifically, had the information reached the Shreveport FBI Office where I turned in the names of Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, and Fayez Banihammad on 1 Nov 2000? If not, who is accountable for such a major oversight?

So, by Graham waiting a few more days before calling the FBI, he was rewarded with Steiger’s Sworn Affidavit. In this case, a little patience paid off. Michael Steiger’s Sworn Affidavit had become an important piece of corroborative evidence.

On or about October 15, 2000, when Jamal , in Steiger’s presence, that , I thought it important to have another individual hear those words from Jamal’s lips. However, at the time, I had no inkling

of the full significance. again repeated Jamal’s father had recently visited bin Laden The plot thickens when, after 9/11 on October 5, 2001, I identified Nawaf Alhazmi (Pentagon crash) by FBI File Photo in USA Today, followed closely by my identification of Fayez Banihammad (WTC 2) through viewing the FBI File Photo in USA Today and www.foxnews.com and www.cnn.com, and the name Khalid Almihdhar (remembering the Thoroughbred Stallion named “Khaled” and the “hdh” in the last name reminiscent of a motor oil) from the dialogue in the same October 5, 2001 issue of USA Today wherein the article disclosed Khalid Almihdhar as Nawaf Alhazmi’s running buddy.

There was absolutely no doubt in my mind as to these three names being identical to the three names printed on three boxes (i.e., one name on each of three boxes) on Jamal’s kitchen floor as eye-witnessed by me on or about September 26, 2000 and on or about October 3, 2000 and on or about October 7, 2000.

After studying the 5 Oct 2001 issue of USA Today, I was certain, beyond any doubt, that I had met both Nawaf Alhazmi and Fayez Banihammad at Jamal’s townhouse on (or about) October 7, 2000 in the presence of both Mohammad Jamal Khan and Mohammed Habeeb Ahmed, MD. SECTION 8

Richard Clarke vs. Clinton Cabinet and the Gorelick Wall (Security from 1992-2000)

Throughout this journey, the reader will be blown away by the exponential deterioration of agencies involved with security of the United States during the 1990’s. What you are about to hear was gleaned from the pens of a former CIA agent, an advisor to several presidents on matters of national security, and award-winning investigative journalists and authors. The disturbing chronological review of highpoints follows:

LOUISIANA BACK-DROP: WADIH el-HAGE

In early 1990, the former University of Southwestern Louisiana (USL ~ renamed University of Louisiana-Lafayette) student named Wadih el-Hage was involved in the murder of Rasid Khalifa, a black Muslim cleric whose doctrine was deemed heretical by the fundamentalist group Al-Fuqra. Wadih el-Hage eventually moved to Arlington, Texas, then on to Brooklyn, NY, and much later becoming the personal secretary of terrorist leader Usama bin Laden.

RICHARD CLARKE vs THE CLINTON CABINET

As author of The Graham Report, I became increasingly intrigued by the security culture surrounding the defense of America. On numerous occasions, this same lack- luster attitude permeated high levels of the U.S. political structure. For our purposes, we will be looking at security highlights from the Clinton years 1992-2000, which, of course, immediately preceded my 1 Nov 2000 Graham Report to Shreveport FBI Agent Steve Hayes and followed approximately one week later by reporting to U.S. Secret Service Agent Ron Lewis.

American citizens will be disappointed by the Clinton administration’s treatment of recommendations by his National Security Advisor Richard Clarke (as taken from his book AGAINST ALL ENEMIES), who was guided by Top Secret discoveries. After seeing the sundry errors of commission and omission, the reader will realize why Graham Report(s) were either not properly analyzed and processed up the ladder to headquarters, or the Graham Report(s) were not properly cross-referenced with intelligence upon arrival at headquarters.

From Clarke and several other sources, revelations of President Clinton’s security failures provided critical pieces to the convoluted question of why the U.S. suffered the Al-Qaeda attacks on September 11, 2001. Assuredly, there is other blame to spread around. All the security snafus notwithstanding, we know who took the 3,000 lives while crashing into American soil on 9/11 ~ Usama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda network of terrorists. Speaking of destruction, let us begin the series of events contributing to a weakened U.S. security:

CLINTON WINS THE PRESIDENCY

1992: William Jefferson Clinton won the U.S. Presidency and, within hours, the press reported that Clinton turned his back on the CIA attempting to provide security briefs in Little Rock, Arkansas.

FIRST BOMBING OF WORLD TRADE CENTER

February 26, 1993: Financed by Usama bin Laden’s brother-in-law Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, five were killed and 1,000 injured in the World Trade Center car- bombing after FBI Agent Nancy Floyd was prevented from investigating perpetrators Abouhalima and Salameh, and perpetrator Abdul Basit Mahmoud Abdul Karim (better known by his alias Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, or more often, known by his alias Ramzi Yousef) missed his asylum hearing and escaped both the FBI and INS, then constructed the 1,500 pound bomb. Perpetrators are later indicted and convicted.

EARLY AIRLINER WARNINGS

Later in 1993, the FBI disrupted the “Day of Terror” Plot by followers of the “Blind Sheikh,” Omar Abdul Rahman (or better known by alias Sheikh Rahman). Scheduled to be hit were landmark targets such as the George Washington Bridge, the Lincoln and Holland Tunnels, the United Nations building, and the New York FBI Office.

CIA CRUMBLING CONTINUES

February 21, 1994: The FBI arrested CIA Agent Rick Ames, establishing Ames as the most prolific U.S. traitor in the history of planet Earth.

The continuing FBI surveillance of hundreds of CIA agents was followed by a drastic CIA size reduction, metamorphing the CIA into a mega-dwarf operation, . When the CIA is prevented from spreading its wings by working with unsavory characters who did not pass the FBI white glove test, the U.S. citizenry was less protected. You see, the bad guys knew how other bad guys thought, planned, and carried out their sinister acts, thereby lent great support to the CIA.

1994: CIA Director Jim Woolsey began transferring the CIA’s counterespionage to the FBI (according to former CIA Agent Robert Baer) as FBI Director Louis Freeh took pride in helping to dismantle the CIA. Freeh had generous Congressional monetary support in opening numerous international FBI offices to replace the reduced CIA influence abroad, all of which drastically changed and exponentially reduced U.S. international security.

EGG ON THE FB-EYE However, FBI gloating was short-lived, as FBI Agent Robert Hanssen wass caught giving away U.S. security secrets in trash bags. Talk about a trashy piece of garbage ~ Hanssen, that is.

CIA HITS CHINESE EMBASSY

A weakened CIA resulted in a powerful U.S. missile exploding into the misidentified Chinese embassy in Belgrade, obviously causing major international distress.

AIRLINER BOMBINGS FOILED IN PHILIPPINES

January, 1995: A plan is foiled that involved bombing 12 airliners headed to the United States, instigators later discovered to be Ramzi Yousef (first WTC bombing) and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (Mastermind of 9/11), who also discussed crashing a plane into the CIA Headquarters in Langley, Virginia.

SIX SECURITY SNAFUS

February, 1995: Abdul Hakim Murad helped to train terrorist pilots with pilot Ranzi Yousef, who was also an accomplished bomb-maker.

1995: Clinton’s Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick authored the classified Memorandum entitled “Instructions for Separation of Certain Foreign Counterintelligence and Criminal Investigations.” The Janet Reno-supported Gorelick Memorandum prevented major info-sharing between intelligence agents and criminal investigators, and even blocked much info-sharing between divisions within the FBI.

(In April, 2004 the media began referring to the Gorelick Memorandum as “The Wall”, or the “Gorelick Wall.” As a member of the 9/11 Commission, Gorelick was accused by a key Republican U.S. Senator as having a conflict of interest and should resign the commission. However, Gorelick was defended by former New Jersey Republican Governor Thomas Keane, Chairman of the 9/11 Commission. The discovery of the Gorelick Wall was described in the April 15, 2004 issue of The Wall Street Journal as the biggest finding from the 9/11 Commission hearings.)

November, 1995: The first attack is carried out against the Saudi National Guard facility in Riyadh.

June 25, 1996: Al-Khobar barracks explosion kills nineteen American soldiers in Saudi Arabia. The U.S. demonstrated little or no response.

July 17, 1996 on Long Island, NY: TWA Flight 800 crashed after leaving JFK for Paris, France. The explosion was determined to be almost identical to the PAL Flt 434 crash, according to former CIA Agent Robert Baer. October, 1996 in Phoenix, AZ: After advising FBI control agent Ken Williams to keep a close eye on an Algerian flight instruction with ties to Sheikh Rahman, FBI intelligence source Harry Ellen was instructed to back off the case. Shortly, Hani Hanjour (hijacking pilot of American Airlines Flt 77 which hit the Pentagon) began pilot training at CRM Airline Training Center in Arizona, and met with Nawaf Alhazmi in late 2000 (only weeks after Alhazmi, Almihdhar, and Banihammad were reported to the FBI in the 1 Nov 2000 Graham Report), with Hani Hanjour receiving his assignment from “9/11 Co-Ringleader Nawaf Alhazmi” to be the hijacking pilot of American Airlines Flt 77 which hit the Pentagon.

1996: The FBI and CIA narrowly missed capturing 9/11 Mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed as he was about to travel from Doha to United Arab Emerites, but the lack of legats (security associates schooled in local customs and language) in those countries hindered the pursuit of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed.

August 31, 1997: Syrian Ghasoub Ghalyoun, linked to Al-Qaeda, filmed videos of New York’s World Trade Center and the Sears Towers.

BERGER: MOVING ON UP

1997: Sandy Berger had moved up from Deputy NSA to become the National Security Advisor (NSA).

Clarke states:

“It had become pretty clear to Sandy Berger that terrorism and domestic preparedness were major problems, presidential priorities, and should be among the very few growing budgets in Washington.”

BIN LADEN’S FATWA AGAINST ISRAEL AND AMERICA

February, 1998: Usama bin Laden issued a fatwa termed the “International Islamic Front for Jihad on the Jews and Crusaders.” In so doing, bin Laden challenged all Muslims to kill all Americans around the world, including civilians. Other threats against Americans followed. The fundamental Muslims had declared war against Israel and America.

August, 1998: Attacks on U.S. Embassies in both Kenya and Tanzania. The United States demonstrated little or no response.

NSA BERGER: CREATE A “TERRORISM CZAR”

1998: At NSA Sandy Berger’s insistence, the U.S. instituted a National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counterterrorism, which the media called the “Terrorism Czar.” Terrorism Czar Richard Clarke described his position as anything but a “Czar” for a variety of reasons: 1. The Terrorism Czar had 12 on his staff, whereas the Drug Czar had several hundred on staff.

2. The Terrorism Czar was specifically instructed by the departments, and backed up by President Clinton, that the Czar would have little or no budget nor operational decision-making capacity.

3. In spite of limitations to the Terrorism Czar, Secret Document PDD-X spelled out four programs to be chaired by the Czar, and, for our purposes, we will look at Program No. 1 and Program No. 9.

Continuing from Clarke’s book:

“Program No. 1: ‘Apprehension, Extradition or Rendition, and Prosecution of Terrorists.’ Although we did not see terrorism as a law enforcement issue, there was a police component to countering terrorism. This program involved finding individual terrorists, wherever they were, and bringing them before U.S. courts. The lead was given to the Justice Department and its component, the FBI.”

WHO REVIEWED THE “GRAHAM REPORT?”

Need I remind our readers that, on 1 Nov 2000, “the FBI” is exactly where I turned in the names of Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar (hijackers hitting the Pentagon) and Fayez Banihammad (hijacker hitting NY’s World Trade Center south tower). Obviously, someone (or several) within the FBI dropped the ball which I placed right in their hands ~ between the numbers. Apparently, The Graham Report was all but discounted. And did U.S. Secret Service Agent Ron Lewis cross-consult with the FBI after I presented Lewis with my report several days after my reporting to Shreveport FBI Agent Steve Hayes? Perhaps the Gorelick Memorandum prevented the consult.

Had the FBI done their homework during November, 2000 they would have discovered that Alhazmi and Banihammad’s alleged harborer and supporter, Mohammad Jamal Khan, in 1997, had illegally structured $50,000.00 which was sent to someone, or to an organization, in Pakistan.

Thus, with suspicions raised, a natural next step would have been to scrutinize Jamal’s Saudi guests (Alhazmi and Banihammad) who were introduced to me as “medical doctors,” as well as the real medical doctor (LSUMC cardiology resident) named Mohammed Habeeb Ahmed, MD who was allegedly providing transportation to Alhazmi and Banihammad, and additionally, Habeeb gave, or lent, five hundred ($500.00) dollars to Jamal in order to partially support Alhazmi and Banihammad while the two were at Jamal’s alleged Safe House or Sleeper Cell. However, due to the FBI oversights, these facts were not discovered until weeks and months after the tragedy of 9/11. More later. Clarke continues with:

“Program No. 9: ‘Countering the Foreign Terrorist Threat in the U.S.’ Although FBI officially believed that there were no sleeper cells in the U.S. we created a program to prevent such cells and find them if they existed. Justice (FBI) was given the lead, with roles for Immigration and Treasury.”

Ditto on the 1 Nov 2000 Graham Report, noting that Programs No. 1 & 9 of PDD-X were policies in the year 1998. Additionally, keep in mind the role of Immigration and Treasury, as the connection appears later in this story (while remembering that, beginning in 2003, INS has been under the new Department of Homeland Security).

ATTORNEY GENERAL JANET RENO: SAVE “STAKEHOLDERS”

Terrorism Czar Richard Clarke recommended that at least one (1) Mass Decontamination Vehicle (MDV) be assigned to each major city, but Attorney General Janet Reno took it out of President Clinton’s recommendations ~ and Clinton gave in. Of dynamic importance, according to Clarke:

“Reno and I had disagreed before about how to disburse money to the cities to prepare them for chemical, biological, or radiological disaster. She was concerned that we satisfy the ‘stakeholders,’ which I learned meant not people with barbeque grills, but the local authorities.

“I was concerned that the local authorities would not know what to buy or would justify some purchase that had little to do with chem.-bio defense.”

RUBIN OVER-RULED RICHARD

The CIA began trying to map important “nodes” in Al-Qaeda’s financial network, but Clinton’s Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin interfered according to Richard Clarke:

“After Secretary Rubin stepped down, it was easier to get co-operation from Treasury. Rubin had opposed our use of the International Economic Emergency Powers Act to go after terrorist financing fronts in the United States. His attitude toward strengthening international money laundering rules had been less than enthusiastic.”

September, 1998: Ali Mohammed is finally arrested by the FBI. A former U.S. Army Special Forces sergeant, Mohammed had stolen Top Secret manuals from Fort Bragg ~ manuals which had been previously overlooked by the FBI. Mohammed had even trained Al-Qaeda’s top command at a training camp in Khost, Afghanistan and took reconnaissance photographs before the African Embassy bombings.

September 16, 1998: Former USL student Wadih el-Hage was indicted for perjury before a New York federal grand jury concerning his connections with Al-Qaeda.

HAMBURG: FEW CIA SPIES

For all practical purposes, the CIA had taken itself out of the spying business when, in October, 1998 Mohamed Atta and Ramzi Binalshibh set up a safe house in Hamburg, Germany. Occupied by Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Nawaf Alhazmi, and Khalid Almihdhar (names familiar to The Graham Report) this safe house served the dual purpose of crash pad and flight training center for the homicidal jihadists of 9/11.

FAA: SEARCH ONLY 2 ARABS PER FLIGHT??

Though it was largely overlooked by the media, during the Clinton years the FAA was strapped with the self-defeating policy that allowed only two (2) Arab males to be searched on any one flight. If a third suspicious looking Arab male attempted to board the same airliner, it was “hands off.”

In her column entitled, “Thank you for choosing United, Mr. bin Laden,” Conservative columnist Ann Coulter wrote that, after two Arab males have been scrutinized through secondary questioning, “Osama bin Laden could then board the plane without being questioned. I’m no security expert, but I’m pretty sure this gives terrorists an opening for an attack.”

If caught breaking this policy, the airline received a stiff fine. Is that not carrying political correctness a trifle too far? Merely another pre-9/11 foolish policy.

DISRUPTING THE BOMBING OF LAX

On December 13, 1999, Ahmed Ressam was detained in Port Angeles, Washington by an alert U.S. Customs agent when attempting to cross the border from Canada. Ressam had explosives with definite intent to bomb Los Angeles International Airport (LAX).

MILLENNIUM

Although much chatter and other red flags were received by intelligence, the U.S. entry into the Twenty-first Century was void of terrorist attack(s).

MALAYSIA AL-QAEDA MEETING: CIA GOOFS

January 5, 2000: The CIA learned about an Al-Qaeda meeting in a Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia condominium and alerts Malaysian intelligence, who film the participants: 9/11 hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar; 9/11 Mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, 9/11 No. 2 planner Ramzi Binalshibh, and Riduan Ismuddin (aka Hambali) who helped to bankrole Yousef’s Bojinka and pope plots as well as his plot on the World Trade Center in New York. Despite their obvious ties with Al-Qaeda, Alhazmi and Almihdhar are not placed on the terrorist Watch List by the CIA.

ALHAZMI & ALMIHDHAR: MISSED OPPORTUNITY

January 15, 2000: Fresh from 9/11 planning session with Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and Ramzi Binalshibh, Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar enter the U.S. at Los Angeles International, and soon take up residency in San Diego, CA, even though Tenet’s CIA already knows that Alhazmi and Almihdhar are members of Al-Qaeda.

March 15, 2000: Mohammed Habeeb Ahmed, MD had his first dental appointment at David M. Graham’s clinic, with Habeeb treated by Dental Hygienist LeeAnne Scruggs. When Dr. Graham noticed Habeeb to be a cardiology resident, Habeeb is asked to join the retrospective medical study contemplated by Graham and Dr. Phil D. Mayers, a periodontist. Habeeb agreed to join the research team.

April 6, 2000: FBI Director Louis Freeh traveled to Pakistan and was unsuccessful in convincing Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf to aid the U.S. in capturing bin Laden.

GRAHAM SUSPICIONS BEGIN

On or about September 26, 2000: Dr. David M. Graham met with Mohammad Jamal Khan at Jamal’s rented townhouse in Shreveport, LA in order to enlist Jamal as an investor in Graham’s upstart company named AdvaLife International, Inc. Graham was immediately drawn to three cardboard boxes on Jamal’s kitchen floor inscribed with the names Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, and Fayez Banihammad (all three names become 9/11 hijackers). Jamal hustled Graham for a large investment in Jamal’s purported upstart textile company, wherein Graham would not have to work but make lots of money. In order to investigate Jamal, Graham suggested to Jamal that they meet several more times to exchange business opportunities.

On or about October 3, 2000: Graham met Jamal for a second time at Jamal’s rented Shreveport townhouse at Eastwood on the Bayou, and Graham became more suspicious of Jamal due to numerous red flags (and, at this time, Graham was unaware that Jamal and Habeeb were friends).

GRAHAM’S “BIG DAY”

On or about October 7, 2000: Graham’s third meeting at Jamal’s townhouse was suddenly interrupted by the entrance of Dr. Mohammed Habeeb Ahmed escorting future 9/11 hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Fayez Banihammad in through Jamal’s kitchen door; Nawaf and Fayez were then introduced to Graham as medical doctors (which Graham disbelieved). Shortly, Jamal told Habeeb that his (Jamal’s) father had recently visited Usama bin Laden.

USS COLE BOMBING: NO U.S. RESPONSE

October 12, 2000: The U.S. Navy’s guided missile destroyer, the USS Cole, was hit by homicidal bombers in Aden Harbor, Yemen, killing seventeen U.S. sailors. CIA Director Tenet advised President Clinton not to strike back against Usama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda because Tenet cannot be certain of an Al-Qaeda involvement.

GRAHAM’S FIRST CORROBORATION

On or about October 15, 2000: One of Graham’s friends (fictitious name: Michael Steiger) heard Jamal that and the friend signed a Sworn Affidavit of Jamal’s statements (with additional info) and presented the affidavit to Shreveport FBI Agent-in-Charge Mike Kinder in Graham’s presence.

TERRORIST RALLIES IN WASHINGTON, DC

2000: The Islamic Association of Palestine (IAP), headquartered in Richardson, Texas held its Annual Conference during Thanksgiving weekend in Chicago where much of Hamas’ fundraising was earmarked to pay the families of homicide martyrs.

On October 28, 2000 a large group of pro-Palestinians marched from Freedom Plaza to Lafayette Park in Washington, DC while singing “Hizballah is our model.” The protesters rallied around the theme of promoting Hamas and Hizballah.

GRAHAM REPORT ~ THREE 9/11 HIJACKERS: MISSED OPPORTUNITY

November 1, 2000: The original Graham Report was reported face-to-face to Shreveport FBI Agent Steve Hayes at Dr. David Graham’s dental clinic in Shreveport, LA containing the names of future 9/11 hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar (both hitting the Pentagon) and Fayez Banihammad (hitting WTC 2).

GRAHAM REPORTS TO U.S. SECRET SERVICE

On or about November 7, 2000: An oral Graham Report was reported to Shreveport U.S. Secret Service Agent Ron Lewis concerning the 1 Nov 2000 Graham Report. My worries lessened since both the FBI and U.S. Secret Service now had my concerns.

SHORTLY AFTER THE “NOV 2000 GRAHAM REPORT(S)”

Late 2000: Nawaf Alhazmi met with hijacking pilot Hani Hanjour of American Airlines Flight 77 which hit the Pentagon. In the spring, 2001 Nawaf Alhazmi enlisted the last two American Airlines Flt 77 hijackers: Majed Moqed and Nawaf’s brother Salem Alhazmi (and, of course, Khalid Almihdhar had committed months earlier).. CLINTON WANTED TO FIRE FBI DIRECTOR FREEH

According to Terrorism Czar Richard Clarke, whom President Clinton met with almost daily, President Clinton was livid over FBI Director Louis Freeh’s performance as it related to terrorism. Clarke states:

“Because of the intensity of the political opposition that Clinton engendered, he had been heavily criticized for bombing al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan, for engaging in ‘Wag the Dog’ tactics to divert attention from a scandal about his personal life. For similar reasons, he could not fire the recalcitrant FBI Director who had failed to fix the

Bureau or to uncover terrorists in the United States.”

Heavy stuff. And the 1 Nov 2000 Graham Report to the Shreveport FBI should have been front and center to this topic ~ unless, of course, the Shreveport FBI were blocked by The Gorelick Wall.

Clinton and Usama bin Laden

On one occasion, offshore missiles almost hit the bin Laden camp, though they missed the al-Qaeda leader by two days. Subsequently, fears of wagging the dog strongly influenced the Clinton administration to concentrate on “merely capturing” bin Laden, without any notion of attempting to kill the world’s most vicious terrorist who had, on several occasions, declared war on America.

PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH & SECURITY Late January, 2001: President George W. Bush’s Inauguration in Washington, DC.

Early in 2001: President Bush began his chosen regimen of having (almost) daily briefings from (Clinton hold-over) CIA Director George Tenet, newly appointed National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice and Vice President Dick Cheney (usually present). Clinton administration hold-over Richard Clarke was counterterrorism expert under Rice and had good access to Tenet and Rice, though Clarke felt he could have been more effective by being invited to the near daily security briefings.

RINGLEADERS ALHAZMI & ALMIHDHAR

During 2001: Since Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar are 9/11 Ringleaders (as well as hijackers of American Airlines Flt 77 which hit the Pentagon), Alhazmi made serious contacts with hijackers of each of the other three hijacked airliners of 9/11. Specifically, Alhazmi was conferring with Hamza Alghamdi and Fayez Banihammad (Jamal’s guest), both being hijackers of United Airlines 175 which left Boston first and hit World Trade Center 2 (south tower). Additionally, during 2001: Nawaf Alhazmi had serious communications with both Ahmed Alnami and Saeed Alghamdi, hijackers of United Airlines Flt 93 which crashed into the countryside of Pennsylvania.

NAWAF ALHAZMI: MISSED OPPORTUNITY

April Fool’s Day ~ April 1, 2001: Al-Qaeda member and future 9/11 terrorist Nawaf Alhazmi was given a speeding ticket in a rural area near Cordell, Oklahoma by Deputy Carol Corbett, with the speeding ticket pictured in the 10 Jun 2002 Cover Story issue of NEWSWEEK, providing the world with a copy of Nawaf Alhazmi’s unique signature. More importantly, however, U.S. security missing another opportunity to red flag Alhazmi on the background check since his name had not been placed on the Watch List by the CIA.

ALMIHDHAR and ALHAZMI: MORE MISSED OPPORTUNITIES

May, 2001: Taking advantage of Visa Express in Saudi Arabia along with four other 9/11 hijackers, Khalid Almihdhar re-enters the U.S. Later, his running buddy Nawaf Alhazmi reported a robbery attempt to Fairfax, Virginia police, but escapes scrutiny since his name is still not on the terrorist Watch List

THE FAMOUS “May 6, 2001 PDB”

May 6, 2001: Presidential Daily Briefing (PDB) entitled “Bin Laden Determined to Strike in U.S.” was released by The White House on April 9, 2004 and proved to contain no “actionable intelligence” ~ no specific reference to airliners crashing into buildings (as pressure from the 9/11 Commission influenced the Bush Administration to take the unprecedented step of De-Classifying the PDB as a means to prove its case).

Summer, 2001: FBI Agent John O’Neill, after warning for months that Al-Qaeda had their eye on hitting America, resigned to become head of security of New York’s World Trade Center. O’Neill died on 9/11 while hustling people from the crumbling inferno at WTC ~ and distinguished himself as one of America’s 9/11 heroes.

NAWAF ALHAZMI & MOHAMED ATTA

Additionally, Nawaf Alhazmi had monthly face-to-face meetings with Mohamed Atta (hijacker of American Airlines Flt 11 which left Boston and hit WTC north tower) for three or more months preceding September 11, 2001. . Khalid Shaikh Mohammed gives the go-ahead. Then Atta and Alhazmi decide the date ~ September 11, 2001.

CIA: TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE

August 23, 2001: To no avail, the CIA belatedly placed the names of Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar on the Watch List. With such short notice, the FBI was unable to locate Alhazmi and Almihdhar. Graham was not contacted (however, Graham had no new information concerning the 2001 whereabouts of Alhazmi and Almihdhar). September 11, 2001: Tragedies in New York, Washington DC, and Pennsylvania. The United States begins the arduous task of attempting to uncover victim remains, restore destroyed U.S. properties, and study the events leading to 9/11.

TWO YEARS LATER: 9/11 MASTERMIND SINGS

On September 23, 2003 an Associated Press release provided partial interrogation of captured Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (Mastermind and head of operation for 9/11) who declared that Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar were (1) more important than Mohamed Atta, (2) were hand-picked by Usama bin Laden, (3) were central to the 9/11 attacks, and (4) were receiving Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s coded messages over Internet chat rooms. Though already a key to pre-9/11 terrorist activities, the AP release of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed’s partial interrogation elevated The Graham Report of 1 Nov 2000 to mega-major status.

THIRTY MONTHS AFTER 9/11

Thankfully, U.S. security has prevented all attempted attacks on American soil since September 11, 2001 as well as reliable sources reporting aborted attacks in France, England, and Italy. In the U.S., the new USA Patriot Act has greatly benefited the countless dedicated security personnel committed to defending America.

Unfortunately, major terrorist attacks have occurred in Israel, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, recently in Spain, and others. Yes, the Free World is at war with worldwide terrorism which hates countries founded on democratic, constitutional government.

MAJOR “9/11 COMMISSION” FINDING: “ GORELICK WALL”

During the April, 2004 9/11 Commission’s Open Hearings, former Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick was exposed by Attorney General John Ashcroft’s sworn testimony concerning Gorelick’s pre-Patriot Act “wall” that prevented communication between intelligence agents and criminal investigators.

The April 15, 2004 issue of The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) quotes AG Ashcroft as stating:

“The old national intelligence system in place on September 11 was destined to fail.

“In the days before September 11, the wall specifically impeded the investigation into Zacarias Moussaoui, “ a criminal warrant to search his computer. The warrant was rejected because FBI officials feared breaching the wall.

“When the CIA finally told the FBI that al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi were the the country in late August, agents in New York searched for the suspects. But because of the wall, FBI headquarters refused to allow criminal investigators who knew the most about the most recent al Qaeda attack to join the hunt for the suspected terrorists.

“At that time, a frustrated FBI investigator wrote headquarters, quote, ‘Whatever has happened to this ~ someday someone will die ~ and wall or no wall ~ the public will not understand why we were not more effective and throwing every resource we had at certain ‘problems.’ “

Declassifying a March 4, 1995 memo, Ashcroft revealed wherein Jamie Gorelick had instructed then-FBI Director Louis Freeh and U.S. Attorney Mary Jo White that they would be required to use a more strict interpretation of the law than the law required.

The Wall Street Journal Editorial continues by claiming that Attorney General Janet Reno’s memo of July 19, 1995 instructed all U.S. Attorneys to avoid “the appearance” of overlap between intelligence-related activities and law-enforcement operations.

Continuing to quote from the Wall Street Journal issue of April 15, 2004:

“Recall, too, that during the time of Ms. Gorelick’s 1995 memo, the issue causing the most tension between the Reno-Gorelick Justice Department and Director Freeh’s FBI was not counterterrorism but widely reported allegations of contributions to the Clinton-Gore campaign from foreign sources, involving the likes of John Huang and Charlie Trie. Mr. Trie later told investigators that between 1994 and 1996 he raised some $1.2 million, much of it from foreign sources, whose identities were hidden by straw donors. Ms. Gorelick resigned as Deputy Attorney General in 1997 to become vice chairman of Fannie Mae.

“From any reasonably objective point of view, the Gorelick memo has to count as by far the biggest news so far out of the 9/11 hearings...”

With this background, now take a hard look at how, on November 1, 2000 I presented the Graham Report face-to-face to Shreveport FBI Agent Steve Hayes and, approximately one week later, presented a Graham Report summary face-to-face to Shreveport U.S. Secret Service Agent Ron Lewis. Then decide how you would priortize the causes for the tragedy of September 11, 2001. SECTION 9

The Original Graham Report: 1 Nov 2000 to Shreveport FBI Agent Steve Hayes

GRAHAM REPORTS “FACE-TO-FACE” TO HAYES

Graham essentially related the entire encounter (Section 1 through Section 7) with Jamal and Habeeb, including but not limited to, providing Agent Hayes with the names Nawaf Alhazmi, Fayez Banihammad, and Khalid Almihdhar, as seen on the three boxes on Jamal’s kitchen floor. Additionally, Graham told Hayes about Jamal saying that his father had recently visited Usama bin Laden, and that FBI Agent Steve Hayes heard it all, including but not limited to: Jamal dates women from Barksdale Air Force Base, and Jamal wants to buy a large white used cargo truck parked on or about the 3400 block of Youree Drive in Shreveport. Jamal hangs out emailing around the world at USA CASH, the owner of which has provided Jamal with at least ten thousand ($10,000.00) dollars, and will provide Jamal with more money. Jamal said he visited the Masjid Al-Noor Mosque on Youree Drive, but Jamal said that the Muslims at the Mosque did not like him, and he did not like them either.

On or about 7 Oct 2000, Graham told Agent Hayes “face-to-face” how Graham personally witnessed Mohammed Habeeb Ahmed, MD enter Jamal’s kitchen door unannounced while escorting the two Mid-easterners, all three men wearing off-white colored turbans and below-the-knee jackets. Hayes heard that Habeeb almost fainted on the spot when first seeing his dentist (Dr. Graham) talking with Jamal in Jamal’s living room. Graham acknowledged recognizing Habeeb as his patient and told Habeeb that Graham and Jamal were talking business (Remember, Graham coaxed Jamal into meeting often to share each other’s business opportunity, as a means to obtain more information about Jamal).

Habeeb relaxed, then introduced “Dr. Fayez Banihammad, a resident with me at LSU Medical Center;” Jamal agreed saying, “That’s right, and this is Dr. Nawaf Alhazmi, a medical doctor from Chicago who will be staying with me for four to five weeks while Nawaf takes medical course(s) at LSU Medical Center.” (Both Habeeb and Jamal allegedly told total lies with these two introductions.)

GRAHAM SENSED THE TWO ARABS WERE NOT DOCTORS

Graham told FBI Agent Steve Hayes that, for several reasons, he (Graham) quickly realized that Nawaf and Fayez were not medical doctors. For example, Graham asked Nawaf if he was going to specialize in cardiology like Habeeb, with Nawaf then looking dumbfounded and the question being answered by Habeeb. Graham asked Nawaf if he would set up practice in Shreveport. After Nawaf hesitated with a bewildered look, Habeeb and Jamal fell over themselves to answer the question. Nawaf’s steady, intimidating stare penetrated Graham for the ensuing ten minutes or more.

GRAHAM FEARED A PHYSICAL ATTACK

Graham actually felt that Nawaf was so disturbed by Graham’s presence as to propel Nawaf into a physical attack of Graham. Jamal noticed Nawaf’s never-ending stare at Graham and suggested Nawaf go upstairs to rest for awhile. Nawaf nodded affirmatively, followed by Graham offering Nawaf a parting handshake while expressing his desire that Nawaf enjoy his medical studies at LSUMC. Nawaf answered with an unsure:

“Thank - - (much hesitation) - - you.”

Nawaf proceeded upstairs with one more penetrating stare flashed at Graham. David was relieved to be rid of Nawaf’s temperament, and quietly listened to Habeeb and Jamal making small talk for several minutes (Fayez, in military fashion, continued standing “at parade rest” for the final fifteen minutes, saying not a word since first entering Jamal’s townhouse. The entire twenty-five minutes or so Fayez remained in his perpetual state with eyes fixated on the corner of the ceiling).

GRAHAM’S BIGGEST SHOCK

Shockingly, with a face-splitting smile, Jamal excitedly told Habeeb,

“Oh, Habeeb, I forgot to tell you, (my) father recently visited Usama bin Laden!”

With that, Habeeb said not a word while giving Jamal one of those are-you-out-of-your- mind looks as Habeeb’s head slightly tilted to the right. Instantly, the room became eerily quiet. Five seconds, ten, then fifteen seconds of silence. By then, Graham realized he may be in danger and decided to break the ice with the neutral question:

“Say, Jamal, your family seems to know this bin Laden guy, and all I know is a little negative stuff I saw on TV a couple of times. What’s bin Laden really like?”

Jumping in with both feet, Jamal shouts out,

“You are right. The TV lies! Bin Laden is a nice guy. He is a good businessman and makes lots of money! And Usama bin Laden has friends all over the world! “ as Jamal smiles broadly and opens his arms widely toward the ceiling.

Red flag number umpteen ~ and a bright red flag at that!! Wow! Graham wanted to literally run out the back door. But Graham decided to maintain his position of secrecy, so decided to make a bit of small talk, then announced he almost forgot his emergency appointment ~ the lady who called around 7:30 a.m. and was so thankful that she could be seen by a dentist on a Saturday (Graham knew Dr. Habeeb would buy that one). Graham then casually dismissed himself. During my interview with FBI Agent Steve Hayes, Hayes took notes as I related the story in detail. After weeks of hanging around Jamal, and systematically rushing back to the clinic or a restaurant to record my thoughts, Steve saw notes scribbled on everything from prescription pads to restaurant napkins to 3” by 5” cards ~ a huge pile of various and sundry notes were scattered over my dental reception room oriental coffee table for Agent Hayes’ purview.

AGENT HAYES’S JUDGEMENT OF JAMAL

Near the conclusion of the interview, Graham asked Hayes if he agreed that Graham’s suspicions should be investigated as a national security risk. Hayes told Graham that Graham had merely run into an international con artist. Again, Graham reiterated the numerous red flags which he thought should prompt a thorough FBI investigation.

GRAHAM PLEADS WITH HAYES

Graham succinctly reminded FBI Agent Steve Hayes that Jamal: (1) Had access to Barksdale Air Force Base by dating Barksdale women and giving them jewelry, and Jamal loved going all over the base; (2) Jamal was very interested in purchasing the large white used truck on Youree Drive in Shreveport, and Graham was worried about an Oklahoma-style bombing of the B-52 flight line like the enemy loved to do in Vietnam; (3) Jamal did his “around-the-world” faxing and emailing at USA CASH business located at 779 Shreveport-Barksdale Highway (same address as Jamal’s business card), and the owner of USA CASH had invested over $10,000.00 with Jamal and said owner wished to buy Jamal a newer truck than the one on Youree Drive; (4) Dr. Graham’s old dental patient Mohammed Habeeb Ahmed, MD almost fainted upon seeing Graham standing in Jamal’s living room; (5) Jamal, along with Mohammed Habeeb Ahmed, MD, did introduce Graham to two young Middle-easterners as “medical doctors,” one as (so- called) “Dr. Fayez Banihammad” whom Habeeb said was a resident medical doctor with Habeeb at LSU Medical Center, and Jamal introduces a “Dr. Nawaf Alhazmi from Chicago,” whom Jamal said would be staying with him for four to five weeks while taking medical course(s) at LSU Medical Center; and (6) Graham unmistakably heard Jamal tell Habeeb (in well-spoken English, Jamal and Habeeb’s best common language) that Jamal’s father had recently visited Usama bin Laden, followed by Habeeb and Jamal becoming totally silent (thereby indicating that a self-demeaning statement had been made in Graham’s presence); then immediately followed (7) Jamal stating to Habeeb, Graham, and Fayez that “The TV lies. Usama bin Laden is a good guy. He is good businessman and makes lots of money. And bin Laden has contacts all over the world,” as Jamal flashes a big smile while opening his arms upwardly.

GRAHAM’S OFFER TO HELP IS REJECTED Graham offered to hang out with Jamal in order to report any additional suspicious activity and/or conversation with Jamal. Agent Hayes told Graham that Graham should merely stay away from Jamal. Graham was greatly displeased with FBI Agent Steve Hayes’ response to his report, but was courteous in escorting Hayes to the parking lot.

Graham is only a citizen, and this is the FBI saying, “Stay away.” But Graham primarily feared that the FBI might not even open an investigation of this alarming consortium of disturbing Muslims.

After being so thoroughly dubious about Jamal, Habeeb, and their two middle-Eastern guests, I stood dejectedly leaning against my maroon antique dental chair (located in my clinic foyer) with a determination to go over the head of FBI Agent Hayes. However, my persistence would one day bring more flak than the rocket attacks in Vietnam. SECTION 10

7 Nov 2000: Second Graham Report to U.S. Secret Service

How true it was that I was quite upset with the response of FBI Agent Steve Hayes after giving him my report on 1 Nov 2000. Grumbling to my dental staff that I was “going over FBI Agent Hayes’ head” to make sure the case was investigated, the women in my clinic merely laughed it off with statements like, “Sure, a dentist knows more about terrorism than an FBI agent. R-r-i-ight.” For several days leading to 7 Nov 2000, I was contemplating to whom I should re-report my account with the Muslims. Then, a surprise visit ostensibly to check my credibility (over the Graham Report to FBI Agent Hayes) saved me the trouble.

On or about November 7, 2000: U.S. Secret Service Agent Ron Lewis visited Dr. Graham at his dental clinic

Graham assumed that Agent Lewis’s visit was to evaluate Graham’s credibility in providing recent information to FBI Agent Steve Hayes a few days earlier, especially due to Graham’s fear of a potential truck bombing of Barksdale Air Force Base B-52 flight line. Agent Lewis’ stated reason for being at Dr. Graham’s dental clinic was to see if anyone knew the names of individuals living in apartments above the clinic.

During the fifteen minute interview, Graham related the basics of his same concerns as provided to FBI Agent Steve Hayes on November 1, 2000. As Secret Service Agent Ron Lewis parted, Dr. Graham told Lewis that he could now sleep better at night knowing that “two security agencies would take care of the people’s business.”

THE PRE-9/11 GRAHAM REPORT and FBI DIRECTOR FREEH

The reader is now aware that the entire Graham Report was presented “face-to-face” to a Shreveport FBI Agent, and a summary Graham Report was presented “face-to- face” to a Shreveport U.S. Secret Service Agent, both Graham Reports having been reported over ten months before September 11, 2001.

Naturally, I had no way of knowing whether or not the Graham Report given to Shreveport FBI Agent Steve Hayes on 1 Nov 2000 was ever sent up-line to FBI Headquarters. Critical questions: (1) Did the Graham Report reach the desk of FBI Director Louie Freeh? (2) Did the Graham Report reach the desk of Attorney General Janet Reno? (3) Did the Graham Report reach the desk of President Bill Clinton? (4) If the answers to questions 1-3 were affirmative, did the Clinton Administration forward the entire Graham Report to President George W. Bush’s Administration? Answers to these three questions must be forthcoming through the investigation by members of the 9-11 Commission.

Specifically, the citizen’s 9-11 Commission should demand questioning of former FBI Director Freeh, former Attorney General Reno, and former President Clinton and their principal staffers in order to derive at the truth.

As the citizens’ 9/11 investigative arm and mouthpiece, is it not incumbent upon the 9-11 Commission to investigate thoroughly and report their fact-finding into the pre- 9/11 handling of The Graham Report(s)?

Since my report that went to the U.S. Congress Joint Select Committee on Intelligence was labeled “CONFIDENTIAl SECURITY REPORT,” I hereby give the 9-11 Commission full authority to reveal my association as author of The Graham Report to any and all individuals and/or entities necessary to fulfill the 9-11 Commission’s obligation in their investigation into the events leading to 9/11. Additionally, I hold the 9-11 Commission harmless from any and all consequences of said Graham Report investigation, including, but not limited to, any and all results of said investigations.

WHY WAS GRAHAM NOT CONTACTED?

NOTE: During the weeks preceding 9/11, Graham was not contacted by either the FBI nor INS in regard to whether or not Graham had any recent information concerning any individuals in the Graham Reports. This is important because, on August 23, 2001, the CIA finally placed Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar on the Terrorist Watch List, and the FBI should have been investigating all their leads.

Since Graham had reported the names of 9/11 hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar (along with hijacker Fayez Banihammad and alleged aiders and supporters Jamal and Habeeb) to the Shreveport FBI on November 1, 2000, why was Graham not contacted by the FBI in the weeks preceding September 11, 2001? Great question.

Since no security agency contacted Graham during the pre-9/11 period, one must wonder if “other pre-9/11 informers” were not likewise neglected immediately preceding 9/11. It is true that the FBI and other agencies had only a few days (since the CIA waited until August 23, 2001 to put out the alert) to capture Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar before September 11, 2001.

Moreover, the FBI files should have contained information provided by the National Security Agency (NSA) which informed all security agencies that Nawaf Alhazmi, his brother Salem Alhazmi, and Khalid Almihdhar were in the terrorist group Al-Qaeda. After I reported to the Shreveport FBI on 1 Nov 2000 and re-reported to the Shreveport U.S. Secret Service on or about 7 Nov 2000, I saw no need to re-report to the Bush Administration’s U.S. Department of Justice. One would assume that President Clinton’s U.S. Department of Justice would relay such vital information to the Bush Administration during their several security meetings prior to George W. Bush taking over as U.S. President.

The U.S. public must rely on the “citizen’s” 9/11 Commission investigation to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. Let’s face it ~ The Graham Report is extremely volatile! Without my breaking The Graham Report to the mass media BEFORE the 9/11 Commission’s Final Report is made public in late July, 2004 does anyone believe the 9/11 Commission will reveal in its Final Report that the names of hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, and Fayez Banihammad were reported to both the Shreveport FBI agent and the Shreveport U.S. Secret Service agent ten months before 9/11? PART II

SECTION 11 September 11, 2001

Months had passed. Suddenly, terror of 9-11-01 in New York City, Washington DC, and Stony Creek Township, Pennsylvania. A grim remembrance of Americans and others jumping out of the World Trade Center north and south towers. The vivid remembrance of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld assisting medical emergency crews with Pentagon victims scurrying to waiting ambulances. A proud, yet mixed remembrance of brave All-American heroes attacking the hijackers of United Airlines Flight 93, forcing hijackers to put the plane into a crash landing in Stony Creek Township, Pennsylvania.

A NATION IN SHOCK

The nation was in a virtual state of shock. Americans were glued to the television for greater insight into the most devastating attack ever on U.S. soil. Air Force One, with President George W. Bush and several members of his team, left Florida while purportedly weighing their options for a destination. Ostensibly, contingency plans were formulated months earlier, but security concerns dictated that global media not broadcast where the American President was headed.

Dr. David Graham and lunch-time buddies Henry Knight, Jerry King, John Short, Rick Welch, Reenie Roth, Larry Sheldon, Warren Thompson, Sheldon Hewitt, Pat Patterson and Ann Ford were hugging the television in Brite Tomato Restaurant (in early 2004, new owner Dr. John Thompson renamed it Funky Monkey) a quarter mile east of Graham’s clinic. Suddenly, eyes darted right as the phone rang. Rick yelled to Reenie that Air Force One just zipped past his buddy on the outskirts of Shreveport. He figured it was heading to the safety of Barksdale Air Force Base, just over Red River and adjacent to Bossier City.

When I heard President Bush was approaching Barksdale, my first thoughts were, “My FBI and U.S. Secret Service reports about the Arabs possibly truck-bombing the Barksdale AFB flight line must have made it a safer place. After all, here comes Air Force One!”

How rapidly the Shreveport-Bossier City Media spread the word. Popular Shreveport DJ Larry Ryan was heard breaking the news simultaneously with Air Force One smoking its tires on the Barksdale runway. We were proud that national security had chosen “our town.” The President promised retribution for the sinister acts that day, and began the process of uplifting America with God’s help. Want a good conspiracy theory? Dwell on this one. My friend, who shall go unnamed, has a brother retired from U.S.A.F. intelligence who once related that the U.S. government has contingency plans in place whereby the President and Vice- President have prescribed “destinations of protection” in the event of enemy attack. No real secret, right? Right. O.K., let’s take it further.

SPECULATIVE QUESTIONS

A Big Question: Was an alleged Al-Qaeda supporter, namely Mohammad Jamal Khan, on reconnaissance missions on Barksdale Air Force Base during the year 2000? Let’s not forget the numerous red flags surrounding Mohammad Jamal Khan and Mohammed Habeeb Ahmed MD, including but not limited to, the Barksdale women escorting Jamal all over Barksdale AFB. Can we allege that Jamal was mentally stowing away vital terrorist information on his many rides around the massive B-52 base and delivering this information around the world (via Internet) on his daily routine at USA CASH business at 779 Shreveport-Barksdale Highway in Shreveport (where Jamal boasted of being “a very important person” while faxing and emailing around the world ~ even the Mideast)?

The Bigger Question: Could Al-Qaeda have had any way of knowing that, on September 11, 2001 the nation’s contingency plan included Air Force One with our President landing at Barksdale Air Force Base? Was this why 9/11 Ringleader Nawaf Alhazmi visited Shreveport for four to five weeks in the weeks surrounding October, 2000 and was Alhazmi taking orders from Khalid Shaikh Mohammed during Jamal’s daily Internet routine at USA CASH? Walks like, talks like...

To add salt to this speculative wound, one must consider the potential that the three hijackers’ boxes on Jamal’s kitchen floor may have contained paraphernalia for making bombs or other tools of the terrorist trade. Perhaps serious interrogation of Jamal might determine the total truth.

RHETORICAL QUESTION

Were my worries on November 1, 2000 concerning potential dangers to Barksdale AFB worthy of being reported? If your answer is “No,” be advised to review (in earlier Sections) the numerous pre-9/11 red flags surrounding Jamal, Habeeb, and their two (perhaps three) Arab visitors. All of my friends were concerned by the countless red flags. Why not the FBI and the U.S. Secret Service?

New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani and Governor George Pataki led admirably, as did brave Firefighters, NYPD, and Port responders. New Yorkers and Washingtonians were desperate to locate loved ones. Busy cell phones. Checking hospitals. Long lines. Checking injury lists. Pictures of missing relatives before television cameras. With such a massive catastrophe, body ID was slower than slow. It would continue for weeks upon weeks. America and the Free World shared their losses and heartache. After digesting the description of bin Laden’s infiltrating terrorists as listed in his discovered workbook, it was the first time I suspected the connection of 9/11 with Mohammad Jamal Khan’s Shreveport guests back in the several weeks surrounding October, 2000. Man, it could be linked! SECTION 12 Graham Calls FBI HOTLINE

“How could seeing bin Laden’s terrorist workbook on television stimulate my call to the FBI Hotline?” Let’s go there.

Usama bin Laden’s instructions included, but were not limited to: (1) U.S. Al Qaeda operative(s) should be well dressed in conservative suit and tie; (2) preferably black, shiny shoes; (3) use a cell phone; (4) live in upscale housing so as to reduce close contact with your neighbors, but (5) be sure to mingle socially when possible. Perfect description of Mohammad Jamal Khan. Add that to Jamal’s baggage of endless red flags!

The adrenalin from my hunch was too great!

Upon calling the FBI Hotline, I quickly realized the Justice Department apparently hired numerous civilian-types to answer the thousands of post-9/11 calls. After hearing my synopsis of alleged Shreveport terrorist activity, the inexperienced, naive young man said,

“Doctor, I just don’t think you have anything we would be interested in.”

With that, I was livid. Here I was all fired up to report my deal and this guy thinks he’s gonna get a call from someone who actually saw hijackers flying airliners.

“Young man, you listen to me very carefully. I want you to immediately get me someone who has serious clout. And I didn’t stutter. Do you understand?”

“Yes Sir! Yes Sir! Please hold on.” ALAS ~ A VOICE OF AUTHORITY

The new voice exemplified a woman with definite authority. After getting into the Shreveport account for a couple minutes, she stopped me with, “Sir, excuse me, but we have literally hundreds of calls coming in. Your worry about Barksdale Air Force Base got my attention. I promise to have an FBI agent call real soon.”

“Great. That’s all I wanted. Thanks so much for your time, and good luck to you guys trying to catch the terrorists. We appreciate your hard work.”

“Thank you. That means a lot. Good-bye, Doctor.”

After reporting to the Hotline, I sensed in my spirit an unpleasant, building distain for Muslims. Uncontrollable. My entanglement with the suspicious middle-Easterners, in particular, was seeding this resentment. Keep an open mind? Next to impossible. SECTION 13

October 2, 2001: Re-Report to Shreveport FBI

October 2, 2001: The first post-9/11 Graham Report, face-to-face to Shreveport FBI Agent Ray Spoon

FBI AGENT SPOON

I’ll never forget FBI Agent Ray Spoon’s first entrance into my dental clinic. He was tall, athletic, like the tight end on a college football team. Spoon was rugged-looking with an emotionless expression. Could be he had a hard day’s night. More likely, he was pumping himself up for what I was about to hear. With his left hand swinging a plastic iridescent green clipboard, Agent Spoon popped through the door. Taking three steps inside to stand wide-legged adjacent to the decorative antique dental chair, Spoon offered a handshake, then defensively folded his arms, and aggressively opened with,

“Dr. Graham, when you called the FBI Hotline, you said you gave the Shreveport FBI this report several months ago. I cannot find any such report! What was the agent’s name and that date?”

WAS A COVER-UP DEVELOPING ?

Agent Spoon’s opening statement questioned the existence of a pre-9/11 report by Dr. Graham to the FBI. Spoon emphatically said that Graham should know the exact date and agent’s name. Graham explained that it had been six to eight months, or more, since the initial FBI interview, and it was difficult to recall exactly.

For a third time, Spoon insisted, “Dr. Graham, if you really turned in an FBI report, I need the agent’s name and the exact date!”

“Agent Spoon, I definitely turned in that report. Look, Spoon, from where you are standing, you can see the reception room chair to the left of my Chinese tower. That’s the chair the FBI agent was sitting in, and I was on the right side of the tower. Seems like his name was Steve something-or-other, but I can’t be for certain the date. Well, there’s no way I can give you the date off the top of my head. Over six months ago, probably more. But, I tell you what. If I can locate my Year 2000 Dental Appointment Book, his name should be right there on the day of my interview. I’ll give it a look after we finish with your interview.” TRUE VALUE OF AN APPOINTMENT BOOK

Early on, it was all I could do to contain myself, with Spoon’s mean-spirited, continuing inference that I had not provided a pre-9/11 FBI report. But, I must admit to being somewhat intimidated; he had succeeded. In any case, the mere mention of an “appointment book” transformed Spoon into a pleasant fellow.

I vividly remembered having the pre-9/11 FBI agent’s name in the Year 2000 Appointment Book circled with a red pencil, so as to have my notes ready when he arrived. After all, how often does one meet with the FBI? For several days, my dental staff had seen the glaring FBI appointment (1 Nov 2000 at 4:30 pm) each time they entered a new dental appointment.

The big question was, “Could I locate the Year 2000 Appointment Book?” For legal reasons, doctor-types generally save medical records for a given number of years, according to state law. But stuff can get misplaced, or lost, and I desperately feared Murphy’s Law. My packed-away Year 2000 Appointment Book suddenly garnered inflated value like a Gutenberg Bible. Well, not quite.

THE CASE OF A SECOND INFORMER

Though Agent Ray Spoon had Graham’s handwritten notes in hand, he continued to do a thorough job of testing Graham’s memory. Graham had good recall on the general story from months earlier, but had no immediate recall of the exact names of the three middle- Easterners living at Jamal’s townhouse. After thirty minutes, Spoon asked Graham if Jamal drove a mid-size SUV-type vehicle. Graham replied,

“Yeah, Spoon, it was kinda two-tone grey and charcoal. Similar to a Chevy II. Can’t remember the license number, but I gave it to Agent Steve whats-his-name. Say, by your knowing about Jamal’s auto, did someone else turn in Jamal, too?”

“Uh, Uh. Yeah. Yeah, they did.”

Naïve as I am, at the time I believed Agent Spoon, in spite of his hesitation. After all, this is the FBI, and I’m just trying to help. Right? Why not trust the FBI? (A few weeks later, I suspected that Agent Spoon had already read my pre-9/11 report to “Agent Steve,” and that there was potentially no other individual reporting this case. Had spoon thrown me a curve? Reader, stay tuned.)

After discussing the account with Graham for about one hour (as best to Graham’s memory, as given to FBI Agent Steve Hayes, Agent Spoon asked Graham concerning the response of “Agent Steve.” Graham told Spoon that Agent Steve tried to convince Graham that Mohamad Jamal (the name Jamal gave Graham) was merely “an international con artist.” Graham continued by telling Spoon that he then recounted his long litany of concerns to “Agent Steve.”

Agent Spoon then asked, “Graham, after you said all that, what was Agent Steve’s response?” “Agent Spoon, Steve said that I should just stay away from those Muslims.”

“What did you say then?”

“Well, I offered to hang out a while longer with Jamal and Habeeb to see if anything really big came up. But Steve repeated to stay away from them. So, I obeyed the FBI. What else is a citizen to do? To be honest, I would have preferred a more seasoned FBI agent like yourself.”

Agent Spoon dropped his head, glanced up at Graham out of the corner of his eye, then whispered, “Dr. Graham, if you had given me all your concerns in November of 2000, rest assured that I would have opened a full-scale investigation.”

Ray Spoon shortly parted Graham’s dental clinic with an open invitation for Graham to call Spoon’s pager number if Graham recalled anything not covered on their 2 Oct 2001 interview.

CHASING DOWN THE APPOINTMENT BOOK

About two hours after Agent Spoon left the clinic, I called my Business Manager for info on where to locate the Year 2000 Appointment Book. Joannie (name changed) said,

“If you’re at my desk, look in the lower left drawer. If the Year 2000 Appointment Book is not there, it must be in the upstairs storage room in one of those boxes.”

“Thanks a bunch, Joannie. Sure hope it’s in the drawer. See ya’ in the morning.”

Struck out in the drawer. Wanted to postpone searching upstairs ~ not one of my favorite things. Boxes everywhere. Man. Opening the closest storage box, the unbelievable happened: the Year 2000 Appointment Book was staring me in the face, for both Dental Hygiene and General Dentistry ~ bigger than Dallas!

Flipping through page after page, appointment after appointment, and there it was. November 1, 2000: Shreveport FBI Agent Steve Hayes. Pay dirt! I immediately recalled his clean-cut appearance and likeable demeanor. It was now 9:00 p.m., not too late to page Agent Spoon at home, I reasoned. Worth a try; he should be excited about my locating the agent’s name and date.

AGENT SPOON SHOCKS GRAHAM

“Agent Spoon, hey, this is David Graham. Sorry to bother you at night, but I got that information for you.”

“Oh? What information?”

“Well, it was November 1, 2000, over ten months before 9/11, and the FBI Agent’s name was Steve Hayes. At least I remembered his first name. Ha! Bet you know Steve.”

I was blown away by Spoon’s response: “Look, Dr. Graham, I have some very disturbing news for you. At the Shreveport FBI Office today, we got a mysterious phone call saying ‘they will take care of whoever turned in Jamal.’ ”

“Well, Spoon, all I can say is ‘I hope they get that other guy (who purportedly also turned in Jamal) instead of me.’ I’ll be up front with you. I’ve already shared my experience with two dozen patients and friends.”

“Well, that’s your choice, Dr. Graham.”

(As days and months progressed, I would witness Spoon’s job experience and “grasp of the occasion,” though, early on, the intimidating pressure I would experience from the FBI became quite overbearing. While never verbally hearing the words, my observations told me that the FBI preferred me to back off this case.)

WAS THE “THREATENING CALL” A SCARE TACTIC ?

The PURPORTED threatening phone call to the FBI office worried Dr. Graham to no end; however, upon further conjecture over the ensuing weeks, Graham hoped Spoon had dreamed up the threatening call so that Graham would not tell friends about the original Nov 1, 2000 interview with Agent Hayes, and the whole affair for that matter. In other words, muffle all talk. But Graham knew it was inadvisable to keep such information solely to oneself. As my sweet mom used to say, “Safety in numbers.” Of course, mom was thinking about her son staying out of trouble. Ha!

It wouldn’t be the first time someone was taken out for knowing too much without sharing the information. I vividly recalled the book Compromised about alleged CIA drug running (Cocaine) through Mena, Arkansas to raise monies to fight the Sandinistas down in Nicaragua after Congress cut off funding. The CIA agent-author of the book was running for his life until his book was published. And, one of the alleged CIA-type pilots running guns to Nicaragua, Barry Seals from Baton Rouge, was snuffed out some months after completing his missions. Barry was a big talker. He knew too much that was not shared by enough folk in short order. Louisiana legend: “the Feds or someone” alerted a drug Cartel telling them where Barry could be found.

This book, however, is like opening a pressure value. Yes, moms know about safety in numbers. Strange how parents know to share such simple, yet vital principles. Graham’s main reason for self-publishing this book was the fear that “someone” could have a publisher shelve the story. To this day, Graham is looking over his shoulder.

If all this worry wasn’t enough, three days from now I was in for the absolute shock of my life! Bar none. The floodgate was about to open ~ and yours truly experienced a renewed acquaintance with frightening figures from the past. October 5, 2001: SECTION 14

USA TODAY: Identifying the Terrorists

BREAKFAST CLUB Showered and shaved. Down the apartment steps and over to Murrell’s Grill for breakfast. You see, many months earlier I had been “unofficially accepted” to join the local Breakfast Club, strategically positioned under photos of former Shreveport politicos.

Breakfast Clubs see the likes of businessmen, doctors, truck drivers, pawn shop owners, car salesmen, attorneys, and perhaps even a Merchant Marine Captain. They could be anybody. Occasionally, a woman or two will break the barrier. It’s where the politicians drop by before election day. Now you know the place!

Today seemed no different. Vernon Johnson. Richard Elston. The late Felix Wheeler. The late Phillip Cecola. Roy Fulco. Bill Meier. Bobby Sutton. Larry Barberousse. Frank Hampson. Yours truly. And, oh yes, Claire Malcolm and Lennis Elston, the beautiful barrier breakers! All in place. On any given day, in order to handle table traffic, a bit of shift work on arrivals please.

“USA TODAY” WAS NEVER SO IMPORTANT

Glancing at the next table, I noticed the USA Today with a story about 9/11, so I quipped,

“Say, Larry, are you looking at pictures of the hijackers?” “Yeah, David, all the little bastards are in the lineup!” “Time out. I’ll be right back.” Outside to the vending machine. Speedy return.

Let’s see now. No, don’t recognize a face that hit the World Trade Center 1. Well, that stubby-necked looking guy on the end of row 2 could have been the fellow at Jamal’s whose eyes were fixated on the corner of the ceiling. Yeah, he was the guy who never looked anyone in the eye, including Jamal and Habeeb ~ just kept standing there at “parade rest.” GRAHAM IDENTIFIES “PRETTY EYES” Let’s see ~ the American Flight 77 hijackers who crashed into the Pentagon.

You gotta’ be kidding! The second one from the right. That’s ole Pretty Eyes who was staring me down at Jamal’s that day! Nawaf Alhazmi ~ one of the names on Jamal’s boxes. Wow! You gotta’ be kiddin! Man, that’s him all right. Those pretty eyes should have been on a good-looking woman. Couldn’t forget Nawaf’s stare if you paid me a million.

Richard, tell Nita to cancel my order! Man, I’m not believing my eyes. Gotta call Agent Spoon!

I slapped two bucks on the table and jogged through Murrell’s front door, stopping traffic in a dead run across East Kings Highway, as Spoon’s return call rang out upon reaching the clinic front door.

THE ELUSIVE AGENT SPOON

Spoon asked if Nawaf had a mustache when Graham saw him at Jamal’s townhouse, and Graham said Nawaf was clean-shaven at Jamal’s. Then, Spoon asked Graham if he was sure Nawaf Alhazmi was the same guy he had seen at Jamal’s townhouse over ten months ago. Graham said he was absolutely sure of Nawaf Alhazmi being the same guy, minus the mustache, with Nawaf, Habeeb, and the third man all wearing identical light- colored turbans and jackets, like maybe they’d been to the Mosque. (Much later, Habeeb confirmed in the “Graham-Habeeb Corroborating Videotape of June 24, 2002” that Habeeb arrived at Jamal’s townhouse with Nawaf and Fayez, with Graham present, after having accompanied Nawaf and Fayez for prayers at Masjid Al-Noor Mosque on Youree Drive in Shreveport).

GRAHAM IDENTIFIES “STUBBY”

Graham also thought that the far right picture (in the 7 Oct 2000 USA Today) of the WTC south tower hijackers resembled the stubby middle-Easterner Graham had been introduced to as a medical doctor by both Habeeb and Jamal (Habeeb saying Fayez Banihammad was a resident MD with Habeeb at LSU Medical Center); however, Graham did not mention this to Spoon at the time because he (Graham) was totally convinced of Nawaf Alhazmi’s identity. A short time later, Graham knew, beyond a doubt, that “Stubby” was truly Fayez Banihammad, recalling that he thought Fayez might be a woman due to his given name being spelled “Fayez,” or similar to “Faye.” Graham remembered the name Khalid Almihdhar (though never meeting Khalid) due to “Khaled” being the sire of Kentucky Derby winner Swaps.

THREE IMPORTANT NAMES TO THE 9/11 PUZZLE All three names had been reported to Shreveport FBI Agent Steve Hayes on Nov 1, 2000. Naturally, on or about 26 Sep 2000, Graham had no idea what these names meant, but he thought it best to jot them down on the palm of his left hand. However, Graham was aghast after the terror of 9-11-01, as Alhazmi, Almihdhar, and Banihammad would all be charged by the U.S. Justice Department as Unindicted Co-Conspirators of 9-11, due to being alleged hijackers of the following airliners:

  1. Nawaf Alhazmi – alleged hijacker of American Airlines Flt. No. 77 which

hit the Pentagon (On or about 7 Oct 2000 Graham was introduced to “Dr. Nawaf Alhazmi” by Jamal and Habeeb, and Nawaf was later deemed to be Mohamed Atta’s Right Hand by the Joint Select Committee on Intelligence’s 9/11 Report) and later, on September 16, 2003, the Associated Press release of interrogation reports from captured Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Al-Qaeda No. 3 and Mastermind of 9/11, reveals Almihdhar and Alhazmi: (1) more important than Mohamed Atta; (2) central to the 9/11 attacks; (3) handpicked by Usama bin Laden; and (4) the so-called Mastermind of 9/11, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, was communicating with them through Internet chat room coded messages.

  1. Fayez Banihammad – alleged hijacker of United Airlines Flt. No. 175 which hit the World Trade Center south tower, possibly commandeering the flight crew and cutting their throats, since Fayez was not known to be a pilot (On or about 7 Oct 2000 Graham was introduced to “Dr. Fayez Banihammad” by Jamal and Habeeb, with Habeeb saying Fayez was a resident MD with him at LSUMC ~ an unmitigated lie)
  2. Khalid Almihdhar – alleged hijacker of American Airlines Flt. No. 77 which

hit the Pentagon (Graham never actually met Khalid Almihdhar) and known by intelligence to have been a ring-leading implementer of 9/11 with Nawaf Alhazmi. (NOTE: In late 2003, Arab newspapers reported Khalid Almihdhar as being alive somewhere in the Arab world.)

GRAHAM BEGINS HELPING THE SHREVEPORT FBI Since Graham had legitimate reason to contact Habeeb in regard to the purported ongoing research study, in mid-October, 2001, Agent Spoon asked Graham to call Habeeb at LSU Medical Center to see if Habeeb was still in Shreveport. As requested by the FBI, Graham did contact Habeeb, who made a dental appointment that same day to come by Dr. Graham’s clinic. Before Habeeb arrived for said appointment, Graham called Spoon; Spoon was pleased with the Habeeb contact and asked Graham to act normal around Habeeb without bringing up the name of Jamal and just see what develops.

During the appointment at 4:00 p.m., Dr. Graham checked Habeeb’s teeth and while Graham was writing on the dental chart, Habeeb asked Graham if he had heard from Jamal. Dr. Graham replied that he had not talked with Jamal since around October, 2000. Habeeb then said that he (Habeeb) had not talked to Jamal since November of 2000. With that statement by Habeeb, I thought Habeeb had gone out of his way to convince me that he and Jamal seldom communicated. Habeeb’s intentions were simply too obvious. Yes, Habeeb’s demeanor was more than suspect. I read him like a book. Had he been playing poker, Habeeb would be accused of pulling a Texas Windy, bluffing by betting big while holding a handful of weak cards.

Graham continued to procrastinate on the research study in order to stay in touch with Dr. Habeeb after he finished his residency program at LSU Medical Center in late June, 2002. Habeeb then headed to Ochsner Hospital in New Orleans, LA (but not before Graham filmed his corroborating videotape of Graham and Habeeb on June 24, 2002 ~ much more on the filming later).

By this time, though I knew in my heart it was wrong, the gravity of my situation had fostered a deep resentment for Muslims. A minority of misguided Muslims had put the hurt on America. Directly on our soil. Directly killing over 3,000 Americans. I took it quite personally ~ too personally. Like many in the Free World, I was caught up in placing the blame on too many Muslims in spite of knowing there are many good Muslim American citizens.

Being single and enjoying eating out, in every restaurant my eyes searched for faces in the crowd that had the middle-Eastern look. There’s a Muslim over there. And probably two more at that back table. It was rapidly becoming an obsession. SECTION 15

Dallas FBI Arrests Jamal in Tyler, Texas

THE SO-CALLED NAWAF ALHAZMI LOOK-ALIKE

On or about October 10, 2001:

Dr. Graham paged Agent Spoon to provide Spoon with details of the used truck (that Jamal was interested in purchasing) that had slipped Graham’s memory during the October 2, 2001 interview (with Spoon). After discussing the large used truck for two minutes, Spoon changed the subject and told Graham that “somebody said” there is a medical doctor over at LSU Medical Center who looks a lot like the Arab Graham called “Pretty Eyes,” namely Nawaf Alhazmi.

Graham said that Spoon should bring Graham a picture of this so-called look-alike doctor from LSUMC, to clear things up, because Graham was absolutely certain he (Graham) met Nawaf Alhazmi at Jamal’s townhouse on or about 7 Oct 2000, as identified on 5 Oct 2001 in USA Today.

Further, Graham said he would be more inclined for Spoon to introduce Graham face-to- face to the purported Nawaf Alhazmi look-alike at LSU Medical Center since Graham did not want an erroneous Shreveport FBI report to go upstairs to FBI Headquarters. Spoon said he would either try to get a picture or arrange said introduction in order to clear up the matter. In all fairness, this could have been Spoon’s manner of testing Graham’s memory and/or ascertaining that Graham was sticking by his story.

TYLER, TX: JAMAL IS ARRESTED

On or about October 12, 2001: Jamal Arrested in Texas by Dallas FBI Field Office

According to FBI Agent Spoon, the Dallas FBI Field Office agents arrested Mohammad Jamal Khan at or near Tyler, Texas on an original charge of firearms violation. Jamal had allegedly purchased a semi-automatic rifle while having an expired business visa. After the FBI ran a thorough background check on Jamal, he was indicted (along with his business partner Saeed Tanoli) for structuring fifty thousand ($50,000.00) dollars by depositing and wire transferring nine thousand nine hundred ninety-nine ($9,999.00) dollars at the request of Liaquat Ali, a Shreveport package liquor store owner. All three eventually pled guilty, with Liaquat Ali rolling over with evidence and also being nailed for other offenses which led, but was not limited to, to his being fined fifty-three thousand ($53,000.00) dollars. Only Liaquat Ali’s name appeared in the Shreveport Gannett daily, The Times, with basic details of his case (Mohammad Jamal Khan and Saeed Tanoli’s names appeared in no local media outlets as of May 7, 2004). It was great hearing of Jamal’s arrest. The FBI did their homework well. I only wished the arrest had been for allegedly aiding and abetting terrorism.

GRAHAM PRESSES SPOON ABOUT ALHAZMI LOOK-ALIKE

On or about October 16, 2001:

Graham asked Spoon about the picture of the so-called “Nawaf-look-alike-doctor” from LSU Med Center. Spoon, sounding highly irritated, told Graham not to worry about it any more, because Nawaf Alhazmi died in the Pentagon crash along with Khalid Almihdhar and Fayez Banihammad, and Spoon had earlier arranged for Jamal to be arrested near Tyler, Texas. Spoon firmly stated to Graham that he was not worrying about those dead terrorists, and that he was worrying about terrorists who were alive and able to do us harm today.

Graham politely retorted that they needed to clear the air about a possible doctor at LSU Med Center looking like Nawaf, so that in the event Jamal and/or Habeeb were brought to trial for allegedly aiding and abetting the terrorists, no one could contest the fact that Graham had absolutely seen Nawaf and Fayez enter Jamal’s townhouse with Habeeb. Besides, an FBI report by Spoon, or others, would be incorrect if stating that Nawaf could have been an LSUMC doctor.

In any case, since Spoon did not desire to pursue the look-alike picture, Graham assumed that there was no look-alike doctor at LSU Medical Center in the first place. Another design by Spoon’s supervisors to distract Graham? You decide.

UP HOPPED THE “BUZZARD AND THE ORIOLE”

Dr. Graham also asked Agent Spoon for more details about the threat concerning “whoever turned in Jamal” (since Graham was an informer). Spoon said that it was no big deal, that Jamal was just mouthing off in prison saying that he (Jamal) was going to pay back the informer. Spoon told Graham that Jamal really could not do anything, since he was in prison. Yeah, right. Of course, this “new story” of Jamal mouthing off in jail is decidedly different from Spoon’s original alleged scare tactic of saying the “Shreveport FBI office had gotten a mysterious phone call saying that they would pay back whoever turned in Jamal.” Again, you decide. Whatever Spoon’s reasoning, his earlier remarks obviously did cause Graham to fear an alleged terrorist payback.

Suddenly, it became obvious that any and all Shreveport FBI agents were intent on not returning my phone calls or pages. Knowing Agent Spoon, in particular, as an especially good agent, I reasoned that an FBI supervisor-type had directed Spoon and other agents to avoid Dr. David Graham in the hope that I would simply go back to crowning teeth and forget the whole affair, especially with a formidable amount of FBI intimidation thrown in. The potentially fabricated story of an LSU Med Center Nawaf Alhazmi look-alike fits this category. Such confusion led me to share these accounts with friends, who were not as forgiving of the FBI. I kept thinking that my being avoided by the Shreveport FBI might reflect their busy schedule. After all, Agent Spoon stated on several occasions that he had stacks of cases on his desk ~ terrorism, narcotics, you name it. Well, I was satisfied with such an excuse for a few weeks. However, after the Shreveport FBI totally stopped returning important phone calls (topics of vital information that I disclosed), I wondered if the Shreveport FBI Office was bent on keeping the lid on my Shreveport Al-Qaeda story since the original Graham Report was dated over ten months before September 11, 2001, thereby spreading much egg on their face during the tenure of FBI Director Louis Freeh.

GRAHAM’S FRUSTRATIONS LED TO WRITING THE STORY

Being respectful of authority from both my upbringing and military training, this new perceived FBI deception began to boil inside. Surely a citizen trying to help unravel the mysteries of 9/11 should be able to communicate with his FBI agents covering the case. What’s going on here?

My frustration was finally brought to an end. It was now obvious where I should direct my attention. My entire terrorist encounter should be recorded. Write the story.

Avoiding friends after clinic hours, I was totally committed to writing exact details of my inadvertent run-in with suspected terrorists in Shreveport, Louisiana. Nights and weekends. Friends did not understand the commitment. Serious commitment. I felt betrayed by an FBI that I had believed in since a young boy. Why were they treating me with such elitism? I considered the information in my reports to be extremely important. I did not understand ~ and I was totally confounded.

Such avoidance by the FBI engendered a growing fear. The sincerity of my mission, coupled with surprising treatment by the FBI, left me empty ~ yes, my inner being was hurting. They simply were not shooting straight, figuratively speaking, of course. SECTION 16 Terror Puzzle Becomes A Picture

HORSE TALK ~ TERROR TALK

Having been in both the Texas and Louisiana Thoroughbred Breeders Associations, Graham readily identified with the name Khalid Almihdhar, since “Khaled” was the sire of Kentucky Derby winner Swaps (Post-9/11, Graham discovered that the three names on the boxes on Jamal’s kitchen floor were actually the names of three alleged hijackers on 9-11-01).

In retrospect, a few weeks after 9/11, the FBI obviously knew the names on Jamal’s boxes matched the 9/11 hijackers, unless, that is, either (1) the “Gorelick Wall” interfered with intra/inter-security communication, or (2) the Shreveport FBI Office was derelict of duty by not forwarding the disturbing Graham Report up to FBI Headquarters, or (3) FBI Headquarters did actually receive the Graham Report but downgraded Graham’s information (similarly as evidence proved that FBI Headquarters downgraded Ms. Rowley’s pre-9/11 Minneapolis FBI Report).

GRAHAM IDENTIFIES THREE 9/11 HIJACKERS

As this frightening ordeal was being unraveled by Graham, Agent Spoon’s behavior (about desiring to talk with Graham) made an about-face. Graham’s identification of Fayez Banihammad as the “stubby one to whom Dr. Graham had been introduced to as Medical Doctor at LSUMC” came days after Graham’s ID of Nawaf Alhazmi.

On the same day, the name “Khalid Almihdhar” was identified as one of the names on Jamal’s three boxes on Jamal’s kitchen floor. Though Graham never met Khalid Almihdhar, his (Khalid Almihdhar’s) name was turned over to Agent Steve Hayes on November 1, 2000 (along with Nawaf Alhazmi and Fayez Banihammad), with Graham learning from the Oct 5, 2001 USA Today article that Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar were running buddies.

SHREVEPORT FBI AVOIDS GRAHAM

After Graham reported to FBI Agent Spoon of his completing the three identifications of hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi, Fayez Banihammad, and Khalid Almihdhar as having been on boxes on Jamal’s kitchen floor, and Graham having met (shaking hands with) so-called “Dr. Nawaf Alhazmi” and “Dr. Fayez Banihammad,” back on or about 7 Oct 2000, Agent Spoon abruptly stopped returning Graham’s phone calls and/or pages. During this period, self-inflicted pressure was bad enough without the Shreveport FBI running out on me. I felt deserted. Divorced. Yes, divorced without good cause. And the desertion angered me immensely. It actually increased my determination to follow through on recording details of my account.

GRAHAM REPORTS TO FBI-CIA-HOMELAND WEBSITES

Since FBI Agent Spoon began to ignore Graham’s pages, Dr. Graham began sending information, as discovered, to www.ifccfbi.gov and to Homeland Security and to www.cia.gov. There may have been one more thing that upset Spoon. However, Graham’s serious encounter which follows would not justify the FBI’s behavior in ignoring Graham’s calls with national security information. Graham thought the average citizen would have stopped helping the FBI with this treatment from the agents. However, Dr. Graham did not hold this against Agent Spoon, for Graham thought “someone up-line to Spoon” must be calling the shots related to Spoon not returning Graham’s pages. So Graham kept searching for answers surrounding Mohammad Jamal Khan and Dr. Mohammed “Habeeb” Ahmed, the LSU Medical Center resident in cardiology.

After several weeks of frustration about Spoon not returning calls and pages, Graham began writing a manuscript about the entire account, beginning with meeting Habeeb in the dental clinic and meeting Jamal several months later as a potential investor in Graham’s upstart company AdvaLife.

Writing about the events of this account proved to be my foremost manner of release. Record the story with precise details. Writing brought freedom. Freedom to tell it all, without knowing the day would come when my Shreveport terrorist account would be valuable information for the U.S. Joint Select Committee on Intelligence (JSCI) studying the events leading to September 11, 2001 and the “9/11 Commission,” who would have new information (at their disposal) related to events leading up to 9/11 and, additionally, is providing an in-depth 9/11 Commission Final Report for use in future strengthening of U.S. security. SECTION 17 National Security Leak

Though I experienced several shocking episodes sprinkled throughout this report, this section was up there with the best of them. And it was so coincidental as to be downright frightening.

Shockingly, one of Dr. Graham’s patients, Vernon Mouton (fictitious name), said he had read a report stating that Jamal (after being arrested) said he (Jamal) was trying to do business with people like Dr. David Graham. Mouton said he read on a report that Jamal was in Federal Prison in North Carolina. Graham asked Mouton where he had gotten his information, and Mouton arrogantly said not to worry about his source. Graham told Mouton that he did not know it, but Graham had turned in Mohamad Jamal months ago on November 1, 2000. Though friends, Graham and the former Golden Gloves boxer, Mouton, had uncharacteristically heated words over his outbursts.

Dr. Graham immediately called Agent Spoon, Graham relating the Vernon Mouton episode to Spoon and asking him if there could be a Shreveport FBI leak. Spoon assured Graham that the FBI had orders from President George W. Bush on down to stop all leaks. Even though Graham was not convinced, he (Graham) would be proven wrong. Let’s go there.

GRAHAM UNRAVELS THE SECURITY LEAK

Two weeks later, Mouton dropped by Dr. Graham’s dental clinic about 7:00 p.m. after having several beers. Graham asked Mouton to have a seat and chat a while. Ten minutes later, Graham began complementing Mouton on how good he was at getting information. Graham asked Mouton had he come across anything lately about Jamal. Before long, Graham had coaxed out of Mouton his earlier source for information (about Jamal) as having come out of Houston. Graham reported this major security leak to www.ifccfbi.gov since Spoon did not return Graham’s pages.

Since the security leak involved the office of a former government official of major significance, Graham would have preferred to report directly to an agent, but had little choice. The exact place of the aforementioned leak will be revealed in Closed Session to the Joint Select Committee on Intelligence (JSCI) beginning on or about June, 2002, should the committee invite Graham to testify.

The JSCI never called Dr. Graham for any reason whatsoever. However, Graham remains open to share details to the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) at any future date.

Once again, due to non-communication from the Shreveport FBI agents, I was forced to reveal a serious national security leak over the Internet: www.ifccfbi.gov How ridiculous! But, what was I to do? Share it with the Domino pizza delivery boy? SECTION 18 FBI Turns Deaf Ear

A FRUSTRATED GRAHAM CALLS AGENT HUDSON

On or about January 4, 2002:

Graham aired dissatisfactions to FBI Agent David Hudson, who had an empathetic ear:

Calling the Shreveport FBI Office for Agent Spoon, the receptionist said Spoon was out, so Graham asked for the Director (unaware that the proper title is Special Agent-in- Charge). The receptionist, following Graham’s choice of words, informed Graham that the Director had moved on, and that they now had an Interim Director.

Rather than conversing with an Interim Director whom he had not met, Graham thought of his pool hall acquaintance, David Hudson. Graham knew Shreveport FBI Agent David Hudson from hanging out at Mama Mia’s Restaurant on Centenary Boulevard, watching off-duty agents and fishing buddies shoot the sticks. The receptionist got Hudson on the phone.

Graham told Agent Hudson about the entire Jamal-Habeeb encounter with the suspicious mid-easterners, and so on, then asked Hudson why Spoon did not return his pages any longer. Graham related to Agent Hudson that the average citizen would have given up weeks ago due to the indifferent treatment by Shreveport FBI Agents.

Graham then shared with Hudson that the situation had gotten so bad that Graham had completed an extremely in-depth report about the entire Jamal-Habeeb encounters, and that Dr. Graham might mail copies to all major security heads in order to make sure the reports were being sent in exactly as Graham had related them. How could Graham trust Agents Spoon and Bland if they consistently ignored returning pages by Graham? Something was sadly wrong about this situation.

AGENTS HUDSON AND SPOON HUDDLE

Hudson promised Graham that he would try to get Spoon to give him a holler. Sure enough, two hours later, Spoon called and said that since it was Friday, he would definitely call Graham the following Monday to set up an interview about Graham’s new physical information: five pages of notes made by , who spent two full days looking into Jamal’s business dealings as a prerequisite for business with Jamal, with allegedly uncovering fraudulent behavior by Jamal. Well, Agent Spoon did not call for several months, not until 22 May, 2000, and Graham remained holding the hardcopy information, which Spoon said not to mail him (probably since all FBI offices were swamped with checking each piece of mail, as this period coincided with the Anthrax cases).

First, Graham had copies of five pages of notes made by as he investigated Jamal’s business dealings. Second, Graham had one of Jamal’s business cards that Brenda O’Brock recovered with help from husband Jim, a business card showing that Jamal used “779 Shreveport-Barksdale Highway, Shreveport, LA 71105” as the address for his purported new company called Global Textile Industry, Inc., this address being the exact address of USA CASH, where Jamal told Graham that Jamal hung out daily doing his faxes and emails around the world.

JAMAL DECLARES HIS WORLDWIDE IMPORTANCE

Jamal underscored his status, by shouting, “David, I am a very important person! I promise you, I am very important. I’m emailing around the world ~ everywhere ~ even to the Mideast.” as he slapped his chest with each exclamation.

Said business card also stated Jamal’s Fax number. Graham has saved said Jamal business card in a protected container, just in case the FBI one day wishes to run a DNA to prove Jamal had handled the card (and that no one printed it recently).

Upon the January, 2002 arrival of Agent-in-Charge Mike Kinder to the Shreveport FBI Office, Dr. Graham began to hope for drastic changes in the area of communications. SECTION 19

31 Jan 2002: Manuscript to Shreveport FBI

JAMAL AND NANCY KHAN

In late January, 2002, I discovered that Mohammad Jamal and his new wife, Nancy, from Tyler, Texas, are listed in directory service as Nancy and Jamal Khan, I instantly recalled that Jamal told me on or about 9-26-00 that his father’s name was “Khan.” I would have been able to give in Pakistan) months earlier, but the FBI stopped consulting me on the case (had I known Jamal was remarried again, now using his last name as Khan, I would have instantly been able to recall Jamal telling me that his . Remember, after re- reporting my story, Agent Spoon told me on 2 October, 2001, that Jamal’s In any case, Jamal is now known as “Mohammad Jamal Khan.” CORROBORATION: GRAHAM RECOGNIZES AGENT HAYES

January 31, 2002: Talk with new Shreveport FBI Agent-in-charge Mike Kinder

Graham met with Agent-in-Charge Kinder, with Agent Steve Hayes at his side exchanging cordialities with Dr. Graham (yes, that is the same FBI Agent Steve Hayes who took Graham’s initial report on 1 Nov 2000). Kinder immediately asked which agents had not been returning Graham pages, and Graham chose not to discredit any agent(s) in the presence of Agent Hayes, with Graham explaining that he was primarily interested in helping to prevent another terrorist attack like September 11, 2001.

I wholeheartedly believe Agent Kinder had Agent Hayes at his side that day merely to see if I would recognize Steve Hayes as the Shreveport FBI agent who had received my first report back on November 1, 2000. And I was extremely pleased with what the reader is about to discover:

CRITICAL ADMISSION BY FBI AGENT STEVE HAYES

Graham briefly referred to facts of the Jamal-Habeeb encounters. In the presence of Agent Mike Kinder, Agent Mike Hayes agreed that Graham had, on 1 Nov 2000, reported to Agent Hayes the names of Nawaf Alhazmi, Fayez Banihammad, and Khalid Almihdhar, with Hayes defensively stating, “Yes, but I did not know who those three guys were.”

Graham chimed in with, “That’s right, and I feared the Muslims might truck-bomb Barksdale’s B-52 flight line.”

Kinder then quietly allowed Graham to give a thumbnail sketch of his encounter, with Agent Hayes nodding in agreement.

Agent Kinder was given a copy of a manuscript (that Graham preferred to give Kinder rather than publishing a book at that point), said manuscript providing an in-depth look into the Jamal-Habeeb association with future Unindicted Co-Conspirators of 9/11 (one hijacker of United Flt 175 and two hijackers of American Flt 77), and Kinder assured Graham that Agent Bland would be calling Graham after Kinder and Bland had digested the report.

Unfortunately, Shreveport FBI Agent Bland never called Graham, even after Graham specified he had pertinent information about the case of Dr. Mohammed Habeeb Ahmed, whom Bland was allegedly assigned to investigate (U.S. Secret Service Agent Ron Lewis told Graham that FBI Agent Bland was investigating Habeeb); but Graham persisted in providing information to the FBI by reporting directly to www.ifccfbi.gov and to Homeland Security, and occasionally to www.cia.gov

February 11, 2002: Call to Shreveport FBI Agent-in-Charge Mike Kinder

Special Agent-in-Charge Mike Kinder returned Graham’s call and was quite cordial in requesting Graham to feel free, at any time, to drop off information at the Shreveport FBI Office, requesting the names of employees who received said information. Kinder additionally stated that Agent Bland would be contacting Graham in several days. Graham greatly appreciated this new attitude and attention to detail. Again, unfortunately FBI Agent Bland never called. Everyone said Bland was a nice fellow, so what’s his problem? Up-line supervisors are allegedly acting like a broken record. On the other hand, perhaps Agent Bland was being overly cautious concerning his name being in the Graham Report. Sorry, too late. SECTION 20

7 Feb 2002: Report to FBI Agent Spoon

BACKDROP

In 1982, the thoroughbreds were not supporting our Grawood Farm ~ the time, the expense, and changing priorities. Shreveport enjoyed a mild winter that year, with the last foals promising a stretch run. In my final race, with trainer Gene Norman at the helm, our chestnut colt lit up the board at the Fair Grounds in New Orleans. On the backside, grooms and trainers alike quickly surrounded the scrappy little runner. Though Grawood Farm had raised a beautiful chestnut colt, the biggest commotion was about his name. There was something about that name: Run To Jesus.

On 31 Jan 2002, Dr. Graham’s personal conversation with Shreveport FBI Agent-in- Charge Mike Kinder ended with an appointment on or about 7 Feb 2002 to meet him with the new summary report. However, after checking in the Shreveport FBI office downtown, Graham had a little surprise. A smiling FBI Agent Ray Spoon popped through the door instead of Kinder.

FBI Agent Ray Spoon cordially greeted Graham in the Shreveport FBI Office foyer with, “Good to see you, Dr. Graham. I apologize for not returning your calls. I’ve been to some of those required FBI meetings, you know. And then I had a flat tire to change on another occasion; everything kept happening to prevent my returning your calls.” Right. Graham goes through the motions of accepting the Spoon apologies.

Cordially, Spoon notes Graham’s new goatee, and Graham notes Spoon’s new mustache. SPOON AFFIRMS VALIDITY OF THE GRAHAM REPORT

Agent Spoon acknowledges that he read the 96-page report that was delivered on 31 Jan 2002 to FBI Agent-in-Charge Mike Kinder, saying, “Graham, I want you to know that I believe you told the exact truth in your nice report.”

Graham was very appreciative of the compliment, then asked Spoon not to deport Jamal and Habeeb because President George W. Bush said that anyone harboring or supporting a terrorist was a terrorist himself. With that, Agent Spoon cracked a smile and assured Graham that the FBI was involved in things he could not discuss at this time. Good enough for Graham. End of conversation.

As I took the elevator down, reality set in as to why Spoon greeted me rather than Kinder, with whom I had the appointment. I got the distinct feeling that the Shreveport FBI, for whatever reason, was now attempting to smooth over the many telephone refusals I was dealt for countless weeks. Perhaps someone upstairs was now in the business of beginning a new dialogue with me. My deepest desire, however, was short- lived, as I would not have another Shreveport FBI agent return calls until late May, 2002.

GRAHAM UNDER CONVICTION ABOUT MUSLIMS

On a sidebar subject, it had been months since I began resenting everything associated with Islam, unquestionably due to my encounter with the alleged terrorists at Jamal’s residence on or about 7 Oct 2000. I had grown tired of my resentment, which was close to being hatred, that can only destroy an individual over time. Besides, I knew from my Christian upbringing that we should love all people. Long ago, Dad and Mom had taught me to love other Christians, the Jewish people, and those we had never met from other faiths around the world. Even so, at first, my soul was embattled with the dichotomy of hate and love. I desperately needed a Run To Jesus.

It was time for a change ~ a radical internal change for David Malcolm Graham. Some call it soul-searching. So, bedside in my Ockley Street residence, I fell to my knees to seek forgiveness for my unchristian recentment of Islam. Not only did I desire a renewed attitude toward Muslims, I knew, according to the teachings of Jesus, Christians are commanded to love and pray for enemies regardless of where they live, regardless of what they believe, and regardless if some of them may hate and/or kill.

Somehow my ill-founded situation with Muslims was the antithesis of sharing my dental talents around the world: Numerous trips with the Mexican-Indian Training Center in Cordoba, Mexico for Pacific coastal Chinintacho Indians and isolated mountainous villages like Ucella to the east; and my Vietnamese hamlets, refugee camps, and Leprosarium. How I enjoyed those days. Desperate call for a rally.

So I mended fences with a renewed love for all peoples. The Lord forgave my wayward thoughts and transformed me in a dramatic way. It was with grateful heart that all animosity for Muslims was removed and, thankfully, today it is replaced with forgiveness, love, and prayer. When Satan attempts to reclaim his territory by rekindling old animosities, I simply think of the little Chestnut horse and Run to Jesus.

9/11 VICTIM FAMILIES

Considering my difficulty with this subject, my heart goes out to the loved ones of the victims on September 11, 2001. One can only imagine their barriers in projecting forgiveness, love, and prayer for worldwide Muslims. Our humanism fuels hate. God can replace hate with love, if we only ask. The best hope for closure ~ and another reason the victimized families continue to need our prayers for inner strength. SECTION 21

May 22, 2002: Spoon’s Six Surprises

Dr. Mohammed Habeeb Ahmed had a Dental Hygiene appointment at 3:30 pm on May 22, 2002 to have his teeth cleaned (I suspected that since the FBI probably were monitoring Habeeb’s calls, and my calls, that Agent Spoon knew of the dental appointment, but that was merely my speculation).

PLEASE PROTECT YOUR INFORMERS

On 22 May, 2002, after Graham told Spoon of Habeeb’s dental hygiene appointment, Agent Spoon said he might as well come during Habeeb’s appointment time so that Spoon could “clear up this business with Habeeb.” Graham first questioned Spoon as to why he had not questioned Habeeb before now, since Habeeb is regularly at LSUMC, and 9/11 is more than a big deal. Spoon said he actually has been too busy on other cases and Habeeb is a hard man to track down.

Graham then told Spoon that his (Graham’s) personal health could be involved here, because Habeeb would assume Dr. Graham called Spoon to say Habeeb had the 3:30 appointment, and hold that assumption against Graham. FBI Agent Spoon assured Graham that he would tell Habeeb that he followed Habeeb to the dental clinic. Fat chance Habeeb would believe that one! But, Graham sucked it up for the cause, and told Spoon to drop by around 3:50, and if Habeeb’s black Lexus SUV was out front, he would be inside seeing Dr. Graham’s dental hygienist, LeeAnne Scruggs.

Well, as it turned out, Habeeb got busy and missed his dental hygiene appointment. Thank you, Lord. A disappointed Agent Spoon arrived at 3:55 pm, entering the clinic with arms downward and hands flexed outwardly as if to say, “So where is Habeeb?” Graham explained that many doctors have emergencies and have to cancel out, then invited Agent Spoon into the reception room for the chat he originally desired with Graham.

At first, Spoon hesitated as if he forgot that his purported reason for calling Graham was to talk with him (Graham). Could it have really been to make Habeeb angry at Dr. Graham? Hmmm. Spoon displayed a few interesting scenarios during the Graham interview on 22 May 2002, several days before Graham was to hand-carry his Graham Report to the Joint Select Committee on Intelligence in Washington, DC.

SPOON DISHES OUT SURPRISES Immediately, while seated next to Graham, FBI Agent Ray Spoon leaned over into Graham’s face, and asked, “Dr. Graham, how have you been feeling lately?” Graham replied, “Fine.” Ray then leaned even closer, and asked, “Really, Graham, are you sure you have been feeling good these days?” David, being somewhat intimidated, answers as firmly as possible, “Yeah, I’m doing Okay.” “Just checking; know you’ve had a lot on your mind these last few days.”

You see, Agent Spoon would not have been doing his job if Dr. Graham were not being monitored on his telephone calls. Therefore, the Shreveport FBI potentially knew at this point that Graham had every intention of hand-carrying his Graham Report to the Joint Select Committee on Intelligence. In fact, Spoon probably even knew that David would drive his Land Rover to Charleston, SC on Saturday, 1 Jun 2002, to spend the night with Tracy Ammons, then head out for Washington, DC on Sunday. (Is that giving the Shreveport FBI too much credit?)

THE STRANGE POLYGRAPH

During conversation with Agent Spoon, Graham asked him if and when we would see an indictment against Jamal and Habeeb for alleged support of terrorists. Spoon said the federal government would not charge anyone without corroborating evidence, and that Graham’s account, by itself, would wind up being “he said – she said.” Spoon then said that Jamal had passed a Polygraph Test. Immediately and emphatically, Graham asked if the FBI, during the testing, had “asked Jamal if he had ever met Nawaf Alhazmi and Fayez Banihammad.”

With that, Spoon quickly jumped to his feet, saying, “That sounds like something you saw on television. The FBI doesn’t operate like that.” Graham replied, “Well, that seems like the absolute best question the FBI would eventually ask Jamal and Habeeb, just to evaluate how the needle jumps.” “Too much television, Graham.”

UPDATED INFORMATION That day, FBI Agent Spoon’s statements included, but were not limited to, the following: 1.

2. Mohammad Jamal Khan, Saeed A. Tanoli, and Liaquat Ali all pled guilty of structuring $50,000.00 by Jamal and Saeed Tanoli depositing and wire transferring $9,999.00 at the request of Liaquat Ali (all Public Record).

The Justice Department may attempt to deport Jamal but they may not have enough on him for deportation. Graham replied, “Good, I think Jamal and and Habeeb should be taken to Tribunal Court as alleged terrorist harborers and supporters, repectively.” Spoon said that Graham’s witnessing against

them may not be enough at this point (Subsequently, “Graham-Habeeb Videotape of June 24, 2002” and the “Graham-Khan Videotape of March 8, 2003” should provide strong corroboration of any and all Graham Reports to FBI, CIA, and Homeland Security, or to any court or tribunal).

3. Graham suggested to Spoon that if he were to show Jamal and Habeeb the photographs of Nawaf Alhazmi and Fayez Banihammad, and Jamal and/or Habeeb were to say they did not know these men, then it would further reinforce that Jamal and Habeeb were faking the identities and vocations of (9/11 hijackers) Fayez andNawaf when Graham met them on or about 7 Oct 2000, and further, it would reinforce that both Jamal and Habeeb were allegedly terrorists themselves.

On 22 May, 2002 I considered that I had been misled by the FBI in at least two ways:

(1). FBI Agent Spoon insisted upon having an interview with me even though he knew full well that Habeeb would think I called the FBI to entrap him while having a dental hygiene appointment.

Was the FBI intentionally endangering a U.S. citizen? Surely not.

(2). And, when Spoon tried to discourage the validity of my account with the 9/11 terrorists, and their harborers and supporters, I took it as an attempt to have me postpone my trip to the Joint Select

Committee on Intelligence. Of course, some would say, “That’s just good business negotiation.” Perhaps so. But for Spoon to

imply, through the purported passed Polygraph Test, that Jamal was not harboring and supporting terrorists was too much; of course, one could say that Spoon was merely testing the strength of my potential future testimony. Hey, I’d love to believe the latter!

Oh, yes, may I give you one to grow on?

(3). Before parting, FBI Agent Spoon tried to convince me that there are potentially three or four “Dr. Nawaf Alhazmi’s” in Chicago. I reminded Spoon one more time that I was absolutely certain that I was an eye-witness to Nawaf Alhazmi, the 9/11 terrorist (who was pictured in 5 Oct 2001 USA Today and hijacked American Airlines Flight 77 which hit the Pentagon) as the same man I saw at Jamal’s townhouse on or about 7 Oct 2000. Additionally, I

was absolutely sure, a few days later, that Fayez Banihammad (who hijacked United Airlines Flight 175 which hit World Trade Center south tower) was the other hijacker whom I was with at Jamal’s townhouse at Eastwood on the Bayou in Shreveport, LA on or about 7 Oct 2000.

The next day, I checked for hours to locate a Nawaf Alhazmi, doctor or otherwise, in the Chicago area to no avail. Even if there is a second Nawaf Alhazmi in this world, the fact remains that the terrorists Nawaf Alhazmi and Fayez Banihammad in USA Today were unquestionably the young men at Jamal’s townhouse (on or about 7 Oct 2000).

22 May 2002 may have been another in a series of cases wherein “up-line FBI supervisors” were controlling the shots and directing Spoon in his alleged attempts to convince me to postpone the Washington, DC trip. Then, too, Spoon (during Oct 2000) was Shreveport FBI Assistant Agent-in-Charge and may have felt an obligation to reduce Shreveport FBI’s accountability. We may never know the whole story. In any case, this is what I went through just days before I left for Washington, DC with Graham Report in hand.

BULLET INTO GRAHAM’S RESIDENCE

SIDEBAR: An incident at my Ockley Street residence also preceded my DC trip. Without notifying me, my landlord and her property repairman replaced one of my front windows which had been shot with a .22 caliber bullet. My doubts were quickly supplanted after they told me to check out the .22 slug lodged in the second-from-left panel of my Chinese screen in the living room. They told no lies.

In no way am I implying this was an FBI event. On the contrary, an acquaintance known for his panic attacks could be the culprit. This guy was extremely dubious when hearing of my account and even acted jealous that I was heading to Washington with my terrorism report. I am in no way claiming to be a psychiatrist, but this type of guy just might plug a window in his effort to alter reality. Whatever. The bullet remains in the engraving on the beautiful Chinese divider.

Regardless of the perpetrator, when a bullet races through your house, you begin to worry of enemies. Since I had no known enemies, uncertainty reigned. I would have been a total fool not to consider all potential offenders. FBI? No. Al-Qaeda? Not on their radar screen. Panicsville friend? Possibly. Random shooting? Unlikely in that neighborhood. Remains a mystery.

GRAHAM GOES DEFENSIVE

But, more importantly, why ignore the situation as if it never happened? Consequently, I dragged out the ole camou flak jacket. Until leaving for Washington, I wore it in the SUV at night. Flak jacket to sleep, or bunching it up next to my torso (on my south side, toward the Chinese divider). Hey, the next bullet could be from a .308, or a .45, or whatever. In fact, I trekked on down to Lorant’s Sporting Goods and bought myself a nice little XR-15 (AR-15 with short barrel). Jerry Lorant grinned and said, “David, you’ll have lots of fun with that little baby!” Pray it will never be needed.

SECOND SIDEBAR: During this same timeline, I received an evening call at the dental clinic, with the cheery voice (in broken English) announcing a new dental magazine. She wanted to ask some of those annoying survey questions. Obviously being on my best behavior, I complied. A few quick questions. Yes, I am a solo practitioner. Yes, I’ve been in practice for over 20 years. Color of my eyes? What’s that got to do with dentistry? Clunk. Miss Broken English was instantly gone with no good-byes. Hmmm.

Could someone be compiling a composite picture of yours truly? On the other hand, could someone be wanting me to “think” such a composite was being constructed, perhaps to give me something else to worry about? We’ll never know. Who knows, perhaps someone needed statistics to create the average “generic dentist” for a video game. Yeah, fat chance. PART III

SECTION 22

June 2, 2002: Graham Reports to Joint Select Committee on Intelligence

FLASHBACK: FEAR IN VIETNAM

By my count, beginning in later 1967, Bien Hoa Air Base received over twenty-five rocket attacks before my departing in July, 1968. Dodging rockets is no fun. You see, rockets are much more dangerous than mortars ~ like a rocket would knock out the entire ceiling in an average American living room, exploding the roof shingles, rafters, air-conditioning unit, ceiling, stud walls and furniture, sending the mangled refuge many feet into the air. Thankfully, in Vietnam, most servicemen/women had protective bunkers, but only the newly-designed bunkers with (sand-filled) three-foot thick walls and ceiling could survive a direct hit.

Rocket attacks at Bien Hoa were so awesome and became so frequent as to send a few guys stateside as basket cases ~ and several of my friends were over half-way home. One night stands alone in my mind.

We could hear the rockets exploding almost on top of us. By the sound of concussions, I could tell that three or four rockets had hit nearby living quarters, the hooches, and a few deathly screams rang out. And when the first sirene was to signal medics to the dispensary, it was obvious that I would be detoured to treat the nearby casualties. It would be more than I expected.

Several hooches were in total flames. The Ranch Hand hooch, where our Medical Commander Major Vause quartered, was burning profusely (refer to Timeline to see the burning Ranch Hand hooch). But the worst scene was forty feet away.

A group of Airmen on TDY (Temporary Duty) from Cam Ranh Bay had taken a direct hit in the doorway of their bunker. Survivors on the opposite end of the bunker said several of the men had not obeyed orders to lie down during rocket attacks. A gigantic pile of sand, about fifteen feet in diameter, was filled with Airmen’s bodies and pieces of bodies. And six or seven objects were jammed between the bunker and the hooch, sticking into the air, but I couldn’t take the time to check it out. I was the ranking medical officer, and so, had to command the bloody scene. Triage: decide which casualties can be saved.

“Don’t just stand there! Immediately start digging these guys out of the sand ~ now! I’ll shine the light to see if their pupils respond (no pupils closing indicates no life).” Two alert Airmen quickly grabbed hold of the injured, one dragging a body by the foot and the other grabbing a fallen comrade by the hand. Shockingly, neither Airmen had hold of a complete body. I was as stunned as they.

“Shake it off, guys, you gotta forget it and keep going! Dig some more guys out of the sand! That’s it, fellows, you’re doing great. But let’s go faster! Every second counts!”

“Doc, I think this one is alive! Come quick!”

“Good job, Airman, he is alive! And I see the ambulance has arrived. Put him on that litter the way you were taught. You guys over there, come give a hand. And hustle it up ~ he needs a doctor A-SAP! If our doctors have time, they’ll probably get him over to Long Binh Army Hospital ~ better facilities. That leg looks bad, but he’ll make it.”

“Fisher, boy am I glad to see you. Get a couple of guys and dig for the middle. I see some boots moving over there. Do you see’em?”

“Gotcha covered, Doc. Let’s dig, men ~ dig, dig, dig!!” “Lord, help us.” “Doc, we don’t need your light. I know this one is alive! Wave for the ambulance!”

Those two were the only ones that were saved in the sand-pile that night. Fourteen dead from the direct hit. More than that were wounded inside the bunker ~ most with hearing injuries.

Forty minutes later, the tired Airmen had done all they could and lay prostrate near the sand, some in tears for lost buddies. As my batteries were low, I jogged close to the six projectiles jammed between the bunker and the hooch to take a look. My heart sank. The bodies of three Airmen had been blown high into the high and landed head-first between the bunker and hooch ~ the six darkened objects were their charred legs pointing up, without the feet. All I could think of were their parents.

No man present would try to convince any other man on that scene that they did not endure fear that night. That was a subject no one dared to touch. But as devastating as it was, my fear factor that night was surpassed in our continuing story:

DID THE FBI FEAR THE GRAHAM REPORT ?

Dr. Graham knew the Shreveport FBI was upset about Graham’s desire to present his report to the Joint Select Committee on Intelligence (JSCI) in DC. Would the local FBI appear to be inadequate for the task of fighting terrorism? The FBI had reason to worry. Consequently, a rapidly developing fear was building inside Graham ~ an abiding fear that the FBI might do anything to protect their hind quarters. Dr. Graham now feared his own FBI more than the Al-Qaeda (or their sympathizers) he alleged were still in Shreveport.

It is unbelievably disquieting to fear the major security agency within the borders of your own country, even if, as in my case, one had volunteered for combat duty during wartime. A heretofore fearless man began to fear ~ his own country. Sad, but true. Quite frankly, the several days before driving to Charleston, SC and on to Washington were terrifying days. Precautions were the watchword.

EXPONENTIAL FEAR

Looking over the shoulder. Taking alternate routes home every evening. Looking intently into the shadows of tall shrubbery near the driveway in my Creswell home. Making sure the Glock .40 caliber was loaded, and nearby. Many nights sleeping in a flack jacket, while waking to the faintest sound each night. The Bien Hoa rocket attacks in Vietnam didn’t compare with this fear. Much prayer. Graham figured the heavy pressure would be over once he got the Graham Report into the hands of the Joint Select Committee on Intelligence.

June 1, 2002: The FBI pressure was so real that Graham worried about air travel to Washington ~ worry for the other passengers on board. So, off to Charleston via the Land Rover. Taking the trip alone, Graham envisioned being pulled over by the FBI at any moment. So the trip involved doubling back on highway routes, not staying strictly to I-20 East. Though it took longer, it also brought a measure of unrealistic relief (friends later kidded David about looking for black helicopters, but it was no joke at the time). Charleston was a pleasant sight. David spent a restful night with Roberta and Andy , and awoke eager to head North in Tracy Ammon’s black Suburban.

CORROBORATION: TRACY AMMONS

Somewhere around the North Carolina border, Tracy reminded Graham that he (Graham) had related to Tracy every detail of the original Graham Report shortly after 1 Nov 2000. Thus, Dr. Graham realized that he now had yet another witness to corroborate the fact that, indeed, the Shreveport FBI did get a Graham Report over ten months before 9/11.

Sunday evening News, June 2, 2002:

Would you believe Tracy’s Washington balcony overlooked the damaged Pentagon several blocks away? It had been almost eight months since 9/11. One very tall crane was wrapping up the repair process where American Airlines Flight 77 (carrying hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar, the 9/11 Ringleaders) crashed, taking over 165 lives. Very surreal feeling for Graham, considering all he had endured.

UNBELIEVABLE TIMING OF NEWSWEEK COVERSTORY As Tracy took a bathroom break just after ten o’clock, the TV monitor was suddenly flooded with tomorrow’s edition of NEWSWEEK, the Cover Story splashed the pictures of Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar with large print saying “9/11 Terrorists the CIA Should Have Caught.” WOW! Two of the three names Graham had turned in on November 1, 2000 to Shreveport FBI Agent Steve Hayes! Just what Graham needed to accomplish tomorrow’s mission at the Joint Select Committee on Intelligence.

This was heavy. Security agencies released information that Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar were on a CIA videotape filmed in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia during the January, 2000 Al Qaeda condominium meeting with operatives of bin Laden, some of the terrorists being implicated later in the USS Cole bombing in Aden Harbor, Yemen. In Malaysia, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the so-called Mastermind of 9/11, provided early strategy to Alhazmi and Almihdhar. The plot thickens.

Everyone back home, plus Washington-savvy folks in Charleston, said it would take an act of Congress for Graham to get his report into the Joint Select Committee on Intelligence. And Tracy had spent enough time in Washington to know things don’t happen overnight in that town. Graham figured the NEWSWEEK Cover Story was his ticket to ride.

APPOINTMENT WITH U.S. JOINT INTELLIGENCE

Sleeping was tough on Sunday night, June 2, 2002, not due to a bad mattress but because of Graham’s excitement about the NEWSWEEK Cover Story. Graham snatched up the mag when it hit the rack late Monday morning. A quick phone call to U.S. Congress’ Joint Select Committee on Intelligence Office in the Hart Building. Graham explained to the friendly voice that the two terrorists on NEWSWEEK’s cover, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, were in the Graham Report presented to the Shreveport FBI agent on 1 Nov 2000, over ten months before 9/11. The secretary liked what she heard, so Graham was given an appointment to tell his story the next day. YES!!

The June 10 issue of NEWSWEEK (on shelves June 3, 2002) also stated that, in late 2000, Nawaf Alhazmi had met with the hijacking pilot, Hani Hanjour, of American Airlines Flt 77 which hit the Pentagon (Khalid Almihdhar, or course, was already a leader on Nawaf’s team); even more, in spring of 2001, Nawaf had enlisted his brother, Salem Alhazmi and Majed Moqed to join as the fourth and fifth attackers of the Pentagon. And, since Graham’s account had never broken in the media (since Graham had been asked by the FBI not to rock the boat), few were aware that Nawaf Alhazmi had met with Fayez Banihammad (WTC 2) in Shreveport, LA during at least October, 2000 while allegedly being aided and abetted by Jamal and Habeeb.

After talking to the Senate Intelligence Office secretary, and being unfamiliar with Washington, I thought it best to make a Monday trial run to the Hart Building from Tracy’s office in DC. During my rapid walk toward the Hart Building, I wondered how far would the FBI go to prevent my delivering The Graham Report. A bit paranoid? You bet. Though I made sure to call the JSCI Office on a neutral telephone, I had no doubt the FBI knew exactly why I had come to Washington, DC. During this period, it was difficult to suppress Spoon’s stern questions about my health a few days back on 22 May 2002.

FEARING THE FBI

For these reasons, visions of the FBI intercepting me on the Tuesday walk to snuff The Graham Report literally dominated my thoughts. I envisioned being the target in a government stake-out. Very unnerving. I could not believe this was happening to me. It was like my nerves were bending under an FBI white flame. Stress had become distress. Usually a relaxed guy ~ but now, quite tense.

APPOINTMENT DAY WITH “INTELLIGENCE” ATTORNEY

By Tuesday morning, 4 Jun 2002, my emotions had relaxed not one iota. As I scurried toward the Hart Building, I pondered as to why an average U.S. citizen should be afraid of his government while doing his civic duty. Something was wrong with this picture.

Over-the-shoulder glances were uncontrollable. No matter which direction, every person was an agent. Darting back and forth, doubling back, fashioning a thumbs-up to Congressman Billy Tauzin (R-LA) leaving Congress, circling around several blocks, then, in dripping sweat from the June humidity, breathlessly jogging into the Hart Senate Office Building. Entering cool brick and mortar never felt so good, and it had little to do with air conditioning. I was relieved to be off the street.

During the one-hour reception room wait at the Senate Intelligence office, in his excitement Graham told two security guards about the Shreveport Al-Qaeda. A young male aide finally appeared, and while quickly placing his finger on Nawaf Alhazmi’s nose on the NEWSWEEK Cover, the aide asked Graham, “Who is that guy?” Graham answered, “Nawaf Alhazmi.” “And who’s that?” “Khalid Almihdhar.” The aide then asked Graham for a two-minute synopsis of the story. No prob. The sharp aide liked what he heard.

Next came the gracious secretary, saying that the Joint Select Committee on Intelligence (JSCI) attorney would be out in fifteen minutes. Graham said that would be no problem, as he had reserved the day (even though Graham had actually reserved the entire week). Three minutes later, Counsel Steven A. Cash entered the foyer and asked Graham to sign in. At last. But Graham knew they must be extremely busy with interviews. While walking to the conference table, Cash stated he only had a few minutes. Graham said he only needed ten minutes or so. Cash nodded in the affirmative. Thirty minutes later, a smiling Steven Cash accepted the Graham Report.

SWEET SMELL OF SUCCESS Friday morning, June 7, 2000: One of the most memorable days of my life. Senate Intelligence Attorney Steven A. Cash called me to say The Graham Report was now in the Joint Select Committee on Intelligence as part of studying events leading up to September 11, 2001. Mission accomplished!

Talk about relief! All the investigation, FBI interviews, writings, fears, and travel were worth it. Most of all, fear of the FBI was suddenly diminished. Looking over my shoulder is the chronic habit I now live with. I knew I had done the right thing ~ and against all odds. I felt good inside. No, on second thought, I felt great inside! I was smiling again. Tracy Ammons was the first friend to be proud of me. Thankfully, there were many more in the months ahead.

As I returned home, Shreveport never looked so beautiful. Having ample time to dwell on time sequences of the case, my first thoughts had me wondering if the FBI had ever contacted Dr. Mohammed Habeeb Ahmed for an interview. Call to Shreveport FBI Office for Agent Cliff Bland; he actually came to the phone!

AGENT BLAND FINALLY TAKES A CALL

My very first chance to talk with Bland, and the first thing out of his mouth is, “How’d your trip go in Washington?” (as if he could not wait to inform me that the Shreveport FBI knew that I had traveled to DC). Realizing my phones (allegedly) had been taped, I told Agent Bland that I hoped they tapped my phones long ago so they’d know exactly what kind of person I am. I then offered to share the entire trip to Washington, DC with the Shreveport FBI if Bland would simply have Special Agent-in-Charge Mike Kinder to give me a call. Kinder never called.

Bland continued to dodge my enquiries about his questioning Habeeb, which is probably what agents are taught to do. However, the conversation was cordial, and I was gratified to finally hear his voice.

PRESS RELEASES LEAD TO MAJOR QUESTIONS

Question: (1) While Graham was in Washington, DC during the week of June 2-6, 2003, according to the CIA leak reported in the Washington Post on June 4, 2002, the CIA had emailed the FBI the names of Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi in Jan 2000 and, if the said CIA leak is factual, why did not the Shreveport FBI apprehend the 9/11 Ringleader Nawaf Alhazmi (and Khalid Almihdhar, if he was also at Jamal’s) immediately after Graham’s Nov 1, 2000 Report to Shreveport FBI Agent Steve Hayes?

(In all fairness, it should be pointed out that the Joint Select Committee on Intelligence lacked substantial proof that the CIA did, in fact, email the FBI concerning Al-Qaeda operatives Alhazmi and Almihdhar entering the U.S. in early 2000.) Question (2): No one could predict that the CIA, in 2001, would have possession of the Malaysia Video in which Khalid Almihdhar, and his traveling friend Nawaf Alhazmi, were on the January, 2000 Malaysia Video with Al Qaeda operatives such as Khalid Sheik Mohammed, Al-Qaeda No. 3 and Mastermind of 9/11, thereby deeming Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi WANTED MEN. Why did the CIA so belatedly put Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar on the Watch List on August 23, 2001, thereby putting extreme pressure on the FBI to locate the two terrorists before the shattering events of September 11, 2001? Was anyone held accountable?

With that background information, after 23 Aug 2001, can someone please come up with one good reason why I was not contacted in this regard since I had previously reported, on November 1, 2000, that I was an eye-witness to meeting (shaking hands with) Nawaf Alhazmi and Fayez Banihammad in Shreveport, Louisiana on or about October 7, 2000, with both Mohammed Habeeb Ahmed, MD and Mohammad Jamal Khan present, with Nawaf Alhazmi living with Jamal in Shreveport for four to five weeks during late year 2000 and Fayez Banihammad living with Jamal for at least several days during October, 2000?

I remain open to any reasonable explanation as to why I was not contacted by the FBI or by another national security agency (after 23 Aug 2001) to ask me if I had any new information concerning the whereabouts of Nawaf Alhazmi. Obviously, major improvements are in order. I will now belatedly answer that question: “No, I had no further information.”

In all fairness, perhaps an understaffed FBI and/or archaic computer systems were legitimate fall-guys. All terrorist databases will be forwarded to the new FBI Terrorism Screening Center which was originally scheduled to open in December, 2003 but rescheduled to open around May, 2004. For all Americans, please get it right, guys. SECTION 23

June 24, 2002: Graham-Habeeb Video Corroboration

With the pressure off, traveling back to Charleston, then Shreveport, were an absolute delight. Settling back into dental practice, I pondered Agent Spoon’s comments on 22 May 2002 that I had no corroboration. Where in the world could corroboration be found? The three “Shreveport” hijackers died on 9/11 and Jamal has been jailed. Quick deduction tells me there is only one possible corroborator (other than my previous corroborator Michael Steiger).

Habeeb. Why not have Mohammed Habeeb Ahmed, MD drop by the clinic to discuss the joint medical research study about “Gum Disease Potentially Linked to Cardiovascular Disease” and film the conversation? It was arranged through the services of a professional photographer associated with Private Investigator Rick Turner. Such a filming is legal in Louisiana so long as one person in the filming is aware of the film rolling.

Habeeb also wanted to make a Dental Hygiene appointment, then talk about the research study. Ironically, after being a dentist for over thirty years, the study of gum disease was a contact point to force the wheels in motion for my corroborating videotape on terrorism.

A GOOD FILM PRODUCTION

The “Graham-Habeeb Corroborating Videotape filmed on 24 Jun 2002:”

Graham hired photographer Bill Harmon (name changed) to set up a “security camera” in Dr. Graham’s dental reception room at 512 East Kings Highway, Suite A, Shreveport, LA for the purpose of secretly filming a discussion between Dr. Graham and Mohammed Habeeb Ahmed, MD (alias Mohomed Habeeb Ahmed, MD) concerning a proposed medical research study that Graham, Phil D. Mayers DDS, MS and Habeeb were contemplating.

Said filming on 6-24-02 brought some interesting disclosures as Graham (pre-planned) mentioned the need for more medical doctors in the study: The ensuing filming recorded a discussion of a previous encounter, on or about October 7, 2000 at Mohammad Jamal Khan’s rented townhouse at 3521 East Lake Drive, Shreveport, LA 71105. Habeeb, during said filming on 6-24-02, corroborates Graham on approximately 75 % of Graham’s story related in all the Graham Reports (completely listed later).

Everything went to perfection. Photographer Harmon positioned the camera between two bronze turtles on the second shelf of Graham’s reception room Chinese Tower, which has walls of glass panes. With the tower door pane removed, it offered the perfect setting to shoot film and pick up sound. To distract Habeeb from the Chinese Tower, Graham set up a large white marking board inscribed with the medical study heading and related medical terminology.

THE SETUP

Before his dental hygiene appointment, Habeeb strolled into the reception room to read Graham’s notations on the white marking board. Since Bill Harmon was still milling around, Habeeb looked his way, followed by Graham saying Bill is merely a friend. Habeeb is then called by LeeAnne Scruggs for his dental hygiene appointment. While Habeeb is with the hygienist, Graham walked in the doorway to show Habeeb a copy of May, 2002 issue of Scientific American with Cover story about inflammation affecting heart disease, and tells Habeeb he will place the magazine in Habeeb’s reception room chair for the medical study talks to follow (since the camera was aimed at that particular chair).

After Dental Hygienist LeeAnne Scruggs finished Habeeb’s dental cleaning, he “dated the day of filming” by paying with his credit card. Sitting in the perfect chair for filming, Dr. Habeeb was immersed in details of the research while personally contributing worthy comments. Graham pulled up a chair next to Habeeb (so Graham would be in the filming) and asked his prepared question about Habeeb securing at least one more physician for the study. Habeeb finally said perhaps he could locate a young doctor. Graham’s opening.

CORROBORATING MUCH OF THE GRAHAM REPORT

“How about that young doctor from Chicago who Jamal introduced to me back almost two years ago? You know, the one staying with Jamal for a month or so while taking courses at LSUMC. Hey, that was the one talking to me. His first name was Nawaf, remember?”

“Right.”

Over the succeeding forty minutes or so, Habeeb corroborated about seventy-five per cent of the “on or about 7 Oct 2000 meeting” which took place with two terrorists, Nawaf Alhazmi (Pentagon crash) and Fayez Banihammad (WTC 2 crash), at Jamal’s townhouse located at 3521 East Lake Drive, Shreveport, LA 71105: (1) The three brown boxes with Nawaf, Fayez, and Khalid’s full names printed on separate boxes; (2) Habeeb escorted Nawaf and Fayez in through the (back) kitchen door, all wearing turbans and light colored robes, with Habeeb stating they had been giving prayers at the nearby Mosque (Masjid al-Noor at 3969 Youree Drive, Shreveport, LA 71105); (3) Habeeb admitted that a young man was there named “Nawaf.” Agent Spoon, corroboration is rapidly building.

Dental Hygienist LeeAnne Scruggs began her dental care on Mohammaed Habeeb Ahmed, MD at around 4:30 pm and Habeeb’s dental hygiene appointment lasted until approximately 4:55 pm. The videotape demonstrates that Habeeb then walked out of the Dental Hygiene Operatory to the business counter to pay his dental fee using his credit card (which dates the filming). Key points of the “Graham-Habeeb Corroborating Videotape of June 24, 2001” included, but were not limited to, the following as designated by minutes/seconds on the recorded tape. Certain segments of the videotape are herein REDACTED:

0 – 12:39 Relatively unimportant introductory; then, dead time

12:40 Graham consulted with Habeeb in the Dental Hygiene Operatory doorway, telling Habeeb that his Scientific American magazine will be in his reception room seat when LeeAnne finishes his hygiene appointment (the May, 2002 Cover story of Scientific American involved inflammation linked to heart disease).

12:53 LeeAnne walked into the hallway

19:01 Graham left the Hygiene doorway, entered the hallway, followed by Habeeb, as LeeAnne entered the hallway; Dental Receptionist Joannie (name changed) laughed; Habeeb paid his dental fee with credit card; Joannie and Habeeb discussed Joannie’s broken ankle; Graham talked about his previously broken ribs hurting only 4 days; Dental Assistant Shirley Milne walked down the hall behind Habeeb and Graham

21:15 Habeeb sat in the reception room wicker chair to begin talks about “Gum Disease Potentially Linked to Cardiovascular Disease” Note: Mirror

is mirroring the corner of Graham’s white marking board while Graham and Habeeb began discussing relevant details of their purported medical research study

27:40 Graham mentioned attending American Dental Association Symposium in Chicago concerning gum disease potentially being linked to heart attacks

27:50 Graham mentioned Robert Genco, DDS, MS from State University of New York in Buffalo, NY (a researcher in gum disease – cardiovascular link)

29:45 Graham asked Habeeb about the “medical doctor” Habeeb had introduced to Graham (on or about 7 Oct 2000) earlier at Jamal’s townhouse, with Graham mentioning that the introduced doctor’s name was something like “Fay – Bani - .” Habeeb acted stunned, and hesitated, to answer.

30:40 Habeeb discussed his possible move to New Orleans in order to enter faculty at Ochsner Hospital

34:15 Jamal is mentioned

35:03 Habeeb denied hearing that Jamal said his (Jamal’s) father had recently visited bin Laden (but Graham expected no confirmation on this topic) 35:32 Jamal’s textile corporation proposition for “investors”

35:39 Habeeb agreed that Habeeb had been to the Mosque (Masjid Al-Noor) with the “two doctors” (Nawaf Alhazmi and Fayez Banihammad) just before entering Jamal’s townhouse with Nawaf and Fayez

36:55 Habeeb mentioned Jamal being “taken by the police”

37:35 Habeeb said he asked Jamal to provide housing for Nawaf since Jamal had plenty of room at Jamal’s place

38:00 Habeeb demeaned Jamal by saying, “the problem with that guy (Jamal) is he (Jamal) talks a lot.” (Habeeb’s statement additionally indicates that Habeeb was worried that Jamal might disclose more about alleged terrorism)

38:16 Graham mentioned that Jamal jumped from the Red River bridge and swam to shore safely

39:00 Habeeb mentioned his loaning Jamal five hundred ($500.00) dollars 40:22 Talk about Jamal giving Graham a ride around Shreveport 40:33 Mention of the USA Cash owner’s black Navigator SUV 41:00 Habeeb described Jamal as a “shady character”

41:50 Graham said that the USA CASH owner wanted to buy Jamal a newer truck than the truck Jamal pointed out to Graham on Youree Drive which was marked “For Sale.”

42:02 Habeeb said that he (Habeeb) was “worried when Jamal was taken by the police”

43:25 Habeeb acknowledged (by slight nod of head) seeing the three boxes on Jamal’s kitchen floor with the “doctors” names on the boxes

43:43 Habeeb did not deny seeing Khalid’s name on a third box, though Habeeb did deny ever having met Khalid

44:34 Habeeb said there is a “problem with that guy Jamal”

45:00 Habeeb admited to asking Jamal to house that guy (Nawaf) from Chicago

46:44 Graham told of Graham’s second visit to Jamal’s townhouse when Sam and Deb drop by to talk with Jamal privately in the kitchen

48:40 Habeeb said, “I don’t know why I gave him (Jamal) that money ($500.00)” 50:46 Habeeb stated that his full name is “Mohammed Habeeb Ahmed, MD”

51:27 Habeeb gave his (Habeeb’s) home town in India, though the sound must be augmented to hear his message, as Habeeb had walked into the dental clinic foyer which was about thirty feet from the camera. (Graham’s audio-recording body wire also picked up the corroborating conversation between Habeeb and Graham.)

A review-analysis of portions of the video of June 24, 2002 have been herein presented. Proper authorities and/or approved Media may view a copy of the “Graham-Habeeb Corroborating Videotape of 24 Jun 2002.”

A CRITICAL CORROBORATION

The importance of said Video is magnified by the fact that Mohammed Habeeb Ahmed, MD was present at Mohammad Jamal Khan’s townhouse on or about October 7, 2000 during which time Habeeb introduced to me the future 9/11 hijacker (of United Airlines Flt 175 which hit World Trade Center south tower) Fayez Banihammad as “Dr. Fayez Banihammad, who is a Resident MD at LSU Medical Center”, followed by Jamal (with Habeeb nodding in agreement) introducing to me the future 9/11 hijacker (of American Airlines Flt 77 which hit the Pentagon) Nawaf Alhazmi as “Dr. Nawaf Alhazmi, a medical doctor from Chicago who will be staying in my townhouse with me while Nawaf attends medical course(s) at LSU Medical Center” (in Shreveport, LA).

Did both Habeeb and Jamal allegedly execute serious CRIMINAL INTENT in disguising the true avocation of both Fayez Banihammad and Nawaf Alhazmi by introducing Fayez and Nawaf to me as “medical doctors,” said true avocations being terrorists? (Habeeb had to be fully aware that Fayez was not a Resident medical doctor at LSU Medical Center, where Habeeb himself worked.) At the least, was not Mohammad Jamal Khan allegedly harboring and supporting Nawaf Alhazmi and Fayez Banihammad? (Let’s also not forget that Jamal’s father had recently visited bin Laden.)

Additionally, was not Mohammed Habeeb Ahmed, MD allegedly supporting Nawaf Alhazmi by securing Jamal to house and feed Nawaf Alhazmi and Fayez Banihammad? Additionally, was not Mohammed Habeeb Ahmed, MD allegedly supporting terrorism by his giving, or lending, Mohammad Jamal Khan five hundred ($500.00) dollars to help take care of Jamal’s alleged harboring and supporting of Nawaf Alhazmi and Fayez Banihammad? Therefore, although the facts of this case are not limited to the aforementioned alleged accusations, are not both Jamal and Habeeb, themselves, alleged terrorists?

REPORTING THE VIDEOTAPE TO FBI AGENT SPOON On June 26, 2002 Graham called Spoon and explained that he (Graham) had filmed himself and Mohammed Habeeb Ahmed, MD talking about their planned medical study with Dr. Mayers, but more importantly, the videotape reveals Habeeb corroborating most of the information in earlier Graham Reports concerning the on or about 7 Oct 2000 meeting at Jamal’s townhouse, that being the day Habeeb entered Jamal’s kitchen door, unannounced, escorting Nawaf Alhazmi (Pentagon crash) and Fayez Banihammad (WTC 2 crash).

FBI Agent Spoon said he would call Graham that evening at 7:30 pm (26 Jun 2002) in order to meet up and view together said “Graham-Habeeb Corroborating Videotape of 24 Jun 2002.” However, Spoon never called Dr. Graham the evening of 26 Jun 2002. So shortly after 8:00 pm, Graham attempted to call Spoon on Graham’s cell phone, but for whatever reason, Graham could not get through to Spoon’s pager. Graham immediately used his second line at the dental clinic and got through to Spoon’s pager, but FBI Agent Spoon would not return the call to Graham.

It was obvious the FBI did not know what to do about this dentist with his corroborating videotape. Please tell me why the FBI would not fall all over themselves to pick up their (original) videotape copy or have me deliver it to the Shreveport FBI office. It was like they did not want to believe I had this terrible thing ~ the videotape. To me, obtaining the corroborating videotape was fantastic!

FBI FINALLY ACCEPTS GRAHAM-HABEEB VIDEOTAPE

Finally, on July 5, 2002 at the Shreveport FBI Office, Dr. Graham was able to give FBI Agent Ray Spoon the “Graham-Habeeb Corroborating Videotape of 24 Jun 2002.” Two days later, Graham provided Spoon with Habeeb’s alias name of “Mohomed Habeeb Ahmed” as seen in the 2001 Shreveport telephone directory, with his address being 3441 Oak Glen Drive, Shreveport, LA (located in Eastwood on the Bayou townhouse complex just like Jamal’s residence).

Unbelievably, on 7 Jul 2002, FBI Agent Spoon revealed to Graham that he (Spoon) had not yet viewed the “Graham-Habeeb Corroborating Videotape of June 24, 2002.” Graham is stunned by Spoon’s statement. Again, however, that could have been Spoon’s manner of conveying to me that he gave little importance to the videotape (whether he actually believed that or not).

At this point, I had no other option but to think the FBI was disappointed that I now possessed a filmed corroboration of a substantial portion of the Graham Reports. Spoon’s attitude originally led me to think that said videotape was of little significance in corroborating my Graham Report.

Spoon was reluctant to congratulate me on obtaining this professional-quality videotape of Habeeb, on 24 Jun 2002, which corroborated so much of my account. He did crack a little smile when accepting the videotape, mumbling something under his breath about that was probably all I would get out of Habeeb. It was like the videotape was worse than poison.

Fourteen months later, in September, 2003 Spoon and I would both know of the USA Today story (AP release) of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed’s interrogation. To think, ten months before 9/11, I had turned in the two 9/11 Ringleaders, Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar, to the Shreveport FBI and to the Shreveport U.S. Secret Service.

Jamal and Habeeb had allegedly aided and abetted one of the 9/11 Ringleaders, Nawaf Alhazmi, and Fayez Banihammad, hijacker of United Airlines Flt 175 which hit World Trade Center south tower in New York City on September 11, 2001 (and we may never know whether or not Khalid Almihdhar was in Shreveport during the weeks surrounding October, 2000). And I was an eye-witness who now had a corroborating videotape in addition to Michael Steiger’s (name changed) Sworn Affidavit. YES! SECTION 24

Updated Report to McCrery to Chambliss to Joint Select Committee on Intelligence

CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT

August 15, 2002: Graham bumped into U.S. Congressman Jim McCrery in front of the American Tower in downtown Shreveport, motioning Jim over to one side, and urgently arranged an appointment with Jim that afternoon. Listening intently in his Bellemead office, McCrery was surprised that Shreveport had alleged terrorists in town. He was even more shocked upon learning that Nawaf Alhazmi had communicated with hijackers of all other 9/11 airliners used as missiles, including United Airlines Flt 93 which may have been headed for McCrery’s desk in the U.S. Congress, except for the brave passengers on board.

David explained to Congressman McCrery that he would have almost certainly contacted McCrery earlier, but thought it unnecessary after reporting to the U.S. Secret Service only a few days after reporting to the FBI back on November 1, 2000. Surely two federal security agencies would take care of the people’s business. McCrery assured Graham that he should not feel any guilt, saying that David had gone beyond the call of duty ~ all his dangerous exposure, obstacles in reporting, and now with the new corroborating videotape of Habeeb.

The next day, August 16, 2002, after an open meeting at Bossier City’s Civic Center where McCrery shared the stage with Barksdale AFB Commander Lt. Gen. Bruce Carlson, Graham handed Congressman McCrery an updated copy of The Graham Report (which included the “Graham-Habeeb Corroborating Videotape of 24 Jun 2002”). McCrery suggested he (McCrery) hand-carry said copy of Graham’s report to his good friend, U.S. Congressman Saxby Chambliss, who, in turn, would hand-carry The Graham Report to Joint Select Committee on Intelligence leadership (U.S. Congressman Porter Goss, Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence). How cool was that! Super done deal.

CHILLING DISCOVERIES

Of the six or seven alleged hijackers on 9-11 who arrived in the U.S. before 2001 (as stated by Asst. FBI Director Dale Watson on or about February 5, 2002 in Open Session of a Congressional Hearing), it was truly mind-boggling that three (of the said “six or seven”) terrorists had their names written (with magic-marker in capital letters approximately two inches in height) on three individual brown cardboard boxes (i.e., one name on each box) as seen on three occasions by David M Graham, DDS on Jamal’s kitchen floor at Jamal’s residence at 3521 East Lake Drive, Shreveport, LA 71105 (and, two names on the boxes were 9/11 Ringleaders Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar). SECTION 25

U.S. Congressional Hearings

Dr. Graham and staff, along with dental patients, intently watched the Congressional Open Hearings surrounding 9/11 on television in Dental Operatory No. 1. Of special note to Graham’s case were the testimonies of Joint Select Committee on Intelligence Staff Director Eleanor Hill and FBI Director Robert Mueller.

ALHAZMI AND ALMIHDHAR ARE FRONT AND CENTER

Eleanor Hill spent a great deal of her testimony surrounding the terrorists Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar, two misguided men our readers have seen volumes on while reading this text. Obviously, Dr. Graham had trouble concentrating on patient care during the days of extensive Congressional Hearings, which, of course, devastated the unfortunate families of 9/11, the brave NYPD, NY Firefighters and Port Authority ~ and others close to the tragedies. All the families were in the Graham Clinic prayers.

In September, 2002, Joint Select Committee on Intelligence Staff Director Eleanor Hill stated in testimony before U.S. Congress that the two 9/11 terrorists Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar (who both hijacked American Airlines Flight 77 and crashed said airliner into Pentagon) should have been placed on the Terror Watch List by CIA in both January, 2000 and in March, 2000, as both men were already known by the CIA as Al Qaeda operatives and living somewhere inside the United States. Staff Director Eleanor Hill spent much of her testimony explaining events related to the two Pentagon hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar (who were later known to be the 9/11 Ringleaders).

Staff Director Hill detailed the travels of Alhazmi and Almihdhar for months preceding 9/11, including their being at the Malaysia Al Qaeda meeting, and being known by the CIA as Al Qaeda operatives as they entered the U.S. The CIA was raked over the coals for not putting Alhazmi and Almihdhar on the Terror Watch List when they had the opportunity in both January, 2000, and in March, 2000.

FBI DIRECTOR MUELLER

On September 26, 2002 FBI Director Robert Mueller states that Nawaf Alhazmi met monthly with Mohamed Atta in the months preceding September 11, 2001.

The case for Nawaf Alhazmi being mega important to the terrorist cause was building fast. During the ensuing several months, security authorities incorrectly believed Mohamed Atta to be the 9/11 Ringleader. And to think, this is the same Nawaf Alhazmi who stared a hole through Graham in Shreveport on or about 7 Oct 2000. Dr. David M. Graham had more than an uneasy feeling about Nawaf and Fayez that day; yes, a discernment that the Muslim group was up to something big. No one would listen.

FLASHBACKS

Graham began having flashbacks: His October, 2000 signals led him to believe they were planning a truck-bombing attack on Barksdale Air Force Base B-52 flight line, with access to the base by dating Barksdale personnel and having their eye on the large used truck near Squire’s Tux Rental on Youree Drive in Shreveport. Who knows, at some point the B-52s could have been a legitimate target. During the battles of Vietnam, Graham knew the enemy would rather blow up a couple of airplanes than to kill Allied troops.

In any case, during October, 2000, Nawaf and Fayez, at least, had been at Jamal’s townhouse, being introduced to Graham by Habeeb and Jamal as medical doctors, though Nawaf and Fayez could barely squeeze out a few words of English ~ certainly not fluent in ENGLISH as most foreign doctors at LSUMC. Graham had seen too many medical doctors from overseas in his dental practice. Besides, Nawaf Alhazmi stared at Graham like he wanted to see David dead, and that was exactly Nawaf’s desire. But that might blow his cover.

Dr. Graham was virtually certain that Nawaf and Fayez were no real doctors. “Imposters,” Graham told the FBI and U.S. Secret Service in early November, 2000. “Quickly investigate these suspicious Muslims, all five of them, even though I never met this Khalid Almihdhar guy. I just know his name was on one of those brown cardboard boxes on Jamal’s kitchen floor

NAWAF ALHAZMI WAS A 9/11 RINGLEADER

To repeat, on September 26, 2002, FBI Director Robert Mueller testified in Congressional Open Hearings that Nawaf Alhazmi had monthly communications with Mohamed Atta prior to September 11, 2001, ostensibly casting Nawaf Alhazmi in a leading role for 9/11 terrorism. Take a look at Nawaf Alhazmi’s associations with other alleged 9/11 terrorists and alleged 9/11 harborers and/or supporters: 1. Nawaf Alhazmi communicated monthly with Mohamed Atta (WTC 1) prior to the terrorist attacks in New York, Washington DC, and Pennsylvania. Atta was considered a major 9/11 terrorist leader. (aforementioned FBI Director Mueller testimony of September 26, 2002). Aforementioned book MASTERMINDS OF TERROR authors classify Nawaf al-Hazmi as Mohamed Atta’s Deputy. Then, in summer, 2003, Joint Select Committee on Intelligence’s 9/11 Report says Nawaf Alhazmi was 9/11 leader Mohamed Atta’s “Right Hand.” As of September 26, 2003 we have the statements of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (so-called Mastermind of 9/11) taken in a secret place of interrogations wherein Mohammed says that Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar were more important than Mohamed Atta, were hand-picked by Usama bin Laden, were central to the 9/11 attacks, and were receiving 9/11 instructions through Khalid Shaikh Mohammed’s Internet chat room secret codes. This all but confirms Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar as 9/11 Ringleaders.

Let us not forget that Nawaf Alhazmi was harbored and supported by Mohammad Jamal Khan for four to five weeks during and surrounding October, 2000, and Nawaf Alhazmi was additionally supported by LSU Medical Center cardiology resident Mohammed Habeeb Ahmed, MD who showed his colors by lying to Graham that hijacker Fayez Banihammad (WTC 2) was a resident medical doctor with him (Habeeb) at LSUMC.

With this combined information, we come to the breaking news that, in the weeks of and weeks surrounding October, 2000 Shreveport was Al-Qaeda USA Headquarters since, at the least, Nawaf Alhazmi was receiving coded messages from Khalid Shaikh Mohammed through Internet chat rooms. Jamal had already disclosed to Graham that Jamal was daily busy with using the Internet to communicate around the world, with Jamal insisting repeatedly that he (Jamal) was a very important person (which, unfortunately, proved to be so true)

  1. Nawaf Alhazmi lived with Fayez Banihammad at Mohammad

Jamal Khan’s rented townhouse at 3521 East Lake Drive, Shreveport, Louisiana, with David M. Graham being an eyewitness to seeing Nawaf Alhazmi and Fayez Banihammad living with Jamal in October, 2000 (Graham identifications in USA Today, October 5 2001 looking at FBI File photographs, www.foxnews.com and www.cnn.com )

  1. Nawaf Alhazmi was the traveling buddy of Khalid Almihdhar, a fellow hijacker of American Airlines Flt 77 which hit the Pentagon, and Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi had attended the January, 2000 Malaysia meeting

with bin Laden operatives later implicated in USS COLE bombing including, but not limited to, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (later known as “Mastermind of 9/11”). Iraqi terrorist Ahmad Hikmat Shadir also attended said Malaysia meeting, which proves that Iraqi terrorists were in Al-Qaeda.

  1. Mere weeks after the November 1, 2000 Graham Report, Nawaf Alhazmi, in late 2000, contacted Hani Hanjour (NEWSWEEK June 10, 2002), who was the hijacking pilot of American Airlines Flt 77 hitting the Pentagon.
  2. In spring of 2001, Nawaf Alhazmi enlisted Nawaf’s brother, Salem Alhazmi, to become a hijacking terrorist of Amer Flt 77 hitting Pentagon. (NEWSWEEK, June 10, 2002). Nawaf also enlisted Majed Moqed to be a hijacker of American Airlines Flt 77 which hit the Pentagon.
  3. Nawaf Alhazmi had major contacts with both Ahmed Alnami and

Saeed Alghamdi (BUSINESS 2.0, Dec 2001), both of whom were hijackers of United Airlines Flt 93, said United Flt 93 thought to have been destined to homicidally crash into the U.S. Capitol or The White House.

  1. Whether intended or not, funds from Saudi Arabia’s U.S. Ambassador’s

wife ultimately helped finance activities of both terrorists Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi. Saudi Arabia vehemently denied any and all intended connections. When I met Nawaf Alhazmi at Jamal’s townhouse, I had no earthly idea who this character would turn out to be. One of the two major Ringleaders of 9/11. Wow! More important than Mohamed Atta! I awake every morning wondering, “Why me, Lord?” And hopefully, my follow-through with Jamal and Habeeb was acceptable to fellow citizens.

FOILED AT DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

NOTE: On Friday, October 11, 2002, Dr. David M Graham attempted to hand-carry copies of Graham’s Updated Report to both Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert Mueller in Washington DC at the Department of Justice building at 3:00 pm, but Graham was informed by the male employee at the desk that “someone upstairs” decided that the Washington DC FBI Field Office would accept the Graham Reports.

However, after several attempts by Graham, it was obvious that the FBI Agent on duty at Washington FBI Field Office would not accept Graham’s Updated Reports, which Graham thought exceedingly important in the fight against terrorism since the updated version contained new information. The official excuse given Graham by the front door guard (outside the front door) was that all agents were busy working on the sniper case. Dr. Graham was never invited inside the Washington DC FBI Field Office (after traveling to Washington, DC from Shreveport).

MORE ON GENERAL HAYDEN’S TESTIMONY

On October 17, 2002, appearing before Congressional Committee, National Security Agency (NSA) Director Lt. General Michael Hayden testified that all security agencies had been notified that Khalid Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi, and Nawaf’s brother Salem Alhazmi were all associated with the international terrorist organization Al-Qaeda.

NSA Director Hayden’s sworn testimony substantiates that FBI Headquarters allegedly knew Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar were in Al-Qaeda when, on November 1, 2000 I originally reported the names Nawaf Alhazmi, Fayez Banihammad and Khalid Almihdhar to Shreveport FBI Agent Steve Hayes. Therefore, the FBI should have identified (at least) Nawaf Alhazmi as “terrorist in country” shortly after 1 Nov 2000 (Nawaf Alhazmi being Co-9/11 Ringleader with Almihdhar).

Moreover, one must wonder as to the response of both U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno and FBI Director Louie Freeh upon hearing this information? After all, Reno and Freeh were in office on 1 Nov 2000. What about President Clinton? And did the the Clinton Administration forward concerns of the Graham Report to the Bush Administration?

Also on October 17, 2002, appearing before the same committee, CIA Director George Tenet stated that the U.S. should be on alert for renewed episodes of Al-Qaeda terrorism within the United States. SECTION 26

March 8, 2003: Graham’s Second Corroborating Videotape

: During said “Graham-Khan Videotape filmed on 3-08-03,” Jamal states Khan, who lives near village of Matta, Pakistan, located in Upper Swat Valley. This is extremely important since, in October, 2000, Graham unmistakably heard Mohammad Jamal Khan tell Mohammed Habeeb Ahmed, MD that his (Jamal’s) father had recently visited Usama bin Laden. Additionally, Shreveport FBI Agent-in-Charge Mike Kinder was handed, in the presence of David M. Graham, a sworn affidavit by Michael G. Lowe of Shreveport, LA, said Lowe affidavit stating that, on or about Oct 15, 2000, Mohammad Jamal Khan told Lowe that his (Jamal’s) father had recently visited Usama bin Laden, and that Jamal said his (Jamal’s) father lived up by China Wall over by Russia. Matta, Pakistan happens to be located in Northwest Pakistan, approximately 150 miles North/Northeast of Peshawar, Pakistan. Since bin Laden entrusted Shammiudden Khan to visit his hideout, it makes sense that, in 2003, bin Laden may request Shammiudden Khan for a “Matta hideout” since Jamal states in said videotape that Shammiudden Khan owns over one thousand mountainous acres about six miles from Matta. Graham reported this VITAL INFORMATION to www.cia.gov and to www.fbi.gov and to Internet site of Homeland Security, along with over-nighting said “Graham-Khan Corroborating Videotape filmed on March 8, 2003” to CIA Headquarters. Additionally, Graham provided the “Graham-Khan Corroborating Videotape of March 8, 2003” to Shreveport FBI Agent Cliff Bland at Shreveport FBI Office, with Bland acting scared of his shadow by merely cracking the FBI reception room door about 4 inches to accept said videotape (with Graham first offering his hand through the cracked door to introduce himself to Bland). What’s with the cracked door? Graham felt fortunate Bland had not slammed the door on his hand. It was like Bland wanted to accept the videotape from Graham without anyone seeing him do so, especially Graham (who could identify Bland later as having received said videotape). All this, and Graham had been told Bland was a nice guy.

Said videotape additionally films Jamal stating that

.

Since 9/11, it is interesting that Jamal no longer followed the “dictates of the bin Laden workbook” found in Afghanistan mountains after the U.S. liberation began. Examples: Jamal seldom dresses in suit and tie; Jamal (openly) uses no cell phone; and Jamal lives in a middle class apartment complex. However, Jamal does continue his Uncle lives in the city of Chakdarra, Pakistan, located approximately 90 miles Northeast of Peshawar, Pakistan, an additional potential hiding place for bin Laden his charismatic, befriending approach to Americans. Everyone says Jamal is a likeable sort of fellow.

The following represents excerpts from the “Graham-Khan Corroborating Videotape of March 8, 2003” as filmed in sequence with designated minutes/seconds as listed:

00:01 Graham provided the date of this videotape as March 8, 2003

20:55 Mohammad Jamal Khan (Jamal) finally arrived (late).

22:30 Jamal refered to “his problems”

22:58 Jamal disclosed to Graham that he (Jamal) is an airplane pilot

24:24 Jamal disclosed that he now owns a new black Toyota truck

24:57 Jamal is surprised when Graham remembered that Jamal has a Pakistani wife and blonde daughter

25:24 Jamal saed he has many friends in Washington (DC), and mumbled something about the Ambassador (potentially the Pakistani Ambassador to the U.S.)

25:31 Jamal tried to convince Graham that Jamal disliked Muslim people, and said, “I am Baptist!” (Much later, in September 2003 Jamal tells Graham that he attends church at Haughton Baptist Temple in Haughton, Louisiana, located several miles east of Shreveport.)

25:54 Jamal saed that “Habeeb and those people (Nawaf Alhazmi and Fayez Banihammad) are fundamentalists. They were ugly to me ~ ugly people” Jamal saed that Dr. Habeeb used him all the time

27:09 Jamal saed that those people (referring to Habeeb and the “other two doctors”) have poor mentality ~ not high class people. Jamal said, “I am real Khan family.”

27:38 REDACTED

28:15 Jamal disclosed his new name (alias) as “Jamal Khan,” not wishing to use “Mohammad” any longer since he now (purportedly) hates the name Mohammed

29:28 REDACTED 30:15 REDACTED 32:32 REDACTED 34:18 REDACTED 34:44 REDACTED 35:15 REDACTED 36:00 REDACTED 38:38 REDACTED 39:40 REDACTED 40:26 REDACTED 42:22 REDACTED 44:26 REDACTED 45:35 REDACTED

50:40 Graham mentioned Bud Williams, who joked with Graham and Jamal at the Evangel ChristianAcademy-Airline High School football game at Airline Stadium in Bossier City, LA on October 6, 2000.

51:00 Jamal agreed with Graham that it was about two and one-half years ago when Graham met with Jamal at Jamal’s townhouse, the same day Habeeb entered escorting Fayez and Nawaf Alhazmi into Jamal’s place, with Habeeb, Nawaf and Fayez all three wearing turbans and white jackets. Jamal additionally agreed with Graham that it was probably the next day (day after said Evangel vs. Airline football game) that Graham visited with Jamal and Habeeb entered Jamal’s townhouse escorting Fayez Banihammad and Nawaf Alhazmi (NOTE: Said football game helped in re-constructing the timeline of the Graham Report).

52:25 Jamal agreed that Habeeb referred Nawaf to stay with Jamal, and Jamal agreed that Habeeb gave Jamal five hundred ($500.00) dollars to “take care of them” (Fayez Banihammad and Nawaf Alhazmi). Jamal acted disgusted with Habeeb because Habeeb inferred that Jamal should repay the $500.00 to Habeeb (since Habeeb thought it to be a loan).

Hopefully, one day the readers and I will have cause for a big party over the results of these Blackouts and Redactions. It is a real possibility ~ wish I could now share the significance about which I, for national security reasons, must save for another day. Please pray “it” becomes a reality. Be assured, the world would be a safer place. SECTION 27 FBI Allegedly Arrests Habeeb

Around October, 2003 a young male dental patient, Toby Ronson (name changed), told me that he had seen on CNN that an LSU Medical Center cardiologist named Dr. Ahmed had been arrested allegedly for something to do with terrorism. Considering the source of this information, I discounted the story.

Then, in early 2004, my middle-aged female dental patient, Mrs. Rene Truax (name changed), excitedly got my attention while relating a story concerning her Biloxi, Mississippi brother-in-law’s cardiology treatment at Shreveport’s Veteran’s Hospital on Stoner Avenue. Rene related how her sister said that she and her husband were visiting in Missouri when a familiar Shreveport face appeared on CNN.

I gave Rene’s sister, Rachel Phillips (name changed), a cell call and caught her in the midst of purchasing an antique Ford Mustang. In the middle of her closing the auto deal, Rachel was overly excited to relate the following: Rachel and hubby Tommy (name changed) were laid back in Missouri watching the tube as CNN flashed the picture of Tommy’s Shreveport cardiologist on the screen, saying Mohammed Habeeb Ahmed, MD had allegedly been arrested for undisclosed support of 9/11 terrorism!

Intending to further substantiate Rachel’s claim, I asked her how she and Tommy knew for certain that it was Habeeb they had seen on CNN. Rachel said that initially she and Tommy were primarily drawn to the doctor’s name due to his appearing to have a longer full beard than when he had seen Tommy as his VA patient (shortly after 9/11, Habeeb had cut his full beard to be about one inch in thickness). However, Rachel continued by saying that she would “never forget Tommy’s handsome doctor who had treated him so well.” Rachel continued with, “Besides, CNN said the doctor was ‘Dr. Mohammed Habeeb Ahmed, a cardiologist from Shreveport, Louisiana.’ ”

I thanked Rachel, then told her I hoped that she would enjoy her “new” Mustang.

I attempted to dig a confirmation out of a reliable FBI agent, but he explainede that so much is compartmentalized there is little chance that anyone would notify him. Apparently FBI agents who previously worked on such a case are left in the dark as to the benefits of their earlier efforts. In such cases, this policy reduces the likelihood for both rumors and the truth being spread around the U.S. while interrogations are in progress. Many times, individuals indicted may be convinced by law enforcement to either turn state’s evidence or may agree to communicate with their up-line terror leaders (and possibly help to capture them) so as to hope for a reduced sentence.

A couple of weeks later, in late February, 2004 I asked FBI Agent Spoon if he had any news concerning the alleged Habeeb arrest. Spoon again (second time) said he would search for the alleged arrest, but (probably due to FBI protocol) Spoon never gave me the answer. A very reliable source told me that the FBI has been extremely reluctant to reveal arrest information since the botched “Jewel-Atlanta bombing arrest.” Such publicity the FBI does not need. Enough said.

MEDIA EXPOSURE

On the flip side, at times media exposure of a terrorist may actually lead to a terrorist’s arrest and indictment. Such was the case wherein Fox News’ Bill O’Reilly covered the Florida professor allegedly with terrorist links. A few months later, citizens witnessed the Florida professor’s arrest and indictment.

Stay tuned to this alleged development concerning Habeeb. SECTION 28

Shreveport-Al Qaeda Connections

The alleged Shreveport terrorists had countless Al-Qaeda connections. Please review the photo-schematic placed early in this book at the beginning of “MAIN CHARACTERS.” A review will include, but is not be limited to, the following:

AL-QAEDA SUMMIT IN MALAYSIA

According to NEWSWEEK (Oct 7, 2002), the FBI was aware that 37-year-old Iraqi terrorist Ahmad Hikmat Shakir was present at the January 2000 Al Qaeda Summit in Malaysia that was attended by two of the 9/11 hijackers. We know the two 9/11 hijackers at that Malaysia Summit to be Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar (NEWSWEEK June 10, 2002) due to videotape of said Malaysia Al-Qaeda Summit in January, 2000 as well as so-called “Al-Qaeda 9/11 Mastermind” Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (interrogations in the summer of 2003).

MOHAMED ATTA: MAJOR AL-QAEDA PLAYER

The article “How They Did It”, by Joel Mowbray, appearing in National Review, December 23, 2002, reviewed an interview of Ramzi bin al-Shibh (later captured) by Jazeera reporter Yosri Fouda. Al-Shibh was extremely close to Mohamed Atta; Ramzi bin al-Shibh revealed that Atta had little contact with Nawaf Alhazmi or Hani Hanjour until near the end of 9/11 planning stages, for communication had been facilitated with Al-Qaeda leaders overseas and between the different hijacking crews (Of prime importance, since remember, this Graham Report reviews information revealing Nawaf Alhazmi having communicated with not only all four of his hijacking accomplices of American Airlines Flt 77 which hit Pentagon, but with Fayez Banihammad (WTC 2) at Jamal’s townhouse, with at least two hijackers of United Airlines Flt 93 (crashed into Stoney Creek, PA near Shanksville) and with Atta (WTC 1).

Additionally, when stating “Al-Qaeda leaders overseas,” one is reminded of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (9/11 Mastermind) revealing his instructions from overseas to Alhazmi and Almihdhar (9/11 Ringleaders) through coded messages over Internet chat rooms. Remember, while Alhazmi and Banihammad were living with Mohammad Jamal Khan, Jamal told Graham that he was emailing around the world from the USA CASH business located at 779 Shreveport-Barksdale Highway. Pieces of the puzzle begin to reveal a picture.

MORE DETAILS

Nawaf Alhazmi obviously had strong contacts with Fayez Banihammad at Jamal’s Shreveport townhouse with Graham as an eye-witness, Fayez being a hijacker of United Airlines Flt 175 which hit WTC south tower; Nawaf Alhazmi communicated with Ahmed Alnami and Saeed Alghamdi who hijacked United Airlines Flt 93; and according to sworn testimony of FBI Director Robert Mueller before JSCI in late 2002, Nawaf Alhazmi had strong monthly contacts with Mohamed Atta in the months prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks. Al-Shibh also disclosed that both Nawaf Alhazmi and Mohamed Atta decided the date of attacks on 9-11-01 only two weeks before the atrocities.

Later, in 2003, the JSCI 9/11 Report names Nawaf Alhazmi as Mohamed Atta’s Right Hand. Soon after, on September 26, 2003 we learn from the AP report that Khalid Shaikh Mohammed interrogations reveal Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar as 9/11 Ringleaders of implementing the horrors on U.S soil.

WHAT “IF”

Considering the aforementioned facts surrounding Nawaf Alhazmi (Khalid Almihdhar and Fayez Banihammad notwithstanding), the evidence indicates that had Nawaf Alhazmi been arrested in Shreveport, LA, shortly after the original Graham Report (given, in face-to-face interview, on November 1, 2000 to Shreveport FBI Agent Steve Hayes, followed several days later by face-to-face summary report to Shreveport U.S. Secret Service Agent Ron Lewis), the events of September 11, 2001, potentially could have either been postponed to a later date or interrupted to such an extent for cancellation altogether.

In the opinion of the Joint Select Committee on Intelligence, the CIA’s negligence in placing Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar on the Watch List in January 2000 or in March 2000 has proven to be a major security snafu, for without Nawaf Alhazmi, 9/11 plans would have been strategically compromised. Additionally, had Nawaf (and potentially Banihammad and Almihdhar) been arrested in Shreveport in late 2000, U.S. security agencies would have had the distinct advantage of potentially uncovering the 9/11 plot through interrogations of Nawaf Alhazmi, since we later discover that Nawaf Alhazmi had “face-to-face” contacts with Mohamed Atta in the months preceeding 9/11, and ostensibly, Nawaf Alhazmi was 9/11 Ringleader along with Khalid Almihdhar.

KHALLAD: PLANNER OF USS COLE BOMBING

On Tuesday, April 29, 2003, Waleed Mohammed Bin Attas (also known as Khallad) was arrested during a pair of raids conducted in southern Karachi. In January, 2000, “Khallad,” along with other members of Al Qaeda including, but not limited to, Khalid Sheik Mohammed and Ramzi bin Al-Shibh met with Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia for planning 9/11 attacks and the bombing of USS Cole which killed 17 U.S. Navymen, the USS Cole bombing believed to have been masterminded by Khallad.

WHY “NO INVESTIGATION” Remember, the names Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, Fayez Banihammad, Mohammed Habeeb Ahmed, MD, and Mohammad Jamal Khan were all five reported in The Graham Report of November 1, 2000, Graham having presented the one-hour report “face-to-face” to Shreveport FBI Agent Steve Hayes; a few days later, on or about November 7, 2000, Dr. Graham presented an oral summary report to U.S. Secret Service Agent Ron Lewis.

Apparently, absolutely no investigation was begun on the heels of the aforementioned (Nov 2000) Graham Reports (to Steve Hayes and to Ron Lewis) since it was not until after Graham’s post-9/11 Report to Shreveport FBI Agent Ray Spoon that Mohammad Jamal Khan was discovered to have committed a firearms offense resulting in Jamal’s arrest, followed by discovering that Jamal and his business partner Saeed Tanoli helped structure fifty thousand ($50,000.00) dollars while depositing and wire transferring nine thousand nine hundred ninety-nine ($9,999.00) dollars at the request of Liaquat Ali, a Shreveport package liquor store owner. All three Pleaded Guilty (Public Record at the Federal Building in Shreveport).

Another Big Question:

Hypothetical Scenario: Since Washington whispers know all about Washington leaks, strap this one on. Intelligence staffers sitting at table in Washington bar begin loose talk about contingency plans for high-level politicos during major catastrophes. Like the Vice-President going underground at the White House and the President heading to Barksdale Air Force Base. Sitting within six feet of the staffers is Mohamed Abdul Ali (fictitious character), reconnaissance agent for the Al-Qaeda, whose appearance and business attire defies his Mid-eastern background. A hurried Internet chat room coded message, and fifteen minutes later, Al-Qaeda No. 3 and Mastermind of 9/11, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, possesses the top secret designed to protect White House leaders.

Scenario, Phase II: Since Al-Qaeda has a history of synchronizing terrorist attacks, could it be that 9/11 Ringleader Nawaf Alhazmi and Fayez Banihammad (and perhaps Khalid Almihdhar) were at Jamal’s “Safe House” in Shreveport during October, 2000 for the purpose of coordinating a simultaneous attack on Barksdale Air Force Base (given the countless red flags) to coincide with the October 12, 2000 USS Cole bombing? Both would have been military targets. If you think that preposterous, kindly continue.

Hypothetical: Consider the fact that Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar were present in the Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia condo when Khalid Shaikh Mohammed allegedly helped plan both the USS Cole bombing and September 11, 2001. Could not Khalid Shaikh Mohammed have also discussed a Barksdale bombing with Nawaf Alhazmi to coincide with USS Cole bombing of 12 Oct 2000? Remember their access to Barksdale. Remember the large used truck Jamal wanted. And, consider these overlapping dates. My conjecture only. THE BARKSDALE FIRE

Speaking of Barksdale AFB, one must wonder about the spring, 2002 major fire which totaled the Eighth Air Force Headquarters building. The fire was declared to have been caused by lightning, but it is interesting that all civilian firemen who fought that blaze were required to sign a statement stating that they would never discuss the fire. Hmmm. Of course, the blaze purportedly did start on the top floor (which would place it near the roof), and the firemen’s pledge not to discuss the case is undoubtedly routine procedure for the U.S. military when dealing with top secret buildings. In any case, street talk around Shreveport and Bossier City had a tough time buying into the lightning bolt. One positive result was Barksdale tightening security all over the base shortly after the fire. Even Army Reserves were brought in for added gate security.

WHY WERE ALHAZMI AND BANIHAMMAD IN TOWN?

After the interrogation of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (Mastermind of 9/11) is complete (ostensibly in 2004), U.S. security agencies will hopefully discover exactly why Nawaf Alhazmi and Fayez Banihammad were allegedly being harbored and supported by Jamal and Habeeb in Shreveport in the weeks surrounding October, 2000. Stay tuned.

Food for thought: Consider that on October 7, 2000 at Eastwood on the Bayou complex, perhaps my inadvertent intervention into Jamal’s meeting with Habeeb, Nawaf Alhazmi, and Fayez Banihammad) injected enough doubt into Alhazmi (since his disposition spoke volumes of his displeasure with my being there) to cause his postponement of a potential attack on Barksdale AFB. Let us remember, Al-Qaeda (1) enjoys coordinating multiple attacks, (2) will generally take the softer (easier) targets, (3) will cancel terrorist activities when faced with complicating circumstances, and (4) generally returns at a later date to attack a previously cancelled target.

Yes, most top security experts state that Al-Qaeda will usually re-visit any target which has been unsuccessfully attacked. One only has to turn to the World Trade Center for a glaring example. Being purely speculative, had Nawaf Alhazmi and Fayez Banihammad been planning a hit on Barksdale in October, 2000 and suddenly backed off after my inadvertently running into Habeeb (with Alhazmi and Banihammad) at Jamal’s residence on or about 7 Oct 2000, one could then assume Al-Qaeda may have had sinister plans for Barksdale months later.

But I would like to believe in the lightning bolt. To repeat, it was much later in August, 2001 according to Ramzi bin al-Shibh, that Nawaf Alhazmi and Mohamed Atta set the date of September 11, 2001.

So, with an Alhazmi fear that my interrupting his meeting at Jamal’s townhouse might lead to my alerting security authorities, Alhazmi may have chosen to postpone a (personally suspected) Barksdale attack so as not to jeopardize bigger plans (such as hijacking airliners and crashing into major U.S. buildings). INTERROGATORS: PLEASE GET THESE ANSWERS

Hopefully, the secretly located U.S. interrogators of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed have pumped him as to (1) why Nawaf Alhazmi and Fayez Banihammad were in Shreveport during October, 2000 timeframe, and additionally (2) whether or not Khalid Almihdhar was also present at Jamal’s Shreveport “Safe House” residence at Eastwood on the Bayou (given the fact that I did see, and report, Khalid Almihdhar’s name on the third box on Jamal’s kitchen floor).

I am fully aware that most security people believe Khalid Almihdhar was outside the U.S. during October, 2000. They also mistakenly believed for over two years that Mohamed Atta was the 9/11 Ringleader until, as released in September, 2003, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed told U.S. interrogators that Alhazmi and Almihdhar were more important than Atta, thereby casting Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar ostensibly as the 9/11 Ringleaders.

Question: If the Khalid Shaikh Mohammed interrogations produce evidence that Al- Qaeda had plans to strike Barksdale Air Force Base at any time prior to the fire at Eighth Air Force Headquarters (such as when Alhazmi and Banihammad were in Shreveport in Oct 2000), should not a major investigation be opened in regard to the possibility of said fire being the result of an Al-Qaeda fire-bombing?

As of December 15, 2003 Jamal remains Out-on-Bail while fighting deportation by the INS. Graham prays for indictments against both Jamal and Habeeb for allegedly aiding and abetting terrorists of 9/11, not merely deportation whereby they potentially could continue to allegedly support terrorism from an overseas location.

MORE “WHAT IF”

So it is no stretch to visualize Shreveport FBI Agents in early November, 2000 arresting both Nawaf Alhazmi and Fayez Banihammad (and potentially Khalid Almihdhar) if only the CIA had placed Nawaf and Almihdhar on the Watch List in Jan 2000 or in Mar 2000 when they had the chance, and if the FBI would have then disseminated said Watch List for distribution in all FBI Offices around the U.S.

It is worthy of speculation that Khalid Almihdhar was potentially upstairs at Jamal’s residence during Graham’s encounter in October, 2000, although U.S. security thought Almihdhar was out of country. Let us not forget, U.S. security was mistakenly naming Mohamed Atta as 9/11 Ringleader, so they, likewise, could have missed more than one of Almihdhar’s entries into, or exits from, the U.S.

One might surmise that without Nawaf Alhazmi (additionally, potentially without Fayez Banihammad and Khalid Almihdhar) the horrors of 9/11 could have been prevented or, at the least, postponed until the FBI, hopefully, would have had ample time to better coordinate with Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), and local law enforcement.

ENLIGHTENMENT IN HOUSTON

Appropriate time to drop a few bombs of my own ~ namely, communication snafus. In late 2002, I took a Houston trip to meet up with friends Loretta and Billy Tilton (names changed), Bill Dupuy (name changed), as well as Betty and Don Hathaway (former Sheriff of Caddo Parish, which includes Shreveport) to honor a Kappa Sigma “Man of the Year” nominee. During an extended visit with Sheriff Hathaway, I discovered a shocking revelation.

CADDO PARISH SHERIFF DON HATHAWAY

After beginning to share the alleged Shreveport terrorist “Safe House” story with Sheriff Hathaway, Don was mystified as to why he had no FBI input concerning the situation (Don was Caddo Parish Sheriff during October, 2000). After all, the Sheriff was known to be the most powerful security leader in every county or parish at that time (excluding the Feds). It simply made no sense to exclude local security. How could the FBI be all things to all people at all times? Task impossible.

NEED: SHREVEPORT-BOSSIER SECURITY SUMMIT

All these months, I assumed the FBI would take care of business by sharing the word about alleged Shreveport terrorists so local security agencies would be aware of a security risk and call an area security meeting to discuss security strategies. On a local note, Ark-La-Tex security agencies would benefit from a Shreveport-Bossier Security Summit. New goals of Homeland Security include such information sharing.

SHREVEPORT MAYOR HIGHTOWER ~ POLICE CHIEF PRATOR

This really got my wheels turning. After having extended calls with Shreveport Mayor Keith Hightower and former Shreveport Police Chief (now Caddo Parish Sheriff) Steve Prator, I was promptly told that the FBI had not shared the alleged Shreveport terrorist Safe House information with them either. It appeared no one was in the loop. Man!

BOSSIER CITY MAYOR DEMENT

Then I attended an evening dinner at Overcomer’s Center in East Texas at the request of Director Richard Wilkes. In attendance was Bossier City Mayor George Dement. Before leaving, I briefly asked Mayor Dement if he had been informed by the FBI concerning his Bossier City resident Mohammad Jamal Khan (Jamal had moved from Eastwood on the Bayou to a Bossier City address). Mayor Dement had no FBI communication about Jamal, but did remember that Jamal was quite persistent in getting the mayor’s letter of recommendation (which Jamal shared with me). LOUISIANA GOVERNOR MIKE FOSTER

Armed with these new and disturbing revelations, I called a close friend, Dr. Billy McCormack, sharing the stories about unshared security info. Dr. Billy then advised me to inform Governor Mike Foster, who was equally uninformed and desired full disclosure. Think about it ~ Louisiana is his state. Rhetorical question: Did Governor Foster deserve to be alerted about the security problems within his state? But there’s potentially a greater snafu.

BARKSDALE AIR FORCE BASE O.S.I.

I called Barksdale Air Force Base Office of Special Investigations (OSI), who were speechless by my alleged Shreveport terrorist story. Then, the thoughtful OSI contact person (a woman) called me back two weeks later to say that they had contacted the appropriate security people and very much appreciated my informing them of potential dangers to Barksdale AFB.

Much later, on April 8, 2003 (same day as “Graham-Khan Corroborating Videotape of 8 Apr 2003”) I met with Barksdale Air Force Base OSI Agent Jeffrey A. Bruce, giving Agent Bruce a personal account of the alleged Shreveport terrorist group and a copy of the Updated Graham Report.

A citizen doing the work of the FBI. I certainly felt a sense of gratification in helping the FBI, but it appeared they were not sharing (with anyone) Jamal’s alleged Shreveport terrorist Safe House and related dangers.

In mid-December, 2003 I called both Caddo Parish Sheriff Steve Prator and Bossier Parish Sheriff Larry Deen, discovering that the FBI had never once consulted with either local Sheriff. Surely there would some way that local law enforcement could assist federal agents in fighting terrorism by, at the least, helping to keep an eye on known alleged terrorists in Shreveport and Bossier City.

WHY REVEAL ALL THIS?

My sole purpose in disclosing this information is to help rectify an extremely weak link in the security chain. Hopefully, those in U.S. positions of power will run with this information and hammer out strict guidelines on sharing security information for the protection of U.S. citizens. Considering we are now 27 months past 9/11, is it not time to get the job done through security cooperation at all levels? Common sense says that more security eyes can improve the chance of rooting out new terrorists and keeping an eye on known sympathizers.

BARKSDALE B-52 PILOTS & JAMAL

What security measures could have been initiated more effectively in Shreveport? Glad you asked the question. Let’s take a look at the Barksdale AFB situation. This simple example makes the point. Without revealing specifics, why did not the Shreveport FBI ask local law enforcement to help track Jamal’s daily patterns of travel and his hang-outs? By so doing, local law inforcement would have known of Jamal frequenting N’CaHoots Sports Grill. Armed with such important information, a stakeout from local law enforcement would have seem Jamal talking to Air Force B-52 pilots whom Jamal was allegedly inquiring about their dates of deployment to Iraq (and given the totality of alleged information surrounding Jamal, his attempt to obtain the B-52 pilots’ deployment dates to Iraq further supports The Graham Report).

Remember, my initial fears of Jamal’s association with Barksdale involved his dating Barksdale women who gave him extensive tours of the base coupled with his desire to purchase the large cargo truck on Youree Drive ~ his having the two unusual Arab visitors, Alhazmi and Banihammad, and his father recently visiting bin Laden additionally raised my blood pressure.

My report had legitimate justification, and the Shreveport FBI direly needed support from local law enforcement in order to provide optimum protection for not only local citizens, but for U.S. national security as well. No one would disagree that Barksdale Air Force Base is undeniably vital to our national security.

THE DELICATE SECURITY BALANCING ACT

On the flip side, there is no question that classified FBI information must be kept “close to the vest,” especially in the early going. If too many cooks know the recipe, the restaurant’s best dish will show up down the street (i.e., too much street talk can transform good security into Keystone Cops, thereby endangering offensive and defensive advantages).

In summation, federal agencies must perform a delicate balancing act when it comes to info-sharing. There are no absolute answers to be applied in all cases. And there should be no room for “territory jealousy” when dealing with U.S. security. Thousands of American lives are at stake.

Most of all, the Feds must not emulate the football quarterback who attempts to personally dominate the offense by throwing the ball into triple coverage when he should throw the ball into the stands (i.e., Americans could care less if the credit goes to federal agencies or local law enforcement, just get the job done ~ win the game of protecting U.S. citizens). A more logical approach would be to focus on utilizing the strengths of security entities at all levels through intelligent, calculated timing. SECTION 29

U.S. CONGRESS’ Joint Select Committee on Intelligence: Testimony and 9/11 Report

Released in the summer, 2003, the Joint Select Committee on Intelligence’s “9/11 Report” said Nawaf Alhazmi was Mohamed Atta’s Right Hand, Mohamed Atta perceived at that time to be Al-Qaeda Ringleader who implemented carrying out the sinister plot on September 11, 2001 (As stated Ad Nauseum, 9/11 Ringleaders are now thought to be Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar, and not Mohamed Atta).

Since the Graham Report was labeled “CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY REPORT,” the Joint Select Committee on Intelligence was considerate in not mentioning my report due to ongoing investigations and for reasons of national security (which is merely my analysis of their decision). The following represents excerpts from the 9/11 Report, (with selected boldness added where applicable to our participants):

“One of the serious problems identified by our Joint Inquiry is the pervasive refusal of the CIA, in the months and years before September 11, to share information about suspected terrorists with the very U.S. Government officials whose responsibility it is to keep them out of the United States: the State Department consular officials who issue visas and the INS officials who man immigration posts at every American port of entry.

“As the JIS outlined in its testimony before one of our joint SSCI/HPSCI hearings, the so-called TIPOFF systems provides the basic “watch list” function by which consular and INS officials check visa applications or U.S. arrivals against lists of suspected terrorists and other undesirables. With respect to suspected terrorists, the TIPOFF database is populated primarily through the submission of names from the CIA. Crucially, however, without CIA input, these officials cannot do their job ~ and even terrorists known to the CIA will be able freely to acquire visas and be granted entry if the CIA has neglected to share their names with TIPOFF.”

The al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi Story

“What such watchlisting problems can mean in practice is illustrated by the failures of the CIA and FBI in dealing with Al-Qa’ida-affiliated terrorists Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi. Their story is ably recounted by in the body of the JIS report, but its highlights are worth repeating here. Al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi attended a terrorist meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in early January 2000. This meeting was known to ~ and surveiled by ~ the CIA, which already knew that al-Mihdhar possessed a multiple- entry visa permitting him to travel to the United States. The National Security Agency (NSA) also independently possessed information linking al-Hazmi to Al-Qa’ida. Neither the CIA nor NSA, however, saw fit to provide their names to the TIPOFF database. There is apparently some confusion over whether the CIA told the FBI anything about al- Mihdhar and al-Hazmi. CIA e-mail traffic reviewed by the JIS, however suggests that the CIA did brief the FBI in general terms. The CIA, however, still did not bother to tell the FBI that al-Mihdhar had a multiple-entry visa that would allow him to enter the United States.

“In early March 2000, the CIA learned that al-Hazmi had arrived in Los Angeles on January 15. Despite having just learned of the presence in this country of an Al- Qa’ida terrorist, the CIA told no one about this. The internal cable transmitting this information, in fact, contained the notation: “Action Required: None, FYI.” This information came at the height of the U.S. Intelligence Community’s alarm over Al- Qa’ida’s “Millennium Plot,” and al-Hazmi’s arrival had occurred at about the same time the CIA knew that Al-Qa’ida terrorist Ahmed Ressam was also supposed to have arrived in Los Angeles to conduct terrorism operations. Still, however, the CIA refused to notify anyone of al-Hazmi’s presence in the country.

“By this point, both al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi – both terrorists known to the CIA – were living in San Diego under their true names. They signed these names on their rental agreement, both used their real names in taking flight school training in May 2000, and al-Mihdhar even used his real name in obtaining a motor vehicle identification card from the State of California. In July 2000, al-Hazmi even applied to the INS for an extension of his visa, sending in this application using both his real name and his current address in San Diego (where he would remain until that December). INS, of course, had no reason to be concerned, since the CIA had withheld the two terrorists’ names from TIPOFF. Nor did the FBI have any reason to look for them – e.g., by conducting a basic Internet search for their names or by querying its informants in Southern California – since the last it had heard from CIA was that these two terrorists were overseas.

“The CIA’s failure to watchlist al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi became more alarming and inexplicable in January 2001, when the CIA discovered that the Malaysia meeting had also been attended by a suspect in the USS Cole bombing. This presumably made the two terrorists even more interesting to the CIA – and their known presence in the U.S. even more dangerous, by confirming their linkages to Al-Qa’ida operational cells – but the CIA still did not bother to inform TIPOFF. This failure was particularly damaging because al-Mihdhar was overseas at the time; putting his name on the watchlist would have enabled INS agents to stop him at the border.

“ Even when given the opportunity to tell the FBI – in face to face meetings – about the presence of these two terrorists in the United States, the CIA refused. At a meeting in June 2001 with FBI officials from the New York Field Office who were working on the USS Cole case, a CIA official refused to tell them that al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi had come to the United States.

“Meanwhile, Khalid al-Mihdhar was in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and applied for a new U.S. visa in June 2001. The State Department officials who took this application appear to have followed procedures and checked his name against their CLASS database, which incorporates TIPOFF watchlist information. Because CIA continued to refuse to put the names of this Al-Qa’ida terrorist into TIPOFF, however, no CLASS ‘hits’ occurred, and al-Mihdhar was given a visa and returned to the United States unmolested in July.

“The CIA only decided to watchlist al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar in late August 2001, by which point they were already in the United States and in the final stages of preparing for the September 11 attacks. By this point, tragically, it was too late for the FBI – hamstrung by its own investigative regulations – to stop them. Although the FBI scrambled in late August and early September to locate the two terrorists in the United States, it denied itself the services of any of its own agents assigned to criminal work and refused even to conduct a basic Internet search that would have revealed al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar living under their true names in San Diego. (According to testimony from an FBI agent in New York who conducted just such an Internet search after the September 11 attacks, finding al-Mihdhar’s address “within hours.”) It also denied itself any assistance that could have been obtained from Treasury officials in tracking down al- Mihdhar and al-Hazmi through their credit card or banking transactions. As it turned out, however, on September 11, 2001, the two men boarded American Airlines Flight 77, and helped fly it into the Pentagon.

Missed Opportunities

“Altogether, the al-Mihdhar/al-Hazmi and “Phoenix EC” stories suggest both the potential of sophisticated information-sharing and good information- empowered analysis and the dangers of failing properly to ‘connect the dots.’ It is impossible to know, of course, whether the September 11 plot could have been disrupted – or at least significantly delayed – had the FBI and CIA acted properly in sharing and understanding information available to them. The evidence, however, suggests a number of pregnant ‘what ifs’:

“If the CIA had been willing to share its information about al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi with consular and INS officials through the TIPOFF program, one or both of them might have been apprehended upon entering or reentering the United States after their Malaysia meeting.

“If the CIA had informed the FBI when it first knew that al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi were in the United States – and the FBI had permitted itself to do common-sense things like use the Internet – these two terrorists might have been located at their home in San Diego (or in flight school in the area) long before the September 11 attacks. Surveillance of them might have led the FBI to other hijackers, or to operational cell leaders, or their deportation might have disrupted the plot.” The words of the Joint Select Committee on Intelligence’s 9/11 Report speak for themselves. However, the Joint Select Committee on Intelligence’s 9/11 Report was released without the benefit of interrogation findings of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, being questioned by security agents at a secret locale during summer, 2003. On Saturday, September 26, 2003, the Associated Press released information reviewing portions of Mohammed’s testimony, which placed Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar as Ringleaders of 9/11 rather than the previously held theory that Mohamed Atta was Ringleader on September 11, 2001.

As stated earlier, The 9/11 Report either REDACTED, or trashed, information in The Graham Report which places Nawaf Alhazmi for four to five weeks surrounding October, 2000 in Shreveport, LA at the Eastwood on the Bayou rented townhouse of Mohammad Jamal Khan when Nawaf Alhazmi potentially could have been captured about ten months before the terror of September 11, 2001 (and potentially capture Fayez Banihammad, who was at Jamal’s townhouse for at least several days surrounding October 7, 2000; and potentially capture Khalid Almihdhar who may have been at Jamal’s since his name was also on a box on Jamal’s kitchen floor on or about 7 Oct 2000). Talk about changing American history! SECTION 30

September, 2003: Alhazmi and Almihdhar

Alleged to be “9/11 Ringleaders”

BACKDROP

If some readers have trouble with the following Christian preamble to this Section, so be it. As stated earlier, I have promised to tell this account exactly as it unfolded, notwithstanding several security redactions. My Christian faith is based solely on Jesus’ sacrifice at Calvary’s Cross and his Resurrection, not on a string of feel-good emotional happenings. But, at the same time, no apologizes for being a man sensitive to the voice of God.

We’ve all heard occasional individuals say they felt as if life’s experiences prepared them for one major mission. The following episode follows several other “coincidences” which have convincing power that my life was prepared for the terrorist account in this book. Christians, in particular, will appreciate my sharing about the sweet woman from East Texas.

In mid-September, 2003 after a home church meeting, Pastor John Booty began smiling as he motioned me to join him and an attractive middle-aged woman near the fireplace. After our introduction, Jackie Patterson (name changed), began telling me about the Lord revealing to her that “David Graham would soon have a dramatic, new windfall in his life.” Without being acquainted with a “David Graham,” she asked husband John if he knew the given name of his friend “Dr. Graham.” Since John and I had become friends months earlier during the men’s Friday lunches, the Pattersons were convinced that Jackie’s message was for me.

(It remains the reader’s choice whether to believe or reject identification of Jackie’s message with the following Associated Press story, which, unquestionably, magnifies the importance of The Graham Report.)

About ten days later, on September 26, 2003 the Associated Press released information summarizing portions of the security interrogations of captured “Al-Qaeda No. 3 and 9/11 Mastermind,” Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. The Associated Press release statements included, but were not limited to, the following from reports of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed’s interrogation:

1. Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar were more important than Mohamed Atta, heretofore thought to be the Ringleader of 9/11.

  1. Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar were handpicked by Usama bin Laden to work with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in heading up the terror on 9/11.
  2. Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar were central to the plot on 9/11.
  3. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed communicated regularly with Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar through coded messages over Internet chat rooms.

IMPORTANCE OF THE GRAHAM REPORT IS ELEVATED The new Associated Press release all but confirms Alhazmi and Almihdhar as the 9/11 Ringleaders. Yes, on September 26, 2003 The Graham Report did, indeed, receive a dramatic, positive windfall. In October, 2000 I had rubbed elbows with (i.e., shook hands with) at least one of the Ringleaders of 9/11. Likewise, through the AP release, the rest of America and the Free World received new information about terrorist activities leading up to September 11, 2001. Unquestionably, these 9/11 revelations from Khalid Shaikh Mohammed significantly elevated the importance of The Graham Report.

After this breaking news, no one could deny that The Graham Report gained stature as a critical piece of historical evidence in the puzzle of why the U.S. suffered the horrors of 9/11. And, as reliable legal sources have affirmed, there is ample evidence to corroborate details of The Graham Report.

SPECULATIONS ONLY

From these new discoveries, it would be no great stretch to make some renewed observations concerning events leading to September 11, 2001. What you are about to receive are merely my personal thoughts and do not represent, in any manner or implication, the official opinions of any and all security agencies (so far as I know):

1. Since FBI Director Robert Mueller stated in Congressional Hearings that during the months preceding September 11, 2001 Nawaf Alhazmi was monthly communicating with Mohamed Atta, it would now be logical to assume that Nawaf Alhazmi was, in fact, relating instructions from Khalid Sheikh Mohammed to Mohamed Atta concerning potentially:

A. Instructing Mohamed Atta in coordinating the hijackings of United Airlines Flight 175 and American Airlines Flt 11

from Boston’s Logan International (Flt 175 took off first, but was passed up in route by Flt 11, therein why Flt 11 hit World Trade Center north tower first).

B. Nawaf meeting with Atta could have additionally been for the purpose of relating Khalid Shaikh Mohammed’s “go ahead” and preference of date(s) for initiating 9/11 and/or other details. 2. Since I was an eyewitness to both Nawaf Alhazmi and Fayez Banihammad being together at Mohammad Jamal Khan’s townhouse at Eastwood on the Bayou complex in Shreveport, LA on or about 7 Oct 2000, it would be logical to assume that Nawaf Alhazmi was potentially sharing general terrorist information. The terrorists did not merely “ happen to bump into

each other in Shreveport, Louisiana at Jamal’s townhouse.”

3. Another hypothetical reason for Nawaf Alhazmi meeting with Fayez Banihammad in Shreveport could have been to implement a plan to truck-bomb nearby Barksdale Air Force Base, possibly the B-52 flightline. Though this may sound preposterous on the surface, please remember:

A. that Alhazmi and Banihammad’s alleged harborer and supporter, Mohammad Jamal Khan, not only had access to Barksdale Air Force Base through his dating women who were stationed at Barksdale (and showering the women with jewelry), but Jamal loved to go all over the base. One-man reconnaissance mission? Could be alleged.

B. And additionally, I was an eyewitness to Jamal pointing out a large used truck on Youree Drive (near Squire’s Tuxedo Rental) which Jamal said he needed to purchase (Jamal stating this twice, as Jamal made two passes by the Youree Drive location, as he also injected that the owner of USA CASH business located at 779 Shreveport-Barksdale Highway (current location of Wing Stop) wanted to purchase a newer truck for Jamal (Jamal stating said owner already having given, or invested, over $10,000.00 into Jamal’s “ventures”).

C. And additionally, remember that Jamal was later hanging out at N’Cahoots Sports Bar one-half mile west of Barksdale’s West Gate, where Jamal was seeking information from B-52 pilots concerning the pilots’ dates of deployment to the war in Iraq

and thoroughly infuriating the Barksdale AFB B-52 pilots. Although this happened months after 9/11, this action by Jamal definitely exposes his interest in the bombing missions of our Barksdale aircraft.

D. And, please forgive my personal indulgence, but perhaps the fact that I inadvertently crossed paths with Nawaf Alhazmi and Fayez Banihammad on or about 7 Oct 2000 at Jamal’s Shreveport townhouse prompted a cancellation of bombing Barksdale Air Force Base. I can assure the reader that the penetrating stare given me by Nawaf Alhazmi that day will never be forgotten by yours truly and, in retrospect, Nawaf’s defiant attitude and demeanor indicates to me that Nawaf was either highly frustrated by my “intrusion into his space/ plans” or else he was contemplating wasting me right there on the spot; but, of course, he probably thought the latter would lead to a huge investigation and potentially expose the entire alleged gang of terrorists. Not worth the risk.

4. Additionally, now that we know that Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar were the Ringleaders of implementing 9/11, it is no stretch to assume that Nawaf Alhazmi used Jamal’s hangout, USA CASH (779 Shreveport-Barksdale Hwy., Shreveport, LA), as terrorist group Al-Qaeda’s communication center for receiving Internet chat room coded messages from Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. One can only hope that the FBI located the USA CASH computers used by Jama and, potentially, the computers used by Nawaf Alhazmi.

Therefore, is it not obvious that, for several weeks surrounding October, 2000 Shreveport, Louisiana was allegedly Al-Qaeda USA Headquarters? Difficult to deny, when considering information in The Graham Report.

NOTE: Without providing details for reasons of national security, I can assure the reader that some electronic information and pertinent documents related to this case are in the hands of appropriate U.S. security officials. Thus, the Redacted statements and Black-outs. Enough said.

5. Additionally, allegedly Jamal and Habeeb were supporting the major U.S. communication network of the terrorist group Al-Qaeda during (at least)

the month of October, 2000, with Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (the mastermind planner of 9/11) communicating with (at least) Jamal’s guest Nawaf Alhazmi by utilizing Internet chat room coded messages ostensibly sent to USA CASH business (779 Shreveport-Barksdale Hwy., Shreveport, LA)

Remember, The Graham Report was not released to the public until well after the Associate Press, on September 26, 2003 released information reviewing portions of the secret interrogations of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed by security agencies.

BOTTOM LINE

Since Usama bin Laden hand-picked Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar to be Ringleaders of 9/11 hijackings, coupled with Jamal allegedly harboring and supporting Nawaf Alhazmi and Fayez Banihammad (and potentially Khalid Almihdhar), it is no stretch to allege that Jamal was aiding and abetting the 9/11 Ringleaders of Al Qaeda which included, but not limited to:

(1) During at least October, 2000, Jamal harbored and supported Nawaf Alhazmi in Jamal’s Shreveport townhouse; and (2) on or about 7 Oct 2000, Jamal agreed with Mohammed Habeeb Ahmed, MD that Fayez Banihammad was a medical doctor at LSU Medical Center; and (3)on or about 7 Oct 2000, Jamal introducing to me the middle-Eeasterner Nawaf Alhazmi as a medical doctor from Chicago who would be staying with Jamal for four to five weeks while Nawaf was purportedly taking medical course(s) at LSU Medical Center; and (4) Jamal accepted five hundred ($500.00) dollars from Habeeb, as either a gift or a loan, for the purpose of Habeeb helping Jamal to take care of Nawaf and Fayez.

To reiterate, large portions of the Graham Reports were corroborated in both the “Graham-Habeeb Corroborating Videotape of 24 Jun 2002” and the “Graham-Khan Corroborating Videotape of 8 Mar 2003.”

Additionally, on or about 7 Oct 2000, I clearly heard Jamal tell Habeeb that Jamal’s father had recently visited Usama bin Laden, which was confirmed later by Witness “X” (fictitious name Michael Steiger) who signed a Sworn Affidavit saying he personally heard Jamal say that Jamal’s father had recently visited bin Laden (and another Redacted statement).

Additionally, Jamal’s friend, Mohammed Habeeb Ahmed, MD was allegedly aiding and abetting 9/11 terrorism by his actions which included, but not limited to: (1) Habeeb admitting (on the “Graham-Habeeb Corroborating Videotape of 24 Jun 2002”) that Habeeb, after meeting Nawaf Alhazmi and Fayez Banihammad at the Masjid Al-Noor Islamic Mosque on Youree Drive in Shreveport, LA, did arrange for Mohammad Jamal Khan to harbor and support Nawaf Alhazmi and Fayez Banihammad; and (2) further, on or about 7 Oct 2000, Habeeb was supporting Nawaf and Fayez which included, but not limited to, Habeeb chauffeuring Nawaf and Fayez to Masjid Al-Noor Islamic Mosque and, additionally on or about 7 Oct 2000, Habeeb chauffeured Nawaf and Fayez to Jamal’s townhouse where Nawaf and Fayez were introduced by Habeeb and Jamal to me as medical doctors, even though they spoke little or no English, and Habeeb allegedly lied to Graham by saying Fayez Banihammad was a medical doctor in residence at LSUMC; and (3) further, Habeeb stated on the 24 Jun 2002 videotape that Habeeb did loan Jamal five hundred ($500.00) dollars in order to help Jamal to support Nawaf and Fayez.

LATE BREAKING NEWS

Graham now fears that Mohammad Jamal Khan, due to alleged support of America- hating Al Qaeda, is potentially continuing to assist terrorists who could provide harm to the U.S. Graham’s aforementioned film corroborations go a long way toward affirming alleged terrorist accusations against Jamal and Habeeb, both of whom should be indicted for, including but not limited to, alleged aiding and abetting 9/11 terrorism against the United States.

In July, 2003, Jamal said he will never use the name “Mohammad” since he has recently converted from Muslim to Southern Baptist. Interesting, since Jamal attempted to open “Ark-La-Tex Tires and Accessories” business in July, 2003, within one block of Masjid Al-Noor, the Muslim mosque in Shreveport, LA. While hesitating to judge Jamal’s spiritual beliefs and/or his motives, it appears strange that Jamal would leave the Islam faith to become a Southern Baptist and then attempt to open a new business within one block of Muslims he recently rejected. Around September 11, 2003, Jamal relocated his “Ark-La-Tex Tires and Accessories” business to 3117 W.70th Street, Shreveport, LA, but the business is now closed. Also interesting: On or about August, 2003, Jamal began using the name “Mohammad Jamal Khan” again, even to the point of having Insty Print design his new business card in this manner; then, suddenly, he called Insty Print to drop the “Mohammad” from his name on said new business card.

Additionally, on March 8, 2003 Jamal hustled Graham to invest with Jamal in an apartment venture in Ft. Worth, TX, where Jamal can purchase around 900 units, repair them, and sell for $25,000,000.00 profit. Jamal wanted Graham to invest from $1,000,000.00 to $2,000,000.00 in the venture, but Graham said he (Graham) would have to find other friends to join on any such investment in order to raise that kind of money (said investment “opportunity” by Jamal for Graham is not on the “Graham-Jamal Corroborating Videotape of 8 Mar 2003” because the tape ran out before Jamal talked business).

On May 22, 2003, Jamal called Graham and wanted to meet about the Ft. Worth investment venture and for his “toothache.” After Graham reports to Shreveport FBI Agent Ray Spoon of said meeting with Jamal. Spoon advises Graham not to be body- wired as a means to record the pending Graham-Jamal conversation of 22 May 2002. Jamal came to the dental clinic and told Graham that Jamal had talked to the owners of James Stone Properties in Ft. Worth, TX and they reduced the price from for Jamal to buy 438 units of phase of Jamal’s venture and that Graham would have to invest at least $400,000.00 to join Jamal and his partners; Jamal quickly reduced Graham’s minimum investment to $200,000.00.

Jamal’s new corporation is called Global Marketing Development, LLC, with Jamal as President/CEO, with Jamal saying a former US Army Brigadier General as Chairman of the Board. Jamal wants a HUD loan. Jamal also said he was referred to James Stone Properties, located in Ft. Worth, TX, by his real estate man in Houston, TX named and a real estate woman. Jamal claims that he (Jamal) has signed a contract to buy phase one of James Stone Apartment Units (438 units), but Jamal could not produce said contract when Graham requested to see said contract, and further, after several weeks Jamal still has not produced said contract.

Additionally, on May 22, 2003, Jamal said that during his investigation by the FBI he discovered that the FBI was “stupid, stupid, stupid, and the FBI could not find one terrorist even if there were 1,000 terrorists around Shreveport and Bossier City.” Additionally, Jamal said he liked Graham’s personal auto and wanted to purchase it for himself, but Graham said he liked the car and did not wish to sell. Graham assumed Jamal wanted Graham’s Land Rover to impress potential investors in his alleged money- raising scams, with monies used to fund whatever causes.

Graham reported events of 22 May 2003 to FBI Agent Ray Spoon.

On September 20, 2003, Jamal droped by Graham’s dental clinic excited about his new Ark-La-Tex Tire company, whereupon Jamal again hustled Graham for an investment in said tire company. Jamal wanted $10,000.00. Graham acts excited so as to photograph (in front of Graham’s clinic) Jamal in his new monogrammed shirt standing at the back of his truck (also photographing the license plate). While visiting Jamal’s new business at 3117 W.70th Street, Jamal related when and how he came to the U.S., including the name of his Saudi contact person in the mid-90s, a Dr. Rudas, of California. Graham had his picture taken with Mohammad Jamal Khan in order to, if necessary, continue his close association and investigatory relationship with Jamal. SECTION 31

For Clarity

Since the first two “Staff Statements” of the 9-11 Commission’s report repeatedly refer to both Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar (who were reported by Graham “face-to-face” to Shreveport FBI Agent Steve Hayes on 1 Nov 2000 and re- reported by Graham in summary fashion “face-to-face” to Shreveport U.S. Secret Service Agent Ron Lewis on or about 7 Nov 2000), Section 30 and Section 31 of this book herein quote verbatim from the 9-11 Commission’s Seventh Public Hearing held on January 26-27, 2004 (boldness selectively added in order to highlight the Graham Report participants/contacts):

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

(9-11 Commission)

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also known as the 9-11 Commission), an independent, bipartisan commission created by congressional legislation and the signature of President George W. Bush in late 2002, is chartered to prepare a full and complete account of the circumstances surrounding the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, including preparedness for and the immediate response to the attacks. The Commission is also mandated to provide recommendations designed to guard against future attacks.

Entry of the 9/11 Hijackers into the United States

Staff Statement No. 1

Members of the Commission, we have developed initial findings on how the individuals who carried out the 9/11 attacks entered the United States. We have also developed initial findings on terrorists who failed in their efforts to enter the United States. These findings lead us to some tentative judgments on the way the United States targets the travel of international terrorists.

This staff statement represents the collective effort of several members of our staff. Susan Ginsburg, Thomas Eldridge, and Janice Kephart-Roberts did most of the investigative work reflected in this statement.

The Commission was able to build upon a large and strong body of work carried out by many talented public servants at the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, the former Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The American people should be proud of the many extraordinary professionals now serving them. To the extent we have criticisms, they are comments less on the talent available and more on how that talent was used.

As we know from the sizable illegal traffic across our land borders, a terrorist could attempt to bypass legal procedures and enter the United States surreptitiously. None of the 9/11 attackers entered or tried to enter our country this way. So today we will focus on the hijackers’ exploitation of legal entry systems. We have handed out a list of the names of 9/11 attackers to help you follow our discussion.

To break down some of al Qaeda’s travel problem, view it from their perspective. For most international travel, a terrorist has to have a passport. To visit some countries, terrorists of certain nationalities must obtain a document permitting them to visit—a visa. Finally the terrorist must actually enter the country and keep from getting detained or deported by immigration or other law enforcement officials. Susan Ginsburg, Senior Counsel to the Commission, will begin by examining how the hijackers navigated these stages.

Passports

Four of the hijackers’ passports have survived in whole or in part. Two were recovered from the crash site of United Airlines Flight 93 in Pennsylvania. One belonged to a hijacker on American Airlines Flight 11. A passerby picked it up and gave it to an NYPD detective shortly before the World Trade Center towers collapsed. A fourth passport was recovered from luggage that did not make it from a Portland flight to Boston onto the connecting flight, which was American Airlines Flight 11. In addition to these four, some digital copies of the hijackers’ passports were recovered in post-9/11 operations.

Two of the passports that have survived, those of Satam al Suqami and Abdul Aziz al Omari, were clearly doctored. To avoid getting into the classified details, we will just state that these were “manipulated in a fraudulent manner,” in ways that have been associated with al Qaeda. Since the passports of 15 of the hijackers did not survive, we cannot make firm factual statements about their documents. But from what we know about al Qaeda passport practices and other information, we believe it is possible that six more of the hijackers presented passports that had some of these same clues to their association with al Qaeda.

Other kinds of passport markings can be highly suspicious. To avoid getting into the classified details, we will just call these “suspicious indicators.” Two of the hijackers, Khalid al Mihdhar and Salem al Hazmi, presented passports that had such suspicious indicators. We know now that each of these two hijackers possessed at least two passports. All of their known passports had these suspicious indicators. We have evidence that three other hijackers, Nawaf al Hazmi, Ahmed al Nami, and Ahmad al Haznawi may have presented passports containing these suspicious indicators. But their passports did not survive the attacks, so we cannot be sure.

Fifteen of the 19 hijackers were Saudi nationals. There were significant security weaknesses in the Saudi government’s issuance of Saudi passports in the period when the visas to the hijackers were issued. Two of the Saudi 9/11 hijackers may have obtained their passports legitimately or illegitimately with the help of a family member who worked in the passport office.

We do not yet know the answer to the question whether the knowledge of these particular clues existed in the intelligence community before 9/11. From the mid-1970s, when terrorists began to launch attacks in the Middle East and Europe, intelligence and border authorities knew that terrorists used forged or altered travel documents. By the 1980s the U.S. government had developed a “Red Book” used to guide and train consular, immigration, and customs officers throughout the world on spotting terrorists. It included photographs of altered or stolen passports, and false travel stamps (also known as cachets) used by terrorists. The importance of training border officials on use of the Red Book is evident from a U.S. government film entitled “The Threat is Real.” Here is a brief excerpt.

The U.S. government ceased publication of the “Red Book” by 1992, in part because it had fallen into the hands of terrorist groups, although there continued to be a number of government efforts to provide information about generic forgery detection and document inspection techniques.

Before 9/11, the FBI and CIA did know of some of the practices employed by al Qaeda. They knew this from training manuals recovered in the mid-1990s and from tracking and interrogations of al Qaeda operatives. Some of this knowledge was revealed in individual criminal cases prosecuted in the United States in the 1990s. And yet, between 1992 and September 11, 2001, we have not found any signs that intelligence, law enforcement, or border inspection services sought to acquire, develop, or disseminate systematic information about al Qaeda’s or other terrorist groups’ travel and passport practices. Thus, such information was not available to consular, immigration, or customs officials who examined the hijackers’ passports before 9/11.

Visas

The State Department is principally responsible for administering U.S. immigration laws outside of the United States. Consular officers, a branch of our diplomatic corps, issue several kinds of visas for visitors and for permanent immigrants. In 2000, these diplomats processed about 10 million applications for visitors’ visas at over 200 posts overseas. U.S. law allows nationals of certain countries to enter without visas on a reciprocal basis, under the visa waiver program. None of the 9/11 hijackers, however, were nationals of a visa waiver country.

Before 9/11, visa applicant s provided their passport and a photograph. A State Department employee checked the passport for any apparent questionable features. A consular officer could call the applicant in for an interview. The applicant’s essential information went into a State Department database. The information was then checked against a large “consular lookout” database called CLASS, which included a substantial watchlist of known and suspected terrorists, called TIPOFF. Our immigration system before 9/11 focused primarily on keeping individuals intending to immigrate from improperly entering the United States. In the visa process, the most common form of fraud is to get a visa to visit the United States as a tourist and then stay to work and perhaps become a resident. Consular officers concentrated on interviewing visa applicants whom they suspected might leave and not return.

Saudi citizens rarely overstayed their visas or tried to work illegally in the United States. The same was true for citizens of the United Arab Emirates. So, while consular officials in both countries always screened applicants in CLASS, including TIPOFF, they would not interview them unless there was something about the applications that seemed problematic.

Visa applicants from these countries frequently had their applications submitted by third party facilitators, like travel agencies. In June 2001, the U.S. consular posts in Saudi Arabia instituted a third party processing program called Visa Express. It required applicants to apply through designated travel agencies instead of by mail or in person. The program was established in part to try to keep crowds of people from congregating outside the posts, which was a security risk to the posts and to the crowds themselves. We have found no evidence that the Visa Express program had any effect on the interview or approval rates for Saudi applicants, or that it reduced the scrutiny given to their applications. It actually lengthened the processing time.

With the exception of our consulates in Mexico, biometric information—like a fingerprint—was not routinely collected from visa applicants before 9/11. Terrorists therefore easily could exploit opportunities for fraud. Khalid Sheikh Mohamed, the chief tactical planner and coordinator of the 9/11 attacks, was indicted in 1996 by Federal authorities in the Southern District of New York for his role in earlier terrorist plots. Yet, KSM, as he is known, obtained a visa to visit the United States on July 23, 2001, about six weeks before the 9/11 attacks. Although he is not a Saudi citizen and we do not believe he was in Saudi Arabia at the time, he applied for a visa using a Saudi passport and an alias, Abdulrahman al Ghamdi. He had someone else submit his application and a photo through the Visa Express program. There is no evidence that he ever used this visa to enter the United States.

Beginning in 1997, the 19 hijackers submitted 24 applications and received 23 visas. The pilots acquired most of theirs in the year 2000. The other hijackers, with two exceptions, obtained their s between the fall of 2000 and June 2001. Two of the visas were issued in Berlin, and two were issued in the United Arab Emirates. The rest were issued in Saudi Arabia. One of the pilots, Hani Hanjour, had an application denied in September 2000 for lack of adequate documentation. He then produced more evidence in support of his student visa application, and it was approved. Except for Hanjour, all the hijackers sought tourist visas.

Of these 24 visa applications, four were destroyed routinely along with other documents before their significance was known. To our knowledge, State consular officers followed their standard operating procedures in every case. They performed a name check using their lookout database, including the TIPOFF watchlist. At the time these people applied for visas, none of them—or at least none of the identities given in their passports—were in the database. We will say more about this in another staff statement later today.

All 20 of these applications were incomplete in some way, with a data field left blank or not answered fully. Such omissions were common. The consular officials focused on getting the biographical data needed for name checks. They generally did not think the omitted items were material to a decision about whether to issue the visa.

Three of the 19 hijackers submitted applications that contained false statements that could have been proven to be false at the time they applied. The applications of Hani Hanjour, Saeed al Ghamdi, and Khalid al Mihdhar stated that they had not previously applied for a U.S. visa when, in fact, they had. In Hanjour’s case the false statement was made in an earlier application for a visit, in 1997, not his final visa application in 2000. Hanjour and Mihdhar also made false statements about whether they had previously traveled to the United States. Information about these prior applications was retrievable at the Jeddah post where each applied.

These false statements may have been intentional, to cover up the applicants’ travel on old passports to suspect locations like Afghanistan for terrorist training. On the other hand, these statements may have been inadvertent. During this period, Saudi citizens often had their applications filled out and submitted by third parties. Most importantly, evidence of the prior visas or travel to the United States actually would have reduced concern that the applicants were intending to immigrate, so consular officers had no good reason to deny the visas or travel.

Al Mihdhar’s case was uniquely problematical. He had not been entered into the TIPOFF watchlist at the time of his second visa application in June 2001. In January 2000 the American consulate in Jeddah had been asked about Mihdhar’s visa status in conjunction with an ongoing urgent terrorist intelligence investigation and confirmed that this al Qaeda operative had a U.S. visa. When Mihdhar applied again in June 2001, the check against the worldwide TIPOFF watchlist took place, but no system then in place included a notation of the prior visa status check. Neither the investigating agency nor the post had made the appropriate lookout entry. Thus, in effect, the post could not ‘remember’ relevant suspicions a year-and-a-half earlier about this same person, who was traveling again with the same biographical information.

At least two of the hijackers were actually interviewed in person in connection with their visa applications. Hanjour was interviewed twice. Satam al Suqami was apparently interviewed in Riyadh. Another hijacker, Ahmed al Nami, was apparently interviewed briefly, but just to clarify an entry on his application. The three consular officers involved have some memory of these interviews. All stated that the reason for their interviews had nothing to do with terrorism. They saw nothing suspicious. At least four individuals implicated in the 9/11 plot tried to get visas and failed: Ramzi Binalshibh, Zakariya Essabar, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali, and Saeed al Gamdi. This Saeed al Gamdi is a different person from the Saeed al Ghamdi who actually became a hijacker.

Ramzi Binalshibh, a Yemeni, apparently intended to train as a pilot along with his Hamburg friends, Mohamed Atta, Marwan al Shehhi, and Ziad Jarrah. Binalshibh applied for a visa three times in Berlin and once in Yemen. He first applied in Berlin on the same day as Atta. He was interviewed twice and denied twice. Yemen is a much poorer country than Saudi Arabia. Both times, consular officers determined he did not have strong ties to Germany and he might be intending to immigrate unlawfully to the United States. Binalshibh tried again in Berlin, this time for a student visa to attend aviation school in Florida. He was denied again for lack of adequate documentation and failure to show sufficient ties to Germany.

Essabar, a Moroccan who may also have intended to be a pilot, tried to get a visa in Berlin at least once and failed because he failed to demonstrate sufficient ties to Germany, such as a job or family there. Third country visa applicants in Berlin were held to significantly higher standards—in terms of documentation and showing ties with their country of residence—than were Saudi and Emirati citizens applying from their own countries.

Ali Abdul Aziz Ali is the nephew of Khalid Sheikh Mohamed and was heavily involved in financial and logistical aspects of the 9/11 plot. He tried to get a U.S. visa in Dubai about two weeks before the attacks. His visa application states that he intended to enter the United States on September 4, 2001, for one week. As a Pakistani visa applicant in a third country, he would have received greater scrutiny from U.S. officials from the start. In any event, it was deemed possible that he intended to immigrate, and accordingly he was denied a visa.

Saeed al Gamdi, also known as “Jihad” al Gamdi, apparently intended to participate in the 9/11 attacks. He is a Saudi and applied for a tourist visa in Jeddah on November 12, 2000, the same date as 9/11 hijacker Ahmad al Haznawi. Haznawi was approved, but al Gamdi was denied after an interview with a consular officer, because the consular officer believed he was intending to immigrate.

Entry into and exit from the United States

With a visa, an individual can travel to a United States port of entry. Upon arrival, the individual must seek admission into the United States from an inspector of what used to be called the INS, an agency whose personnel now form part of the Department of Homeland Security. Property being brought into the United States is checked by inspectors of the U.S. Customs Service, whose personnel are now also part of DHS.

The 19 hijackers entered the United States a total of 33 times. They arrived through ten different airports, though more than half came in through Miami, JFK, or Newark. A visitor with a tourist visa was usually admitted for a stay of six months. All but two of the hijackers were admitted for such stays. Hanjour had a student visa and was admitted for a stay of two years, and Suqami sought and was admitted for a stay of 20 days. The four pilots passed through INS and Customs inspections a total of 17 times before 9/11. Hanjour came to the United States to attend school in three stints during the 1990s. His final arrival was in December 2000, through the Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky airport. The other three pilots, Atta, al Shehhi, and Jarrah, initially came in May and June 2000. They arrived for the last time between May and August 2001. All made a number of trips abroad during their extended stays in the United States.

Of the other 15, only Mihdhar entered the United States, left, and returned. Nawaf al Hazmi arrived in January 2000 with Mihdhar and stayed. Al Mihdhar left in June 2000 and returned to the United States on July 4, 2001. Ten of the others came in pairs between April and June 2001. Three more arrived through Miami on May 28.

The INS inspector usually had about one to one and a half minutes to assess the traveler and make a decision on admissibility and length of stay. For all the entries, a primary INS inspector would work a lane of incoming travelers and check the people and their passports. The inspector would try to assess each individual’s demeanor. No one noted any anomalies in these passports despite the fact, we now believe, that at least two and as many as eight showed evidence of fraudulent manipulation. The inspector would use the passport data, especially if it was machine readable to check various INS and Customs databases. The databases would show the person’s immigration history information, as well as terrorist watchlist and criminal history information.

Of the five hijackers who entered the United States more than once, three of them violated immigration law.

Ziad Jarrah entered in June 2000 on a tourist visa and then promptly enrolled in flight school for six months. He never filed an application to change his immigration status from tourist to student. Had the INS known he was out of status, they could have denied him entry on any of the three subsequent occasions he departed and returned while he was a student.

Marwan al Shehhi came in through Newark in late May 2000, followed a week later by Mohamed Atta. Both were admitted as tourists and soon entered flight school in Florida. In September they did file applications to change their status. Before 9/11, regulations allowed tourists to change their status at any time, so they were in compliance. But both overstayed their periods of admission and completed flight school to obtain commercial pilot licenses. Atta and al Shehhi then left within a few days of one another and returned within a few days of one another in January 2001, while their change in visa status from tourist to student was still pending.

Atta and al Shehhi did get some attention when both said they were coming back to finish flight school. Primary inspectors noticed with each that their story clashed with their attempt to reenter on tourist visas. The rules required them to get proper student visas while they had been overseas, since their earlier pending applications for a change of status were considered abandoned once they left the United States. Atta and al Shehhi were each referred by the primary inspectors to secondary inspection. At secondary, more experienced inspectors could conduct longer interviews, check more databases, take fingerprints, examine personal property, and call on other agencies for help. The inspectors involved have stated they do not remember these encounters. The reports indicate that both men repeated their story about still going to flight school and their pending applications for a change of status. The secondary inspectors admitted Atta and al Shehhi as tourists.

Flight 93 hijacker Saeed al Ghamdi was referred to secondary immigration inspection when he arrived in late June 2001. He had no address on his I-94 form. He spoke little English. He had a one-way ticket and about $500. The inspector wondered whether he was possibly intending to immigrate. Al Ghamdi convinced the inspector that he was a tourist and had enough money.

Customs officers took a second look at two of the hijackers but then admitted them. On Marwan al Shehhi’s first entry into the United States, a customs officer referred him to secondary inspection, completed the inspection, and released him. In May 2001, Waleed al Shehri and Satam Suqami departed Florida for the Bahamas but were refused admission. On their way back to the United States, a customs officer conducting a preclearance in the Bahamas referred al Shehri to a secondary inspection. Customs then released al Shehri to return to the United States with Suqami.

We do know of one success by immigration secondary inspection that affected the 9/11 plot. An al Qaeda operative, Mohamed al Kahtani, arrived at Orlando airport on August 4, 2001. Evidence strongly suggests that Mohamed Atta was waiting there to meet him. Kahtani encountered an experienced and dedicated inspector, Jose Melendez-Perez. We will hear his story later this morning.

During their stays in the United States at least six of the 9/11 hijackers violated immigration laws. We have noted Jarrah’s failure to adjust his status while he was in flight school and the violations by Atta and al Shehhi. Hani Hanjour came on a student visa in December 2000 but then did not attend the English language school for which his visa was issued. Nawaf al Hazmi overstayed his term of admission by nine months. Suqami overstayed his term of admission by four months. None of these violations were detected or acted upon by INS inspectors or agents.

Two programs might have helped detect such violations. One dealt with violations of student status. The other dealt with overstays.

National security concerns about foreign students are not new. By the late 1980s the INS had established a Student/School System to track students, but the system did not work. After the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, when it was discovered that a participant in the plot had been a student who had overstayed his visa, the Department of Justice asked INS to devise a better way to track students. INS officials recommended a new student tracking system and a student ID card that used biometric identifiers. In 1996, Congress mandated a new system to be installed by 1998, without appropriating program funds. The INS scraped together $10 million and piloted a successful student tracking program in the Atlanta area in June 1997, which included a flight school. However, advocates of education interests argued that the program would be burdensome and costly. Upon the order of senior INS management, the project manager was replaced. In 1998, INS indefinitely deferred testing of the biometric student ID card. The program stalled. Senators declared an interest in repealing the 1996 law and sought to obstruct further INS funding for it. Thus, when Atta and al Shehhi lied when questioned about their student status on their reentries in January 2001, and when Hanjour failed to show up for the school for which he was issued a visa in December 2000, a student tracking system was far from available to immigration inspectors or agents.

Congress required the Attorney General to develop an entry-exit system in 1996. The system’s purpose was to improve INS’s ability to address illegal migration and overstays of all types of foreign visitors. By 1998, Congress had appropriated about $40 million to develop the system. Advocates for border communities, however, were concerned that an entry-exit system would slow down trade. INS officials decided to forego the system at the land borders and only to automate the entry process. The automation process was not successful. The result was that when hijackers Suqami and Nawaf al Hazmi overstayed their visas, the system Congress envisaged did not exist. Moreover, when federal law enforcement authorities realized in late August 2001 that Mihdhar had entered with Hazmi in January 2000 at Los Angeles, they could not reliably determine whether or not Hazmi was still in the United States, along with Mihdhar.

Conclusion

The Director of the FBI testified that “[e]ach of the hijackers ... came easily and lawfully from abroad.” The Director of Central Intelligence described 17 of the 19 hijackers as “clean.” We believe the information we have provided today gives the Commission the opportunity to reevaluate those statements. Based on our evaluation of the hijackers’ travel documents, the visa process, the entries into the United States, and the compliance with immigration law while the attackers were here, we have a few observations. Considered collectively, the 9/11 hijackers:

Included among them known al Qaeda operatives who could have been watchlisted; Presented passports “manipulated in a fraudulent manner;” Presented passports with “suspicious indicators” of extremism; Made detectable false statements on their visa applications;

Were pulled out of the travel stream and given greater scrutiny by border officials; Made false statements to border officials to gain entry to the United States; and Violated immigration laws while inside the United States.

These circumstances offered opportunities to intelligence and law enforcement officials. But our government did not fully exploit al Qaeda’s travel vulnerabilities.

Why weren’t they exploited? We do not have all the answers. Certainly neither the State Department’s consular officers nor the INS’s inspectors and agents were ever considered full partners in a national counterterrorism effort. This is exemplified by the Bureau of Consular Affairs’ statement that before 9/11 they were not informed by anyone in the State Department or elsewhere that Saudi citizens could pose security risks. Nor were the Consular Affairs bureau or INS given the resources to perform an expanded mission. Between 1998 and 2001, visa applications rose by nearly a third, an increase of 2.5 million per year. Trained staff did not keep pace with the volume increase. In Jeddah and Riyadh, for example, each consular officer had responsibility for processing, on average, about 30,000 applications per year and routinely interviewed about 200 people per day.

The INS before 9/11 had about 2,000 agents for interior enforcement. As long as the top enforcement priorities were removal of criminal aliens and prosecution of employers who hired illegal aliens, a major counterterrorism effort would not have been possible. This is not to pass judgment on immigration policy generally. What we can do is highlight the way those policy choices affected counterterrorism efforts before 9/11, and potentially affect them today. For our front line border inspection services to have taken a substantially more proactive role in counterterrorism, their missions would have had to have been considered integral to our national security strategy and given commensurate resources.

Today, the level of systematic effort by the intelligence community focused on terrorist travel is much greater. But terrorist travel intelligence is still seen as a niche effort, interesting for specialists, but not central to counterterrorism. Nor have policymakers fully absorbed the information developed by terrorist mobility specialists. Much remains to be done, within the United States and internationally, on travel and identity document security, penalties and enforcement policy with respect to document fraud, and travel document screening efforts at the borders. If we have one conclusion from our work so far, it is that disrupting terrorist mobility globally is at least as important as disrupting terrorist finance as an integral part of counterterrorism (Continued in Section 31). SECTION 32

(CONTINUED) National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9-11 Commission)’s

Seventh Public Hearing Held on January 26-27, 2004:

Three 9/11 Hijackers’ Identification, Watchlisting and Tracking

Staff Statement No. 2

Members of the Commission, working with you, your staff has developed initial findings on the identification, watchlisting, and tracking of three individuals who helped carry out the 9/11 attacks upon the United States. Those individuals are Nawaf al Hazmi, Salem al Hazmi, and Khalid al Mihdhar. These findings and judgments may help your conduct of today’s public hearing and inform the development of your recommendations.

This report reflects the results of work so far. We remain ready to revise our understanding of these topics as our work continues. This staff statement represents the collective effort of a number of members of our staff. Douglas MacEachin, Barbara Grewe, Susan Ginsburg, Lloyd Salvetti, Alexis Albion, Thomas Eldridge, Michael Hurley, and Lorry Fenner did most of the investigative work reflected in this statement.

Our staff was fortunate. We could build upon a substantial body of work carried out by the Joint Inquiry organized in 2002 by the intelligence committees of the House and Senate. We also relied on some high quality work performed by the National Security Agency, along with cooperation from the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of State. Again, we were impressed by the high caliber of the professionals engaged in public service.

The Congressional Joint Inquiry highlighted this story as one of failed opportunities to put these suspected terrorists on a watchlist to prevent them from entering the United States. Therefore the lesson learned, as Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet put it, was to do a better job of putting people on the watchlist, to correct what he called “a weakness in our internal training and an inconsistent understanding of watchlist thresholds.”

We believe the portrayal of this story as a “watchlisting” failure may literally be true. But we think this label is profoundly misleading. (1) No one can know the might have beens. But we do not think it is likely that putting the three future hijackers on a watchlist would, by itself, have prevented the 9/11 attacks. As we pointed out earlier today, al Qaeda adapted to the failure of some of its operatives to gain entry into the United States. None of these three individuals were pilots.

(2) The ‘watchlisting’ label reinforces the sense that watchlisting is a chore off to the side from core intelligence work. Of course everyone rightly acknowledges it is a necessary chore, something that busy intelligence officials just have to remember to do. Yet they did not see it as an integral part of their own intelligence work. The opportunity to prevent the attacks would not have arisen just from preventing these people from entering the United States. It would have come from intelligence work that used watchlisting as a tool.

(3) The watchlisting label also distorts the analysis of accountability. It tends to cast a harsh light on whether one or two people at Headquarters did their job. That focus may be unfair. It is certainly too narrow.

We suggest instead that the watchlisting failure was just one symptom of a larger intelligence failure. The failure raises questions for the Commission about the CIA’s and the Intelligence Community’s management of transnational intelligence operations.

We will do what we can to reconstruct this story, given the appropriate constraints on what can be said about such topics in public. It is detailed, but the details are essential.

The Initial Lead and the Hindsight Issue

The lead in this case came from the analysis of communications by the National Security Agency, or NSA. The NSA, and the intelligence community, obtains what it calls “signals intelligence,” or SIGINT. Some sources relevant to this case are no longer operational. We are therefore able to say a little more about it now without disclosing any of the details about the methods used to collect such intelligence.

The Intelligence Community obtained additional sources after the Embassy bombings in East Africa. These particular sources were important. They offered insight into a larger al Qaeda network in the Middle East and were linked directly to the East Africa bombings.

In late 1999, NSA analyzed communications associated with a man named Khalid, a man named Nawaf, and a man named Salem. NSA analysts at the time thought Salem was Nawaf’s younger brother. They were right.

We now know Nawaf was in Karachi, Pakistan; Khalid was in Yemen; Nawaf planned to leave Karachi on January 2; and they were making plans to meet in Malaysia. Nawaf planned to leave Karachi on January 2. By early on December 31, Pakistani time, U.S. officials in Islamabad, Pakistan’s capital, were following the situation. At this point the relevant working- level officials in the Intelligence Community knew little more than this. But they correctly concluded that “Nawaf” and “Khalid” may be part of “an operational cadre” and that “something nefarious might be afoot.”

We believe every available resource should have been devoted to learning who these people were, and trying to spot and track them.

-- NSA did not think it was its job to initiate this research on its own. It saw itself as an agency to support consumers, such as CIA. It tried to respond energetically to any request made of them. But it tends to wait to be asked.

-- If NSA had been asked to try to identify these people, NSA would have started by checking its own database of earlier information from these same sources. Some of this information had been reported and disseminated around the community. Some had not. But it was all readily accessible in NSA’s database. NSA’s analysts would promptly have discovered who Nawaf was, that his full name was Nawaf al Hazmi, and that he was an old friend of Khalid.

-- NSA analysts also could then have readily inferred that Salem might be named Salem al Hazmi.

-- But NSA was not asked to do this work, at least not until much, much later.

Some might say that such comments display 20/20 hindsight, elevating the importance of these reports out of hundreds of items. This is a reasonable argument. But in this case we think our critique is fair, and not distorted by hindsight. Why?

-- At the end of 1999 and in early 2000, the period of the Millennium Alert, the danger from al Qaeda was, by all accounts, the number one national security priority of the United States. It was a focus of practically daily meetings by the top officials of the government.

􏰀These particular sources of information were especially important ones. Their links to al Qaeda were, in the words of one cable, “notorious.” They had been linked directly with the East Africa Embassy attacks. The relevant analysts have told us that, at the time, these sources were among the very best on al Qaeda.

The Intelligence Community had reported that Nawaf and Khalid were deploying to meet in Kuala Lumpur.

Kuala Lumpur

Following up on intelligence, U.S. officials were active in Yemen and in the United Arab Emirates, where Khalid would get his connecting flight. Other information reinforced the picture of an emerging operation of some kind, and Sale m’s plans to arrive in Yemen soon. Nawaf, Khalid, and now Salem made further arrangements. Nawaf made plans to arrive in Malaysia on January 4. The Intelligence Community thought Nawaf was still in Pakistan and was not leaving there until the 4th. Other officials could have worked on logical flight itineraries and perhaps realized that Nawaf could—and probably did—keep to his original plan, leaving Pakistan for Southeast Asia on January 2. He then planned to—and did—leave his Asian stopover (probably Singapore) for Kuala Lumpur on January 4.

This detail matters because it meant that a possible opportunity to check and track Nawaf’s departure from Pakistan had already been lost. Officials in Pakistan tried to do this on the 4th. They had already missed Nawaf.

On January 3 both CIA Headquarters and U.S. officials around the world began springing energetically into action. With the information about Khalid’s travel itinerary, U.S. officials in Yemen, the United Arab Emirates, and Malaysia performed as well as could be hoped. Longstanding efforts to build relationships with friendly foreign services paid dividends.

Though they had missed Nawaf, officials had more success in tracking Khalid. He was identified as Khalid al Mihdhar. His Saudi passport was photocopied. It showed he had a visa to visit the United States. U.S. officials in Jeddah quickly confirmed that their post had issued this visa in April 1999.

Khalid al Mihdhar was tracked as he arrived at Kuala Lumpur on January 5. He and other Arabs, still unidentified, were surveilled as they congregated in the Malaysian capital. On January 5 CIA headquarters notified officials around the world that “we need to continue the effort to identify these travelers and their activities ... to determine if there is any true threat posed ....” This same cable said the FBI had been notified. The cable also asserts that Mihdhar’s travel documents also were given to the FBI. The weight of available evidence does not support that latter assertion.

At this point the case was considered important enough to mention in the regular updates on al Qaeda being given to the top officials in the U.S. government. On January 3 and 5 the head of CIA’s unit on al Qaeda apparently briefed his bosses on these developments as part of his regular daily updates. These updates, which included other ongoing operational developments, were usually reviewed every day by Director Tenet and by the National Security Adviser, Sandy Berger. On January 5 and 6, the Director of the FBI, Louis Freeh, and other top FBI officials were briefed on the operation as one of their regular updates and were told, correctly, that CIA was in the lead and that CIA had promised to let FBI know if an FBI angle to the case developed.

On January 6 two of the Arabs being tracked in Malaysia left for new destinations, one in Thailand and another in Singapore. After the fact, efforts were made to track them. U.S. officials in Kuala Lumpur wondered if one of these Arabs was the still mysterious Nawaf. Both returned to Kuala Lumpur within the next 24 hours, though the authorities did not know it at the time. The two individuals apparently were Nawaf al Hazmi and an individual now known as Khallad bin Attash. We’ll discuss Khallad again in a moment. On January 7, and then again on January 10, CIA headquarters notified the field that it had run searches on the names it had so far about this case and said these searches produced no “hits.” Headquarters was trying to support the operations in the field. The field had given them information about people being tracked. Headquarters had checked CIA’s own database and had found nothing.

These headquarters officials had not checked the databases at NSA or specifically asked NSA to do so. As mentioned earlier, if NSA had done this job its analysts would quickly have identified “Nawaf” as Nawaf al Hazmi. Someone then could have asked the State Department to check that name too. State would promptly have found its own record on Nawaf al Hazmi. That record would have shown that he too had been issued a visa to visit the United States. They would have learned that the visa had been issued at the same place—Jeddah—and on almost the same day as the one given to Khalid al Mihdhar. But none of this was known at the time.

On January 8, surveillance reported that three of the Arabs under surveillance suddenly left Kuala Lumpur on a short flight to Bangkok, traveling together. U.S. officials in Kuala Lumpur asked U.S. officials in Bangkok for help. The next day, Headquarters, noticing what was going on and working on a Sunday, backed up Kuala Lumpur’s message with another message, marked NIACT Immediate. That meant the incoming cable would alert the duty officer and insure that it was read and acted upon regardless of the hour.

Kuala Lumpur was able to identify one of the travelers as Khalid al Mihdhar. After the flight left they learned that one of his companions had the name Alhazmi. Remember that the officials did not have information that would have allowed them to put that last name together with the name they did know about—Nawaf.

About the third person all they had was part of a name. It was part of the name of the alias being used by Khallad bin Attash. “Khallad” is a nickname, the Arabic word for ‘silver,’ and refers to Khallad’s artificial leg. Khallad was then traveling under an alias. One reason he may have been traveling around East Asia at this time is that he may have been helping to plan possible hijackings on aircraft, perhaps in connection with an early idea for what would become the 9/11 plot. Khallad also had completed his work in helping plan the destruction of a U.S. warship visiting Yemen, the U.S.S. The Sullivans. The attack had just failed – unnoticed. The boat filled with explosives had sunk. Only the terrorists knew what had gone wrong. Almost everything was salvaged and prepared for another day. Khallad would later be a principal planner in the next try, nine months later. That was the October 2000 attack on another U.S. ship visiting Yemen, the U.S.S. Cole, an attack which almost sank the warship and did kill 17 American sailors.

Bangkok and Beyond

The information came to Bangkok too late to track these travelers as they came in. Had authorities in Bangkok already been alerted for Khalid al Mihdhar as part of a general regional or worldwide alert, they might have tracked him coming in. Had they been alerted to look for a possible companion named Nawaf, they might have noticed him too, and even tracked Khallad as well. Instead the authorities were alerted only after Kuala Lumpur sounded the alarm. By that time the travelers had already disappeared into the streets of Bangkok. We now know that two other al Qaeda operatives then flew to Bangkok to meet with Khallad in order to pass him money. Some of this money was reportedly given to Hazmi and Mihdhar for their upcoming work in the U.S. None of this was known at the time.

On January 12 the head of the CIA’s al Qaeda unit updated his bosses that surveillance in Kuala Lumpur was continuing. He may not have known that in fact the Arabs had dispersed and the tracking was falling apart. U.S. officials in Bangkok regretfully reported the bad news on January 13. The names they had were put on a watchlist in Bangkok, so that Thai authorities might notice if they left the country.

U.S. intelligence did learn that one of the travelers was using the name that was Khallad’s alias. Kuala Lumpur promptly asked for more information and agreement “to share that information for watch- listing purposes.” There was no apparent response, and Kuala Lumpur did not follow through on its own watchlisting ideas.

On January 14 the head of the CIA’s al Qaeda unit updated his bosses that officials were continuing to track the suspicious individuals who had now dispersed to various countries. Unfortunately, there is no evidence of any tracking efforts actually being undertaken by anyone after the Arabs disappeared into Bangkok.

CIA Headquarters asked NSA to put al Mihdhar on that agency’s watchlist, which had limited effectiveness. But there was no other effort to consider the onward destinations of these Arabs and set up other opportunities to spot them in case the screen in Bangkok failed. Just from the evidence in Mihdhar’s passport, one of those possible destinations and interdiction points would logically have been the United States. Hence this watchlisting effort could have been seen as integral to reviving a faltering tracking effort, quite apart from the other interests involved.

Weeks passed. Meanwhile, NSA would occasionally pass new information generally of a personal nature, associated with Khalid, Salem, Salem’s brother (Nawaf), and perhaps Khallad as well. At this time, though the Intelligence Community did not know it, Mihdhar was in San Diego, California.

None of these reports seem to have jogged renewed attention until another matter reminded Kuala Lumpur about the case. That post prodded Bangkok a bit, in February, about what had happened with those missing Arabs.

A few weeks later, in early March 2000, Bangkok responded to Kuala Lumpur’s question. It was reported that Nawaf al Hazmi, now identified for the first time with his full name, had departed on January 15, on a United Airlines flight to Los Angeles. We have found no evidence that this information was sent to the FBI.

It was further reported that a person under the name Khallad was using had departed Thailand for the last time on January 20. His destination was Karachi. As for Khalid al Mihdhar, his arrival on January 8 had been noted, but there was no record of his departure. In fact Mihdhar had been on the United flight to Los Angeles with Hazmi on January 15.

We presume this departure information was obtained back in January, on the days that these individuals made their departures. Because these names were watchlisted with the Thai authorities, we cannot yet explain the delay in reporting this news. But, since nothing particular was done with this information even in March, we cannot attribute much significance to this failure alone.

By March 2000 Mihdhar and Hazmi had already established their residence in San Diego. No one knew this at the time, because no follow up was done with any of this information until much later.

In January 2001, while working on the Cole attack, the CIA received information that Khallad had attended the meeting in Kuala Lumpur. As Director Tenet testified publicly before the Joint Inquiry, the Kuala Lumpur meetings “took on greater significance” because this information placed the Arabs who were there with a known al Qaeda operative. This discovery, however, did not lead to any fresh effort to pick up the trail of Mihdhar and Hazmi. By that time Mihdhar had left the United States and returned to Yemen. But if a retrospective of existing information had been conducted at this point, Hazmi might have been tracked down in the United States. And there would still have been time to watchlist Mihdhar before he obtained a new United States visa and reentered the U.S. to join in the 9/11 attacks.

Finally, in the summer of 2001, a thoughtful CIA official detailed to the FBI, working with an FBI employee detailed to the CIA, did some energetic detective work that at last unearthed and reexamined these old puzzle pieces. It became apparent that both Mihdhar and Hazmi were in the United States. They were watchlisted in late August 2001.

It was then too late to catch Mihdhar before he got another visa and returned to the United States to rejoin the operation. The connection to Salem al Hazmi, Nawaf’s younger brother, had never been made, so there was no effort to track his movements while in Yemen, watchlist him before he obtained his visa, or catch him as he entered the United States on a Swissair flight to New York in June 2001. The search in the United States for Nawaf al Hazmi and Mihdhar began. It had gotten off to a stuttering, quarrelsome start by September 11.

The Watchlisting Issue

The Department of State initiated and sponsored the U.S. government’s only pre-9/11 watchlist solely dedicated to catching terrorists. This list, called TIPOFF, was created in 1987 by an unassuming and enterprising public servant named John Arriza, who still helps sustain the program, which is now considerably expanded. The program was meant to keep terrorists from getting visas, of course. But, as the name implies, it also was a system to tip off intelligence and law enforcement agencies that a suspected terrorist was attempting to come to the United States. Any overseas post that obtained appropriate derogatory information about an individual had been told to enter it into TIPOFF by sending the appropriate cable. If the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research saw the information, they could and often did take the initiative to add the individual into TIPOFF. In 2001 the State Department provided more source documents for TIPOFF than any other agency, more than 2,000.

In December 1999 CIA Headquarters had repeated this guidance to its posts overseas, which technically also included its al Qaeda unit at Headquarters. In 2001 CIA provided more than 1,500 source documents to TIPOFF. It was CIA Headquarters that finally nominated Hazmi and Mihdhar for inclusion in TIPOFF.

Sharing of information with the FBI was vital from an intelligence perspective, if the individuals were coming into the United States. But FBI did not maintain the terrorist watchlist. That was the State Department’s job. FBI could contribute names like everyone else. In 2001 the FBI provided about 60 source documents for TIPOFF, fewer than were obtained from the public media, and a number approximately equivalent to the contribution that year from the Australian intelligence service.

It is worth noting that the Federal Aviation Administration’s own ‘no-fly’ list was totally independent from TIPOFF. Few names were on this no-fly list. So, before 9/11, adding someone to TIPOFF would not have any particular effect on their ability to board a commercial flight inside the United States. So, to be specific, adding Hazmi and Mihdhar to TIPOFF did not put them on a no- fly list, and did not keep them from flying on September 11.

Therefore, in thinking about the question of accountability, that potential list tends to expand to everyone. In effect, though, this means no one. At the time of the Joint Inquiry report, the general assumption was that the responsibility rested with some working- level official at CIA Headquarters. Yet, as we can see, many of the recipients of those January 2000 cables could have done their part. Kuala Lumpur thought about it. And so on.

That is why we think this issue must be examined from a broader perspective, that of the overall management of transnational intelligence operations. After all, why would the watchlisting make a difference? One purpose would have been to turn Hazmi and Mihdhar back when they reached Los Angeles, in effect throwing the m back into the sea. That would have served one purpose. But it might not have prevented any attacks.

We think it may be more interesting to consider the intelligence mission. Remember why “TIPOFF” had that name. The intelligence mission was why the suspects were tracked in Malaysia rather than being detained and deported. If the FBI had been given the opportunity to monitor Hazmi and Mihdhar in California, and had been patient for months, or a year, then some larger results might have been possible, even after Mihdhar left. The universe of possibilities expands after Hani Hanjour joined Hazmi in December 2000, after which the two of them lived in Phoenix for several months before driving across the country and linking up with other future hijackers in northern Virginia. Up to this point all of these hijackers named so far were involved in the hijacking of American Airlines 77, which hit the Pentagon. But in northern Virginia they linked up with a hijacker who would join the team assigned to United 175, thus creating a possible opportunity to penetrate the other teams associated with the “Hamburg cell” as well.

These are difficult ‘what ifs.’ It is possible that the Intelligence Community might have judged that the risks of conducting such a prolonged intelligence operation were too high—the risk of losing track of potential terrorists, for example. It is possible that the pre-9/11 FBI would not have been judged capable of conducting such an operation. But surely the Intelligence Community would have preferred to have the chance to make these choices. That is why we see this as an intelligence story—and a challenge for Intelligence Community management.

Management of a Transnational Case

In trying to second-guess the management of intelligence operations, the staff feels humbled as we encounter the experience and hard work of so many of the officials we have interviewed. Although we have some very seasoned intelligence professionals on our staff, we have listened hard to what the serving officials have told us. As you can see, these people cared deeply about combating terrorism. They have poured much of their life energy into this cause. And we believe that many of them were working in a system that was not well designed to take full advantage of their accumulated talents.

From the detail of this case, one can see how hard it is for the Intelligence Community to assemble enough of the puzzle pieces gathered by different agencies to make some sense from them, and then coordinate needed action—to collect or to disrupt. It is especially hard to do all this in a transnational case. This was, and is, a challenge for management.

In this case, there appears to have been at least two strategic errors in management. First, the managers of the case failed to get an all source background analysis of the players, canvassing what all agencies might know so they could assemble the best possible picture for action. This omission is already evident by the end of December 1999.

The second strategic error was that the managers of the case did not systematically set up ways to track the hijackers as they moved in predictable directions. Even if they slipped through the net in Bangkok, it was foreseeable that a traveler with a U.S. visa in his passport might seek to visit the United States. No one had the clear job of insuring that all the likely routes were covered.

Who had the job of managing the case to make sure these things were done? One answer is that everyone had the job. That was the perspective the Commission heard in its interview of the CIA’s Deputy Director for Operations, James Pavitt. Deputy Director Pavitt has been at or near the top of this Directorate for about six and a half years. He stressed that the responsibility resided with all involved. Above all he stressed the primacy of the field. The field had the lead in managing operations. The job of Headquarters, he stressed, was to support the field, and do so without delay. If the field asked for information or other support, the job of Headquarters was to get it—right away.

This is a traditional perspective on operations and, traditionally, it has great merit. It reminded us of the FBI’s pre-9/11 emphasis on the primacy of their Field Offices. When asked about how this traditional structure would adapt to the challenge of managing a transnational case, one that hopped from place to place as this one did, the Deputy Director argued that all involved were responsible for making it work. He underscored the responsibility of the particular field location where the suspects were being tracked at any given time. On the other hand, he also said that the Counterterrorism Center was supposed to “manage all the moving parts,” while what happened on the ground was the responsibility of managers in the field.

With this background, it is easier to understand why the way Headquarters handled this case may not have been so unusual. As pointed out this morning, travel intelligence was not seen as a central concern. Headquarters tended to support and facilitate, trying to make sure everyone was in the loop. From time to time a particular post would push one way, or Headquarters would urge someone to do something, but Headquarters never really took responsibility for the successful management of this case. Hence the managers at Headquarters did not realize that the two strategic errors cited above had occurred, and they scarcely knew that the case had fallen apart.

The director of the Counterterrorism Center at the time, Cofer Black, recalled to us that this operation as one among many and that, at the time, “it was considered interesting, but not heavy water yet.” He recalls the failure to get the word to Bangkok fast enough, but has no evident recollection of why the case then dissolved, unnoticed.

Going the next level down, the director of the al Qaeda unit in CIA at the time recalled to us that he did not think it was his job to direct what should or should not be done. He did not pay attention when the individuals dispersed and things fell apart. He would not have expected NSA to do the retrospective work in its own database. But he was uncertain of his own authority to order them to do it. There was no conscious decision to stop the operation after the trail was temporarily lost in Bangkok. But he acknowledged that perhaps there had been a letdown after the extreme tension and long hours in the period of the Millennium Alert.

We believe both Mr. Black and the former al Qaeda unit head are capable veterans of the Directorate of Operations, among the best the Agency has produced. Therefore we find these accounts more telling about the system than about the people. In this system no one was managing the effort to insure seamless handoffs of information or develop an overall interagency strategy for the operation.

Such management of transnational operations, fully integrating all source analysis, might require more employees. Deputy Director Pavitt told us, as he has told Congress, that he does not think the availability of more money would have prevented the 9/11 attacks. We are not sure that is right. Certainly since 9/11 the application of vast new resources within older management models has achieved some significant gains. But this story is not just about the past. We wonder whether the management of transnational intelligence operations has adapted enough to cope with the challenge of the war on terrorism. Today’s focus on travel intelligence has spotlighted the transnational character of the problem. This particular story is especially tragic. But we do not believe this operating style is unique to this case. We are not sure that these problems have been addressed. We are not sure they are even adequately acknowledged as a problem.

In an environment driven by reactions to the latest threat report and preoccupied with immediate operations, clear, accountable, and strategic management is a challenge. The Intelligence Community must overcome it. SECTION 33

JUSTICE: Jamal and Habeeb

On April 29, 2004, the Associated Press story out of Madrid, Spain, by Maria Jesus Prades, was entitled by Shreveport’s daily, The Times, as “Judge indicts Madrid suspect on charges of planning Sept. 11 attacks.” Going beyond Amer Azizi’s involvement in the Spanish train bombing of March 11, 2004, the story references Azizi being additionally indicted for his involvement in planning and supporting the U.S. terror of 9/11, which clearly holds significance to The Graham Report allegations. Quoting excerpts from the AP story (boldness added when applicable to The Graham Report):

“Amer Azizi, 36, helped organize a meeting in northeast Spain in July, 2001 that key plotters in the U.S. attacks, including suicide pilot Mohamed Atta, used to finalize details, Judge Baltasar Garzon said in the indictment.

“In the new indictment, Azizi is charged with multiple counts of murder -“as many deaths and injuries as were committed” on Sept. 11, 2001 – for helping to plan the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

“Azizi provided lodging for people who attended the July 2001 meeting in the Tarragona region of Spain and acted as a courier, passing on messages between plotters, Garzon said in the indictment.”

To contrast, Mohammad Jamal Khan also (but was not limited to) lodged and supported people (Nawaf Alhazmi and Fayez Banihammad) who were later alleged to be 9/11 hijackers of airliners (which crashed into the Pentagon and World Trade Center south tower, respectively), with Nawaf Alhazmi also being a “9/11 Ringleader.” Jamal additionally agreed with Habeeb that Banihammad was a resident medical doctor at LSU Medical Center (now called LSU Health Science Center).

Additionally, Mohammed Habeeb Ahmed, MD also (but was not limited to) provided support, in several ways, to Nawaf Alhazmi and Fayez Banihammad. Additionally, Habeeb allegedly lied when telling Dr. Graham that Fayez Banihammad was a “medical doctor resident at LSU Medical Center” since Habeeb was a cardiology resident at LSU Medical Center at that time, therefore, Habeeb had to be aware that Banihammad was not a doctor at LSUMC (while Habeeb provided transportation for Alhazmi and Banihammad to and from Jamal’s townhouse, and, to and from Masjid Al-Noor Muslim Mosque; and, additionally, Habeeb gave, or loaned, Jamal $500.00 to help to support Alhazmi and Banihammad). Mohammad Jamal Khan and Mohammed Habeeb Ahmed, MD have both allegedly (but not limited to) aided and abetted terrorists Nawaf Alhazmi and Fayez Banihammad, and potentially other illegal activities, as herein documented by the Graham Reports and corroborated by the two aforementioned videotapes (in possession of the FBI, the Joint Select Committee on Intelligence, and the 9/11 Commission) and an aforementioned Sworn Affidavit by (Witness X) in the hands of the Shreveport FBI.

Additionally, MASTERMINDS OF TERROR underscores the importance of both Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar as strategic participants in 9/11 by stating on page 137:

“Ramzi Binalshibh told Fouda that the Las Vegas meeting in the summer of 2001 was a meeting of the majlis al-shura, or consultative council, According to him, it consisted of the four pilots, Atta, al-Shehhi, al-Jarrah and Hanjour, plus al-Mihdhar and Atta’s deputy, al-Hazmi.”

Knowing this, Graham and his consultants realize the importance of a speedy arrest and trial for both Mohammad Jamal Khan and Mohammed Habeeb Ahmed, MD, for their alleged roles in aiding and abetting the terrorists of September 11, 2001. Jamal and Habeeb’s alleged complicity in the terrors of 9/11 are corroborated by, but not limited to, the “Graham-Habeeb Corroborating Videotape of June 24, 2002” and the “Graham- Khan Corroborating Videotape of March 8, 2003.”

On February 18, 2004 the U.S. Army released the charges against the Muslim Spc. Ryan G. Anderson, one charge which stated that Anderson “wrongfully and dishonorably provided information on Army troop strength, movement, and equipment.” The charges do not allege that Anderson ever actually passed information to real Al-Qaeda members. So how does this relate to Jamal’s case? Let’s take a look:

Considering the totality of Jamal’s case, is it not significant that Jamal was questioning B-52 pilots at N-Cahoots Sports Bar & Grill (just a stone’s throw from Barksdale AFB) about the dates of the pilot’ deployment to Iraq. Looks like, sounds like ...Is Jamal’s case somewhat similar to Ryan Anderson in that both cases involved movement of military equipment? You decide. Or better still, will the Department of Justice please decide.

Since both Jamal and Habeeb are foreign-nationals, why not a Tribunal (Military Commission) for these alleged aiders and abettors of terrorism of 9/11? Though these are Graham’s personal desires, he is cooperating with the U.S. government by testifying (in early 2004) at the Immigration and Naturalization Service for the deportation of Mohammad Jamal Khan.

Since Jamal has been roaming the streets of Shreveport and Bossier City beginning in November, 2002, I often wondered if the FBI had cut a deal with Jamal. But, then, after seeing Jamal drop the “Mohammad” from his name, I knew that would be out of character for a “flipping-over witness,” because, under such a scenario, the FBI would have insisted Jamal to remain Islamic, so as not to be rejected by his Muslim peers.

Let us not forget, Jamal continues to allegedly hustle investors (including but not limited to a Shreveport builder) for the Fort Worth apartment project, which Jamal originally told me would make investors in the neighborhood of twenty-five million ($25,000,000.00) dollars with a two million dollar investment. Of course, Jamal could be offering a legitimate deal to his potential investors.

Again, not to question his conversion, but if one is searching for big-time investors, being Southern Baptist in Shreveport-Bossier City has an inarguably better ring to it than being Muslim. And that’s not religious prejudice. Just facts, folks.

SPECULATION: CONSIDER TERRORIST POSSIBILITIES

At the time Jamal’s father visited Usama bin Laden (potentially days or weeks before October 7, 2000), the Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia meeting of Al-Qaeda operatives had already taken place earlier that year in January, 2000, as confirmed by CIA videotape (released in Jan 2001). The CIA videotape revealed those present at said Malaysia meeting to include, but not limited to: (1) Jamal’s Shreveport guest 9/11 Co- Ringleader Nawaf Alhazmi; and (2) 9/11 Co-Ringleader Khalid Almihdhar; and (3) Khalid Shaikh Mohammed who was the so-called Mastermind of 9/11. Alhazmi and Almihdhar were meeting with other Al-Qaeda members as well.

Jamal was allegedly harboring and supporting more than “9/11 hijackers.” Jamal was allegedly harboring (at least) one of the two “9/11 RINGLEADERS,” Nawaf Alhazmi, at his Shreveport residence located at 3521 East Lake Drive in Eastwood on the Bayou townhouse complex.

The week following my introduction to Nawaf Alhazmi and Fayez Banihammad, and further, the week after Jamal says his father had recently visited bin Laden: On 12 Oct 2000, the USS Cole is bombed by Al-Qaeda, killing 17 American sailors, in Aden Harbor, Yemen.

Take a hard look: Jamal’s guest, Nawaf Alhazmi, attends the Malaysia meeting with Usama bin Laden operatives in January, 2000, then later in the same year, Jamal’s father visits Usama bin Laden, this stated by Jamal in my presence, and in early spring of 2002, the Shreveport FBI receive a Sworn Affidavit by Michael Steiger (changed name) with statements which included, but not limited to, Jamal telling Steiger (on or about 15 Oct 2000) that Jamal’s father had visited Usama bin Laden.

Considering the fact that Mohammad Jamal Khan was also allegedly harboring and supporting Fayez Banihammad, hijacker of United Airlines Flt 175 (which hit WTC south tower), has the case been built for Jamal allegedly harboring and supporting 9/11 terrorists?

Then, too, is Mohammed Habeeb Ahmed, MD allegedly in the same boat? Do we give an MD a pass if he is allegedly guilty of the same, or similar, offenses against U.S. citizens? I sincerely hope Jamal and Habeeb, two foreign nationals, will be tried in civil or Tribunal Court for, including but not limited to, aiding and abetting 9/11 terrorists.

CONSIDER THE TERRORIST EXPERT The highly acclaimed book THE TERRORIST RECOGNITION HANDBOOK is authored by Malcolm W. Nance, who lectured for three years on terrorist tactics and protective measures for the FBI, DEA, IABTI, and U.S. Navy. Nance also worked as anti-terrorism operator providing direct support to the National Security Agency (NSA), the CIA, and the DIA. The man knows his stuff.

In his book, which is a must-read for law enforcement personnel, Malcolm Nance says terrorist groups organize for 3 reasons: (1) preparing for attacks, (2) planning for attacks, and (3) conducting attacks. Let us see if the expert’s model is analogous to the Shreveport situation, then you decide:

1. “Terrorist Cells (Active or Sleeper): Utilize secret communications”

We know from Khalid Shaikh Mohammed’s secret interrogation that he was communicating with 9/11 Ringleaders Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar through coded messages. I was eye-witness to Nawaf Alhazmi and Fayez Banihammad being present in Jamal’s townhouse, and Jamal had earlier told me that he was daily hanging out at USA Cash (located at 779 Shreveport-Barksdale Highway in Shreveport, LA 71105) to send emails and faxes around the world.

Though it is purely speculation on my part, Jamal allegedly could have easily provided Al-Qaeda with military information of Barksdale AFB, such as B-52 bomber strength and B-52 deployment, through his numerous emails and faxes (as a result of Jamal’s easy access by dating women stationed at Barksdale AFB).

Under TYPES of terrorist cells, Nance’s list includes, but not limited to:

2. “Logistics Cell (LOG): People who are organized to provide supplies or support to the other cells. These may include bomb makers, black marketers, doctors, lawyers, bankers, couriers, and others needed in an emergency. Also referred to as the auxiliary cell, support cell, or assistance cell.” Boy, does that sound familiar!

Mohammad Jamal Khan and Dr. Mohammed Habeeb Ahmed both confirm that Nawaf Alhazmi (at least) had room and board at Jamal’s townhouse for four to five weeks surrounding October, 2000, and with Habeeb giving, or loaning, Jamal $500.00 to help support Nawaf Alhazmi (Al-Qaeda hijacker of American Airlines Flt 77 which hit the Pentagon) and Fayez Banihammad (Al-Qaeda hijacker of United Airlines Flt 175 which hit WTC 2), with Fayez being domiciled at Jamal’s for at least several days during October, 2000. So a doctor, Habeeb, allegedly provides emergency assistance to Nawaf and Fayez, by going through Jamal. We also know that Jamal’s father had visited Al-Qaeda leader Usama bin Laden. Looks like, walks like, and allegedly was an active Safe House and/or Logistics Cell at 3521 East Lake Drive, Shreveport, LA 71105 (in Eastwood on the Bayou townhouse complex, front gated entrance being physically located on Knight Street approximately one-half mile south of Shreveport- Barksdale Highway). 3. Now, let us consider Nance’s description of an “Intelligence Cell (INTELL) collects data, makes recommendations, selects targets, and provides information to hit the target.” Nance says a “surveillance team” may have only one member, and a team usually will revisit the same location on many occasions. Very interesting:

We know Jamal told me he dated women on Barksdale Air Force Base and loved going all over the base (which is home to Eighth Air Force Headquarters, 917th USAF Reserves, and Second Bomb Wing of the mighty B-52s. We know Jamal was extremely interested in hustling someone to purchase (for him) the large white used truck on Youree Drive, Shreveport, LA, as Jamal made two passes by said white truck as he repeated to me that USA Cash owner wanted to buy him a newer truck (than the white truck on Youree Drive). We know Jamal made numerous trips all over Barksdale AFB, allegedly for surveillance purposes. And, we know that during this same period of time Jamal was harboring and supporting both Al-Qaeda 9/11 terrorist Nawaf Alhazmi and Al-Qaeda 9/11 terrorist Fayez Banihammad. And, Jamal’s father had recently visited Al-Qaeda leader Usama bin Laden. Look like, walks like ~ you decide.

4. Moreover, Nance mentions (under Operative Membership Pools) “ Open Pools of operatives rely on active cadre and field leadership to recruit lower-level operatives and train them to support their missions. These core personnel do not have to risk themselves completely and can form new cells as necessary. Al-Qaeda uses this system.” My, such a familiar ring:

Yes, allegedly Jamal and Habeeb fit the Open Pool like hand-in-glove. Allegedly lower-level operatives aiding and abetting Al-Qaeda terrorists with little or no risk. If so, allegedly Jamal and Habeeb could be using coded messages or couriers, at present, as new Open Membership Pools are being formed. After all, in October, 2003 Jamal told me his was using a “young Arab” to help in remodeling his Ark-La-Tex Tire business when located on Youree Drive within one block of Masjid Al-Noor Mosque.

Weeks later, Jamal moved said tire business to 3117 W.70th Street (the old Hill Tire location) where he hustled me and a builder named (builder wishes his name withheld from the public) for hundreds of thousands of dollars, both in vain. Disturbingly, at both of Jamal’s tire business locations (Youree Drive and 3117 W.70th Street), Jamal only had a few sample tires out front, with no tires in huge storage rooms, thereby providing Jamal with large open rooms allegedly for any clandestine activity such as preparation room for a truck-bombing. Scary thought.

JAMAL RUNNING THE STREETS

May I sarcastically ask, “Why is Jamal still on the streets of Shreveport and Bossier City, two cities which are adjacent to Barksdale Air Force Base, home of Eighth Air Force, 917th Air Force Reserve Wing, and Second Bomb Wing of B-52s?”

Question: Why not hold Jamal in a prison location while he fights deportation?

LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT On December 10, 2003 Graham called both Caddo Parish Sheriff Steve Prator and Bossier Parish Sheriff Larry Deen to find out if either sheriff had received info-sharing from the FBI concerning his (Graham’s) encounters with the 9/11 terrorists and/or their alleged harborers and supporters, Jamal and Habeeb. Sheriff Prator and Sheriff Deen both indicated, in no uncertain terms, that neither Sheriff has ever been contacted in relation to the Graham Report(s), before or after September 11, 2001. Could local law enforcement help in keeping an eye on alleged terrorists? You decide.

Initially, I was floored to hear that the FBI had never consulted with local law enforcement officials (Caddo Parish, Bossier Parish, Shreveport, Bossier City) on any occasion since the original Graham Report of November 1, 2000. However, on further conjecture, for the FBI to discuss the Graham Report with anyone is thereby revealing that names of three 9/11 hijackers who were reported to the Shreveport FBI over ten months before September 11, 2001. Enough reason to keep the facts close to the vest.

GIVE IT A BREAK

To be fair, however, there remains the strong possibility that federal officials have decided that the Graham Report contains valuable information which should not be shared at the local level (at least, not at this time). Consider the “need to know” philosophy. Then, too, since my reports were labeled “CONFIDENTIAL,” that would be just cause for the federal government to respect my request. Citizen health concerns, you know.

But it still begs the question: “Could not local law enforcement help to keep an eye on (i.e., surveillance on) those allegedly aiding and abetting terrorism without providing local law enforcement with the ‘secret details?’ ” Hopefully, the new Department of Homeland Security can rectify similar situations without jeopardizing national security. SECTION 34

FBI Calls Graham to Testify ~ INS Deletes the Plan

SHORT NOTICE TO TESTIFY

On December 11, 2003 at 4:00 pm, Shreveport FBI Agent Ray Spoon called Graham to see if Graham could (in the morning 12 Dec 2003) join him on a trip to Oakdale, LA for the purpose of Graham testifying for an Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) deportation against Mohammad Jamal Khan. Dr. Graham agreed to help. Agent Spoon and Graham left Shreveport around 4:00 am headed for the INS facility in Oakdale, located adjacent to Oakdale Federal Prison. Once again, Graham was in for a big Spoon surprise!

Soon after departing Shreveport on I-49 heading south, somewhere between Coushatta and Natchitoches, Louisiana Agent Ray Spoon related that his father had been friends with J. Edgar Hoover while also being an FBI agent. Spoon said that made him an early “Hooverite,” though he knew nothing about anybody dressing in drag. Ha. Several FBI stories from his time in Chicago followed until we flew into Alexandria doing about 80 m.p.h. We then turned southwest onto LA 165 toward our destination, the “big city” of Oakdale, home of Oakdale Federal Prison and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).

Passing the exit sign for LeCompte, FBI Agent Spoon eased into my forthcoming testimony. He said my testimony was important for two reasons: (1) for me to admit in the INS Hearing that I had, in fact, filmed Mohammad Jamal Khan on 8 Mar 2003 at my dental clinic, and (2) that Jamal had agreed to escort me into the country of Pakistan on an earlier date while the 8 Mar 2003 videotape discloses Jamal discussing the beauty of Pakistan, where his family lives, and so forth (which was important in that Jamal is now claiming to fear going home because the Pakistani Muslims will kill him since he has converted to the Protestant faith as a Baptist).

Then came the shocker! Shreveport FBI Agent Spoon advised me not to mention that Jamal had harbored and supported the 9/11 terrorists Nawaf Alhazmi and Fayez Banihammad ~ Spoon saying that bringing up the terrorist visitors at Jamal’s townhouse would only be chasing rabbits.

Let’s get this straight: The FBI response to 9/11 terrorist supporters will be to merely deport them, not even mentioning their association with the 9/11 hijackers. Sounds like a sweet cover-up of major security blunders. Deport Jamal by an obscure Oakdale, Louisiana hearing and the public would never find out. The only viable justification for such deportation would be to tail Jamal’s path after deportation in order to gain additional terrorist contacts; and that was my reasoning in agreeing to testify for deportation.

I then asked Spoon if he agreed with me that I should reveal that, in late July of 2003 (months after Jamal purportedly became a Baptist in the fall of 2002) Jamal started his Ark-La-Tex Tire & Accessory business exactly one block from Misjid Al-Noor (Islamic Mosque) on Youree Drive in Shreveport (which demonstrated no fear of the Muslims). Spoon smiled broadly, amused at how I like to chase those rabbits.

(Parenthetically, as of April, 2004 Jamal is selling automobiles and trucks for United Dodge on Bert Kouns Industrial Drive in Shreveport, LA)

SIDEBAR: ALLEGED OFF-LIMIT SITES FOR JAMAL

Significantly, a very reliable source revealed that Jamal was allegedly deported from Saudi Arabia many years ago (date unknown) and is barred from returning. Another reliable source has told me that Jamal allegedly cannot enter Barksdale Air Force Base. A third reliable source tells me that Jamal allegedly is barred from entering Pierre Bossier Mall in Bossier City, LA, Shreveport’s sister city where he resides as of February, 2004.

DAY ONE: JAMAL’S IMMIGRATION HEARING

Agent Spoon and Dr. Graham were pleased with the cordial, accommodating Department of Homeland Security INS Assistant District Counsel Jerry A. Beatmann, who represented the government’s case against Jamal. Shreveport FBI Agent Spoon offered Beatmann the choice of either an edited Graham-Khan Videotape of March 8, 2002 (which primarily covered Jamal speaking of the beauty of Pakistan) or the complete “Graham-Khan Corroborating Videotape of March 8, 2003” (which had been relabeled without “Corroborating Videotape” being part of the new label), with Beatmann choosing the (alleged) original unedited videotape.

Taking an inquiring look toward FBI Agent Spoon, Graham said he did not consider it out of line to inform Counsel Beatmann about Jamal’s new tire business in Shreveport. Eliciting no emotion from Spoon, Graham then asked Beatmann if he thought it important that, in late July 2003, Jamal began his Ark-La-Tex Tires business exactly one block south of the Muslim Mosque named Misjid Al-Noor. Beatmannn agreed with Graham that any close association of Jamal with the Mosque was important evidence in his potential deportation. Spoon appeared unperturbed by Beatmann’s answer, and Graham resisted the temptation to rub it in.

Beatmann went to the INS Hearing without FBI Agent Spoon and witness Graham, telling Spoon and Graham to make themselves at home in his office.

SPOON AND GRAHAM DISCUSS JAMAL AND HABEEB While Agent Spoon and I were waiting in Beatmann’s office, I once again explained to Spoon that my preference was to indict both Jamal and Habeeb for allegedly aiding and abetting 9/11 terrorists Nawaf Alhazmi and Fayez Banihammad. I emphasized my absolute certainty that the two Arab men escorted by Habeeb into Jamal’s townhouse on or about 7 Oct 2000 were definitely Alhazmi (9/11 Co-Ringleader with Khalid Almihdhar and Pentagon terrorist) and Banihammad (WTC 2 terrorist).

SPOON AGAIN DISAVOWS “1 NOV 2000 GRAHAM REPORT”

Spoon once again claimed he never located the 1 Nov 2000 Graham Report to Shreveport FBI Agent Steve Hayes, which prompted my relating an incident to Spoon which he was not privy to. Agent Spoon intently listened to the following:

On or about 31 Jan 2002, when I first met Shreveport Agent-in-Charge Mike Kinder at the Shreveport FBI Office, Kinder asked me to please step inside the hallway. In the hall stood Agent Steve Hayes, ostensibly so Kinder could find out if I recognized Hayes. Agent Hayes and I immediately exchanged cordialities, followed by Kinder immediately asking me for the names of FBI agents who were not returning my calls. I told Kinder that all the agents had their hands full, and besides, I was concerned with helping to prevent another 9/11. Since neither Kinder or Hayes commented, I broke the silence with,

“Back on 1 Nov, 2000 when I gave Agent Hayes the names Nawaf Alhazmi, Fayez Banihammad and Khalid Almihdhar, Agent Hayes had no way of knowing these men would be 9/11 hijackers.”

With that, Agent Hayes quickly quipped, “That’s right! I had no idea who those guys were.”

And I chimed in with,

“And, of course, at that time my big fear was they might be planning a bombing of Barksdale’s B-52 flightline, with Jamal dating women on the base and Jamal wanting to purchase that large used truck on Youree Drive ~

and icing on the cake was Jamal telling Habeeb that Jamal’s father had recently visited Usama bin Laden.”

I then reminded FBI Agent Spoon of my two corroborating videotapes (ninety minutes of Habeeb and I; and one hour of Jamal and I) wherein both Habeeb and Jamal recount much of my story of “on or about 7 Oct 2000.” Spoon was also reminded that on the “Graham-Khan (Jamal) Corroborating Videotape of 8 Mar 2003” Jamal admits that the day of my visit at Jamal’s townhouse (with Habeeb dropping by with their two “doctor-type” visitors) was probably the day after I escorted Jamal to the Evangel Christian Academy vs Airline High School football game held at Airline Stadium in Bossier City, LA on Friday night of 6 Oct 2000 (when Evangel was No. 1 high school football team in the USA).

Upon hearing these scenarios, which confirmed Agent Hayes’ immediate recall of the three Arab names from 1 Nov 2000 and, additionally, confirmed my being with Jamal and his visitors (Habeeb, Alhazmi and Banihammad) on or about 7 Oct 2000, Agent Spoon was momentarily speechless, then turned his attention to my videotape of Jamal discussing Pakistan.

One hour and half later, Beatmann returned, saying that Jamal’s (highly-visible, expensive) New Orleans attorney Larry Fabacher was surprised that Beatmann had a videotape of Graham and Jamal. (Fabacher handles numerous immigration cases, such as foreign medical doctors entering the U.S.)

Judge Wiegand ruled the Hearing to be continued on 19 Mar 2003. Beatmann was pleased with the Continuance, as our side needed the extra time to give it our best effort for Jamal’s pending deportation. At this point, Beatmann agreed with Spoon that Jamal needed to be deported (stay tuned to this “deportation effort”).

I privately wondered just how much Beatmann knew of Jamal’s past, since he had only recently taken the case after another attorney was transferred. Since the INS is now under the Department of Homeland Security, which does not include the FBI or CIA, one had to question whether or not the FBI had shared the disgusting details (of my experience with Jamal, Habeeb, and the 9/11 hijackers) with the INS. After all, it’s no secret that the FBI has a long history of protecting their information, with little or no info-sharing being the rule.

JAMAL ALLLEGEDLY MISLED THE FBI

On this day, 12 Dec 2003, FBI Agent Ray Spoon also surprisingly discovered that, although Jamal had told both Agent Spoon and I (Spoon’s interrogations in 2001-02; Graham’s discussion in fall, 2003) that he (Jamal) had entered the U.S. in New York City, Beatmann revealed that Jamal actually entered the U.S. in Houston, Texas (according to Jamal’s Visa). Spoon wondered out loud as to why Jamal had lied to him.

YOU DECIDE: SPOON’S “ADMISSION?”

Shortly after heading north to Shreveport, Agent Ray Spoon related to me that (on November 1, 2000) when I originally reported to FBI Agent Hayes, he (Spoon) was Assistant Agent-in-Charge of the Shreveport FBI office. This boastful statement by Spoon could be viewed as Spoon’s inadvertent back-door confession that, in fact, Agent Spoon did have knowledge of Agent Hayes having received the Graham Report on 1 Nov 2000. I cordially accepted his statement with a non-confrontational smile.

Just before reaching Alexandria on the way back to Shreveport, Spoon and Graham detoured a couple of miles to LeCompte for lunch at popular Lee’s Restaurant. While engulfing his scrumptious ham lunch, Ray Spoon explained that though Graham was not called to testify today (12 Dec 2003), without Graham and Spoon making an appearance at Oakdale, Jamal’s deportation would likely have been dropped.

After paying the cashier, Ray bought a beautiful cherry pie to-go, and they headed home.

Well, obviously, Jamal now knows that I secretly filmed him. Comforting thought. I’m sure his competent attorney from New Orleans warned Jamal about intimidating a witness, namely me, in any fashion. Toward the end of our ride back home, Agent Spoon told me to give him a quick call if Jamal tries to intimidate or endanger me in any manner, as such an action by Jamal could land him in prison for twenty years or more. I told Agent Spoon that I had a Concealed Handgun Permit and plan to be armed, and that my friends say they are praying for angels of protection.

TURNING POINT: PRIVATE GRAHAM-BEATMANN MEETING

I called INS Counsel Beatmann to set up a pre-testimony appointment in order to lay all the cards on the table ~ be sure the Immigration and Naturalization Service knows the complete story surrounding Mohammad Jamal Khan, his friend Mohammed Habeeb Ahmed, MD and the three Saudi 9/11 hijackers named Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, and Fayez Banihammad.

The three-hour meeting was held on 12 Mar 04 from 9:00 am to 12:00 am at the INS Oakdale conference room with only INS Counsel Jerry A. Beatmann and myself present. This meeting proved to be important tactically in the INS handling of Jamal.

My opened with the FBI’s old reputation for being stingy with info-sharing, and since the FBI is not under Homeland Security like the INS, perhaps Beatmann did not receive The Graham Report (my only conceivable reason for the INS wishing to merely deport Jamal was that perhaps the Oakdale INS group had not received The Graham Report). Sure enough, INS Counsel Jerry Beatmann had no knowledge of my reports, which was a bit strange, as I had also previously reported to Homeland Security months earlier.

Beatmann methodically read the letters of U.S. Congressman Saxby Chambliss to U.S. Congressman Jim McCrery, my letter to McCrery, and McCrey’s answer to me. I injected that Beatmann was holding in his hands a forth-coming book on this entire account, so it is important for the INS to “get it right.” After spending 30 minutes perusing the dozen or so enclosed photographs and report highlights, Beatmann took a deep breath and said this case should not be decided at the Oakdale INS level ~ it must go much higher up the ladder. Boy, was I elated with Beatmann’s decision!

Beatmann said he would, on Monday morning, 15 Mar 2004 personally hand-carry The Graham Report to Chief Counsel Joseph Aguilar of the Board of Immigration Appeals in New Orleans. Ostensibly, Beatmann explained, the matter of Jamal’s potential INS deportation could be referred even higher up in the INS chain of command, especially since this matter will be in the media soon. VIEWING THE VIDEOTAPE

Beatmann carefully watched the entire “Graham-Khan Corroborating Videotape of 3 Mar 03” (which FBI Agent Spoon had relabeled without “corroborating videotape”) in amazement. Beatmann was amazed that Jamal referred to Habeeb and those “other doctors” as fundamentalists. He was equally interested in Jamal exclaiming how important he was and that he had contacts in Washington DC with people like the Ambassador. The entire videotape had obviously impressed Jerry Beatmann.

“SPECIAL PERSONS CASE”

Before parting the Oakdale INS conference room, as Beatmann closed Jamal’s stack of files, my eyes fell on a bold, handwritten heading in the center of the cover on Jamal’s file. Neatly hand-printed in bold caps about one inch in height was the shocking heading of “SPECIAL PERSONS CASE.”

I inquired to Beatmann as to the meaning of “Special Persons Case.” After several seconds of hesitation and squirming, I helped Beatmann by asking, “Unusual circumstances, or something like that?” “Yeah, yeah, you got it.”

Sorry, but my mind instantly recalled Jamal saying how important he was, and the Ambassador thing. Guess what, I could not care less if Jamal or his family happens to be friends with the Pakistani Ambassador to the U.S. Does that change one iota of Jamal’s alleged aiding and abetting the 9/11 terrorists. No way. In Southern jargon, “That dog won’t hunt!”

This situation brings to mind the Saudi Arabian Ambassador’s wife having had her funds funneled to (none other than “our own”) Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar, which, of course, led to the Saudis to deny knowledge of such a money transfer to the 9/11 hijackers (now known as 9/11 Ringleaders).

1994 ANTI-TERRORISM LAWS

Let us remember, in 1994 the U.S. Congress passed ANTI-TERRORISM LAWS which explicitly spelled out examples of “material support” for terrorism. Specifically, material support includes monetary support, lodging, training, personnel, false documents, telecommunications, safe houses, and transportation. These laws should remind readers of the events surrounding Mohammad Jamal Khan and Mohammed Habeeb Ahmed, MD as presented in The Graham Report.

Let’s see - Material Support:

1. Monetary Support: What happened to the fifty thousand ($50,000.00) dollars which was allegedly sent into Pakistan and was illegally structured by Mohammad Jamal Khan, Saeed

Tanoli and Liaquat Ali (all three pleading guilty)? 2. Lodging:

3. Training:

4. Personnel: I was an eye-witness to Jamal providing room and board for both Nawaf Alhazmi (Pentagon terrorist) and Fayez

Banihammad (WTC 2 terrorist); additionally, Habeeb did give, or loan, Jamal five hundred ($500.00) dollars to

provide Jamal with additional support for Alhazmi and Banihammad while they were domiciling at Jamal’s Eastwood on the Bayou rented townhouse in Shreveport (remember the two corroborating videotapes).

Potentially applicable if this Shreveport sleeper cell had visions of doing harm to Barksdale Air Force Base in any fashion, which is given more credence in that Jamal did, in fact, demonstrate his great interest in Barksdale by traveling the base with women befriended with jewelry and by questioning the B-52 pilots (at ‘N Cahoots Sports Bar & Grill) as to the pilot’s dates of deploying to Iraq.

Unsure if the alleged Shreveport Sleeper Cell was busy recruiting new alleged terrorists 5. False Documents: Mohammad Jamal Khan, Mohammed Habeeb Ahmed, MD, and Liaquat Ali were using alias names on different documents (Habeeb’s alias in telephone book).

6. Telecommunications: Jamal was allegedly helping (at least) Nawaf Alhazmi in sending/receiving emails from the USA CASH business 7. Safe Houses:

8. Transportation: located at 779 Shreveport-Barksdale Highway in Shreveport, LA 71105 (ostensibly emailing Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, known as Al-Qaeda No. 3 and the so-called Mastermind of 9/11 terror).

Additionally, Jamal was allegedly using his cell phone communications in support of his alleged Safe House/ Sleeper Cell activities. Habeeb was allegedly using his telephonic communications for support of terrorists Nawaf Alhazmi and Fayez Banihammad.

As mentioned ad nauseum, Jamal harbored 9/11 Ringleader Nawaf Alhazmi and a second 9/11 terrorist, Fayez Banihammad, for weeks surrounding October, 2000

Mohammed Habeeb Ahmed, MD was transporting 9/11 Ringleader Nawaf Alhazmi and fellow 9/11 terrorist Fayez Banihammad around the streets of Shreveport, LA, including, but not limited to, transporting Alhazmi and Banihammad to and from the Muslim Mosque named Masjid Al-Noor located on Youree Drive in Shreveport. Habeeb additionally gave Nawaf and Fayez rides to and from Jamal’s Eastwood on the Bayou townhouse.

Question of the day: In spite of allegedly breaking the aforementioned 1994 Anti- Terrorism Laws on several fronts, will this “SPECIAL PERSON” JAMAL be given special treatment in his INS Hearings? Perhaps so, in the absence of facts hitting the media in time.

NEW ORLEANS: IMMIGRATION BOARD OF APPEALS

According to reliable sources in New Orleans, Chief Counsel Joseph Aguilar of the Immigration Board of Appeals in New Orleans correctly touched base with the National Security Law Division( in the Department of Homeland Security) to discuss the intricacies of Jamal’s case. The NSLD, in Washington DC, asked Aguilar to Fax several pages of The Graham Report for review. Thirty minutes later, the request came from Washington for the entire 189-page Graham Report.

My confidential reliable source said that the next two days involved the Washington DC office communicating vociferously with New Orleans and Oakdale, LA counsels in reference to Jamal and The Graham Report.

GRAHAM REMOVED AS A WITNESS

Interestingly, according to my reliable source, (literally) at the last hour James Left (of the National Security Law Division of the Department of Homeland Security) allegedly ordered Oakdale INS Counsel Beatmann to resist calling Graham as a witness in Jamal’s deportation.

Apparently Homeland Security, bent on deporting Jamal, feared Graham getting on the stand and telling Judge Wiegand (of U.S. Department of Justice) major portions of The Graham Report. By their picturing such a scenario, Graham would not be the prosecution’s ideal witness ~ sometimes referred to as a “hostile witness,” due to a witness not adhering precisely to the prosecution’s case.

Question: Will “the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth” prevail in testimony surrounding the forthcoming hearing to have Mohammad Jamal Khan deported out of the United States?

With the INS having full knowledge that The Graham Report is about to become breaking news, Jamal could need more influential “friends in high places” to save his hide. From the standpoint of homeland security, there is one glaring reason to deport Jamal ~ shadow the man’s every footstep. Being informed of the revelations in The Graham Report, the reader should be able to read between the lines. Think.

WORST CASE SCENARIO The haunting piggy-back question of the day: If Jamal, this foreign-national whose immigration papers are headed with “SPECIAL PERSONS CASE” is dismissed from the United States through deportation, will his name resurface in reference to a future U.S. or foreign terrorist activity such as the March, 2004 railroad bombings in Spain? Obviously, such a development would be shaking spicy salt into a very serious security scenario. Who needs it? Certainly not U.S. security agencies. Just a little Cajun food for thought. Stay tuned.

JAMAL’S NEW JOB

Oh yes, as a means to impress Judge Wiegand of the Justice Department and to satisfy the requirements of his supervised release, as of March, 2004, Jamal was selling automobiles at United Dodge on Bert Kouns Industrial Loop in Shreveport. Any takers for a demo ride?

Question: Why is not Jamal behind bars while awaiting his deportation decision? Are we waiting for Jamal to allegedly assist in another terrorist attack? Real smart.

BREAKING NEWS: JAMAL IS “DANGEROUS FEDERAL FUGITIVE”

Stop the music!! The reader can forget the previous segment about “Jamal’s New Job,” as breaking news places a surprising new twist to our story.

The 13 May 04 issue of The Times, Shreveport’s Gannett daily, covered the story entitled “Bossier City man wanted by U.S. Marshals Service.” Quoting from The Times article by Keri Kirby:

“A Bossier City man is wanted by the U.S. Marshals Service for allegedly failing to appear at a recent hearing related to his federal supervised release.

“Mohammad Jamal Khan, age unavailable, was on supervised release after being charged with trying to avoid reporting that he sent a $50,000 wire transfer to Pakistan, according to U.S. Marshals.

“Khan allegedly violated his federal supervised release when he was arrested by Bossier City police April 10 for allegedly soliciting an undercover female police officer for prostitution.

“When Khan failed to appear for a revocation hearing in Shreveport, U.S. District Judge Tom Stagg issued a federal warrant for his arrest, officials said.

“Khan has ties in Shreveport, Bossier City and Tyler, Texas. He has worked as a car salesman at a local dealership. Kahn owned a Bushmaster AR-15 .223 military-style rifle and should be considered armed and dangerous, officials said.” As it turns out, Jamal was allegedly fired by United Dodge dealership shortly after being arrested by the Bossier City Police Department for the alleged solicitation of a prostitute.

DID JAMAL “PIGEON-DROP” THE BIG-HEARTED CHURCH?

Interestingly, Jamal had befriended the pastor and members of Haughton Baptist Temple, located in nearby Haughton, Louisiana, where Jamal regularly attended and donated to the church since his avowed conversion (in the fall of 2002) from Islam.

According to Pastor Tim Booth, the church (or members thereof), in 2002, paid Jamal’s $10,000 immigration bond, as well as his $2,500 bond which was posted for Jamal’s prostitution arrest in early May, 2004. However, the church’s protective stance of Jamal underwent a metamorphosis after discussions with federal authorities.

On the evening of 14 May 2004, Pastor Booth appeared on local Shreveport Cable Channel 30 (ABC affiliate all-news station) to assure Jamal that the church was praying for him and to encourage Jamal to contact the pastor should he be viewing the TV newscast. Church members stated that Jamal may have returned to Pakistan.

JAMAL’S AIRLINER MANUAL

Since Jamal had earlier disclosed to Graham that he had taken flying lessons in Redding, California in 1995, it is disturbing that federal agents discovered information about airliners in Jamal’s deserted possessions upon his disappearance in May, 2004.

JAMAL’S KORAN

Jamal also left behind a copy of the Koran, but, or course, such a find does not necessarily indicate that Jamal may not be a true convert to Christianity. But it does lead to a sidebar question: Even if Jamal’s conversion is true, does not Jamal remain accountable for his alleged aiding and abetting terrorism on September 11, 2001?

THE “SPECIAL PERSONS CASE” HAS ESCAPED

ALERT! The U.S. needs to locate a SPECIAL PERSON. This person was apparently so special that we had him in our grasp, but let him go. Was Jamal telling the truth when stating on the “Graham-Khan Corroborating Videotape of 8 Mar 2003” that he knew important people in Washington ~ perhaps an Ambassador? Hmmm.

Anyone knowing the whereabouts of Mohammad Jamal Khan (while considering him armed and dangerous, and should NOT approach him) should CALL 1-318-676-4200. SECTION 35 Wrap The Case

It has been my citizen’s duty to provide countless pages (plus numerous interviews) of information to U.S. security agencies. I simply believe many Americans would do likewise if faced with the ordeal I went through with Mohammad Jamal Khan and Dr. Mohammed Habeeb Ahmed, and the two terrorist Mid-easterners (Alhazmi and Banihammad) whom Jamal and Habeeb were allegedly harboring and/or supporting.

Nawaf Alhazmi and Fayez Banihammad were ultimately charged by the U.S. Department of Justice as UnIndicted Co-conspirators in the 9-11-01 attacks on the Pentagon in Washington, DC and New York’s World Trade Center south tower, respectively. Their alleged aiders and abettors have allegedly been investigated and indicted, as indicated by The Graham Report.

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

The many-faceted U.S. spy network involves intelligence gathering at many levels. As quoted in the April 16, 2004 issue of USA Today, these agencies involve the following:

“1. Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps intelligence organizations: Each collects and processes intelligence relevant to its service’s needs.

  1. Central Intelligence Agency: Gathers foreign intelligence, conducts counterintelligence missions.
  2. Coast Guard Intelligence organization: Collects maritime intelligence.
  3. Defense Intelligence Agency: Collects military intelligence, specializes

in foreign-weapons systems.

  1. Energy Department: Monitors nuclear-security issues.
  2. Homeland Security Department: Prevents terrorist attacks within the

USA.

  1. State Department: Produces independent analysis for U.S. diplomats.
  2. Treasury Department: Collects information that may affect U.S.

monetary policy.

  1. Federal Bureau of Investigation: Conducts counterintelligence and

counterterrorism within the USA. 10. National Geospatial-intelligence Agency: Provides digital mapping to support national security.

11. National Reconnaissance Office: Collects and analyzes information from airplane and satellite reconnaissance.

12. National Security Agency: Conducts worldwide electronic surveillance. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

The FBI, as an institution, has held my admiration for many years. When a recent article by political writer John Hill appeared in our Shreveport Gannett newspaper, The Times, advising citizens to never talk to the FBI because the FBI could not be trusted, I was livid. Irresponsible journalism in my mind, considering U.S. security needs citizen input in the New War on terror. Every citizen has the opportunity to have their attorney present when reporting to the FBI.

The countless agents of both the CIA and the FBI deserve the utmost respect from U.S. citizens as they toil to control worldwide terrorism. Because the structure of the U.S. security system was invalid (as this treatise points out) in no way diminishes the efforts of dedicated agents who are devoted to the task of protecting America from terrorists.

DEALING WITH THE GRAHAM REPORT

My most sincere closing comment is this: If Mohammad Jamal Khan is captured, please do not merely deport Jamal and/or Habeeb, thus allowing him/them to go overseas and potentially repeat their alleged support of terrorism.

Considering the initial Graham Report to Shreveport FBI Agent Hayes was over ten months before 9-11, it appears to me that alleged terrorists, such as in The Graham Report, would be better tried in Tribunal Court (military commission) in order to reduce or eliminate dates/details in public eye for reasons of (1) protecting national security information and (2) for witness protection. Let’s bring them to trial. I have solid commitments from several individuals ready to testify, under oath, and corroborate many details of this case.

WORTHY OF NOTE One witness is a Pharmaceutical Representative; one witness is a former Marine in Special Operations; another witness is a housewife; another witness is a Civil Engineer who almost turned in Jamal himself; another witness(es) owned the townhouse Jamal was renting and who entered said townhouse, on or about 3 Oct 2000, while I was visiting with Jamal. Another potential witness owned the townhouses on either side of Jamal’s rented townhouse. Others. In the 2003 published book, MASTERMINDS OF TERROR The Truth Behind the Most Devastating Terrorist Attack the World Has Ever Seen by Yosri Fouda and Nick Fielding, the authors state on page 136:

“Some intelligence sources believe that had al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar in particular not been lost after they entered the USA, the entire al-Qaeda network in the US could have been unraveled.”

Remember two facts: (1) The terrorists are proven experts in coding their messages and (2) our security agents are overextended since 9/11. With such a backdrop, we cannot afford to over-extend FBI surveillance on Al-Qaeda individuals and/or sleeper cells within the U.S. while risking another major catastrophe to fall between the cracks. The obvious solution is to eliminate the aiders and abettors of terrorism from the conclaves of America as quickly as possible.

A CIVILIAN POSSE

With the U.S. facing such an enormous task, I call for a Civilian Posse composed of volunteering law enforcement and military veterans, and other volunteering retirees, to be available for surveillance and the hunting and reporting of supporters of terror as may be emailed or faxed to them on a regular basis. A prime example is the current hunt for Mohammad Jamal Khan. Posse, saddle up! Locate Jamal ~ then, report Jamal, but NEVER APPROACH anyone known to support terrorism.

Moreover, even though the Department of Justice, on 16 May 2004, announced new plans for info-sharing among security agencies, we may never see the day when security agencies are sharing major intelligence information, particularly the FBI with local law enforcement as projected by the new visions of Homeland Security. There will be a large grey area for declaring information as Top Secret.

SUPPORTERS OF TERROR

June 22, 2003: U.S. Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA) stated to CNN’s Wolf Blitzer a blistering statement:

“warning that anyone supplying help to Hamas or any other terrorist organization which takes the lives of Americans are aiding and abetting terrorism, which leads to indictment of first degree murder.”

Similar statements have been repeatedly spoken by President George W. Bush, Attorney General John Ashcroft, FBI Director Robert Mueller, and many members of the U.S. Congress. With such a backdrop, I await indictments against both Mohammad Jamal Khan and Mohammed Habeeb Ahmed, MD for, including but not limited to, allegedly aiding and abetting terrorism against the United States of America on September 11, 2001 through direct attacks upon the United States, the destruction of U.S. property and buildings, and the taking of precious U.S. lives.

GRAHAM’S STANDING OFFER TO TESTIFY

Again, I hereby offer my complete testimony to any and all Courts of Law, including Tribunal, or Military Commission, and, additionally, in the event of my absence, The Graham Report herein may serve as my witness in a Court of Law or Tribunal.

One can only speculate as to how many “Shreveport encounters” happened across America in the months preceding 9/11. Frightening thought. Simple solution: Round’em up, before we witness repeat atrocities. No apologies if it sounds like a western movie. Terrorists endangering United States citizens must be taken out of circulation. No if’s, and’s, or but’s. With no apology.

GO AFTER USAMA BIN LADEN

Since security agencies believe Usama bin Laden to be potentially hiding out in the mountains of NW Pakistan, why has not the U.S. forced Pakistan to allow U.S. military entrance into such suspect areas to pursue capturing bin Laden? Oh yes, tribal traditions.

Question: Is the U.S. involved in an international war on terrorism or not? At present, many elements within the Pakistani intelligence (ISI) may be actually protecting bin Laden. Readers interested in pursing this reasoning should read the book Who Killed Daniel Pearl by Bernard-Henri Levy. On 23 Feb 2003, Levy says Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf was quoted as saying:

“Perhaps Daniel Pearl was over-inquisitive; a media person should be aware of the dangers of getting into dangerous areas; unfortunately, he got over-involved in intelligence games.”

Being able to hunt for bin Laden in all areas of NW Pakistan holds particular

having being the FBI and CIA. NEW BRAND OF HOMELAND ATTACKS importance with The Graham Report in that, on or about 7 Oct 2000, I clearly and unmistakably heard Mohammad Jamal Khan tell Mohammed Habeeb Ahmed, MD that Jamal’s father had recently visited Usama bin Laden. And, days earlier, when I asked Jamal if I could join him on his next trip home to Pakistan, he was quick to say that his (Jamal’s) father lives up by the China Wall and over by Russia; in other words, Jamal’s father lives in NW Pakistan, as marked by Jamal on the Pakistani map during the “Graham-Khan Corroborating Videotape of March 8, 2003,” copy of said videotape presented to both The Homeland Security Agency is concentrating on the dangers of bioterrorism, nuclear terrorism, airliner hijackings and bombings facilitated through sundry designs. Many Americans are unaware of an additional very real danger for all citizens. Let’s go there.

As presented by an excellent January, 2004 CNN PRESENTS program, a major goal of Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia has been to incite fighting between different ethic groups. Due to successes in Southeast Asia, rest assured that the numerous American Al-Qaeda sleeper cells will potentially apply similar techniques within U.S. borders.

U.S. ETHNIC WARS

Visualize the following scenario: Al-Qaeda carries out a contrived killing of several Black Muslims by the Arian Nation, thereby fanning the dormant flames of hatred with resultant threats, gun battles, and massive killings. As the conflict festers, radical elements within the KKK join the battle. But there’s more.

While the black-white battle widens, Al-Qaeda terrorists, posing as white ranchers, gun down hundreds of illegal Mexicans crossing the Rio Grande River into New Mexico, Arizona, Texas and California. Through further clandestine activities, Al-Qaeda fuels the fire by supplying the illegals with firearms and ammunition. A major new ethnic battle is on.

A major ethnic war could pit American Jews against Muslims in highly concentrated Muslim cities such as Dearborn, Michigan. The stage could be set by Al-Qaeda bombing their own Muslim brothers in Dearborn in an effort to blame it on the Jews. Like in the Holy Land, homicidal bombings escalate. Blood flows in Michigan, New York, and elsewhere. Not a beautiful picture of America.

THE ANECDOTE

To intercept this likelihood, education of Americans and her neighbors is critical. We must realize, in advance, that Al-Qaeda will attempt to pit ethnic group against ethnic group within U.S. borders.

This education should be incorporated into Homeland Security’s prevention programs, with federal dollars and private institutions investing in citizen education through public and private and parochial schools, churches, synagogues, mosques, and civic groups throughout America. Early spread of this warning is America’s best defense ~ before Al-Qaeda strikes. Invoke the famous Boy Scout motto: Be Prepared! A WORD OF THANKS

Since September 11, 2001 to those involved with homeland security, the dedicated CIA- FBI agents, state and local law enforcement, and others in security who are committed to high performance on behalf of our great country, I speak for all Americans in saying “Thank You.”

Likewise, on the international front, it has been extremely gratifying to see the successes in Afghanistan and massive capture/elimination of alleged terrorists in the “Deck of Cards,” especially Saddam Hussein and his sons. The CIA, FBI, Special Forces, Special Operatives, and U.S. military working with cooperative foreign friends, are to be highly commended. God’s speed in intelligence gathering, in analysis, in planning, in execution, and in ultimate victory.

WINNING THE BATTLE

During his News Conference on November 13, 2003, Commander of U.S. Central Command, General John Abizaid, said that, unquestionably, the U.S. has the military strength and commitment to win against terrorists in Iraq. And since Al-Qaeda has proven Iraqi connections, the U.S. military has been eliminating members of the terrorist groups responsible for tragedies on September 11, 2001. Bottom line, General Abazaid said the patience, perseverance, and courage of the American people is the necessary ingredient to defeat Al-Qaeda and the other despicable terrorist thugs.

AT HOME

Here at home, the U.S. is quickly benefiting from mistakes of our recent past. We now realize the vital importance of proper analysis of in-hand intelligence, and strategic coordination at the Federal, state, and local level. The molding and reshaping of attitudes, planning and execution must be an ongoing process due to ever-changing strategies of our terrorist enemies. Americans should never forget: A nation is truly free when it handles the people’s business as openly as possible, with courage laced with integrity, and according to Law. Let’s support the men and women commissioned with the vital task of protecting America.

WHAT WE CAN EXPECT Make no mistake, the U.S. and the Free World are in World War III. Opponent? International Terrorism. It’s been branded America’s New War. No easy, short war. And be ever mindful ~ security leaders have stated that the U.S. is again likely to be hit with terrorist attacks, potentially involving repeated airliner hijackings, bio-terrorism, nuclear-terrorism, homicidal bombings, and ethnic wars within her borders. America must become radically stronger by sharpening her defenses, her perseverance, her character and her courage while never losing her will to win. With God’s help, we will win!

A PASSIONATE REMINDER

On Easter Sunday, April 11, 2004 Passion Play Narrator Rick Rowe, with black tuxedo glistening through the dimmed red lights, continued in his deep, melodious voice with:

“The people quickly realized that this man Jesus was a different kind of man ~ Jesus even told his followers to love their enemies!”

The words of Jesus hit me squarely between the eyes, which quickly filled with tears. The Muslin enemies! Throughout my ordeal with the alleged Shreveport terrorists, my sporadic hatred of them was fired up by the Evil One from the dark side ~ Satan. Of that I was certain.

Mel Gibson’s “The Passion of The Christ” ~ and now, the 2004 Easter Passion Play. My apologies for the personal note, but I must share that both were choreographed, like a lazer, to mold and shape my resentment into love. Once again, God had applied His unique, divine touch in re-balancing my act. Once again, Jesus is right on.

Life may appear strange to require loving your worst enemy. But it surely beats hate. And the closer one was to 9/11 emotionally, the more difficult it becomes. So, I repeat, we must never forget to pray for the families of September 11, 2001.

HOW AMERICA CAN RECEIVE GOD’S HELP

Jesus said to pray for, and love, the misguided radical, fundamentalist Muslim enemy. In God’s Word, additional answers are given in II Chronicles 7:14 as follows:

“If my people, which are called by my name, shall humble themselves, and pray, and seek my face, and turn from their wicked ways; then will I hear from heaven, and will forgive their sin, and will heal their land.”

CLOSING REQUEST

May Americans join in daily prayer for protection and guidance for our President and the Presidential Staff, for the U.S. Congress, for state and local leaders, for CIA and FBI agents, for Homeland Security, for U.S. military personnel, for First Responders, for citizens aiding in the New War, and for protection of the greatest defender of freedom in the history of mankind: The United States of America.

Aloha with love, David M Graham 1. REDACTED 2. SECTION 36

Potential Witness List: Tom Coleman’s wife Jan Coleman: (Tom has had stroke and may be foggy about information dealing with the past, but wife Jan Coleman has super recall) Agent Ray had asked Graham how he got to know Jamal. was the man who originally called Dr. Graham to recommend Mohammad Jamal Khan as a potential investor for Graham’s upstart company AdvaLife. FBI Agent

at Barnes & Noble Book Store, informed me that she has provided the FBI with a list of

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  3. was referred to the FBI over the Internet at www.ifccfbi.gov because Agent Cliff Bland did not return two pages by Graham, with Agent Bland apparently being notified quickly that had information about

Spoon apparently interviewed Coleman on several occasions, and I (Graham) understand Tom knew Jamal for weeks, or months, before calling me. Bumping into Tom and Jan Coleman Ray Spoon has his wife Mohammad Jamal Khan’s FAX numbers which she retrieved from an old FAX machine Jamal gave her. Great! Jan Coleman telephone: 318-865-5565 Dr. Mohammed “Habeeb” Ahmed’s brother, specifically Habeeb’s information to Agent Bland. can be called at Coleman also disclosed other pertinent Lorrie brother’s name and phone number. Lorrie, I believe,


REDACTED

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13. knew of Dr. Graham having an appointment with FBI Agent Shirley G. Milne, Dr. Graham’s dental assistant and Lorrie Champion Lake Apartments 318- G. McBroom, Milne Steve Hayes on November 1, 2000, and, like was aware that Dr. Graham was interviewed by both U.S. Secret Service Agent Ron Lewis on or about November 7, 2000, and by FBI Agent Ray Spoon on October 2, 2001. also knew of Dr. Graham’s excitement over identifying Nawaf Alhazmi three days after the Spoon interview, said identification made possible from 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21.

22. 23. REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED

REDACTED viewing the October 5, 2001 issue of USA Today which had photographs of the alleged hijackers on 9-11<span style="font-size: 12.000000pt; font-family: 'TimesNewRomanPSMT'; 318-226-0116., and </span>further confirming identifications on www.foxnews.com and www.cnn.com John Lambert both Jamal and Lambert lived in Eastwood-on-the-Bayou Subdivision. Lambert said he thought about turning in Mohammad Jamal to the FBI himself. Lambert said he (John Lambert) speaks fluent Arabic and that the U.S. government has requested he come out of retirement to help in America’s New War. Lambert said he once worked in the missile program in the Mideast, and while in the Mideast, Lambert said he (Lambert) had met with Usama bin Laden, even though he wanted that fact concealed from the FBI. Lambert also owns, he said, a jet airplane hangered at Greater Shreveport Airport, but that he seldom flies it because of the costs. On one occasion, Lambert and Graham rode through Eastwood-on-the-Bayou Subdivision, and Lambert correctly pointed out Jamal’s previously rented townhouse location at 3521 Eastwood Drive, Shreveport, LA. 14. is a dental patient of Dr. Graham’s who knew Mohammad Jamal (Khan) while Nancy Phifer, owner of Express Personnel Services, 2702 Line Avenue, Shreveport, LA 71104, related to Graham that, in January 2001, Mohammad Jamal requested Nancy find employees for his Global Textile company. Since Phifer suspected Jamal to be a potential collection problem, she informed Jamal that he would be required to pay up front; Jamal answered with, “No problem,” as he opened a drawer full of U.S. money. Significantly, Jamal offered Nancy a glass of tea, which Nancy was being encouraged to drink; when Nancy said she did not care for the tea (after the tea had a strange taste), Nancy, 24. Jamal says, “What’s the matter, do you think I spiked that tea?” Could that have been Jamal’s Freudian slip, since Graham knows for certain that Jamal spiked Graham’s coffee with

sedation on or about October 3, 2000? owned the townhouse (located at

said townhouse is located diagonally across the parking lot from Jamal’s 3521 East Lake Drive rented townhouse. Walter and Debbie Langley Nancy Phifer can be contacted at work: 3 3522 East Lake Dr., Shreveport, LA 71105) which they rented to Ray Hughes, Jr., the owner of USA CASH business at 779 Shreveport-Barksdale Highway, Shreveport, LA 71105 (where Jamal hung out emailing and faxing around the world, using same address) and Hughes being the man Jamal said loaned him at least $10,000.00 and Hughes additionally being the man whom Jamal said wanted to purchase (for Jamal) a newer truck than the large white truck Jamal pointed out to Graham on Youree Drive near Squire’s Tux Rental business. The Langley’s 25. lived Drive, Shreveport, LA 71105. Allegedly, his also and

26. lived Drive, Shreveport, LA 71105 girlfriend “Cynthia” lived there Cynthia may now be 27. 28. key witness a key witness The Graham Report; Bruce’s wife. They do not presently live there. David Malcolm Graham, 512 East Kings Hwy., Shreveport, LA 71105: Author of Mohammad Jamal Khan may flip over on Mohammed Habeeb Ahmed, MD and thereby become SECTION 37 Complete List of Graham Reports

Note: In this book, in the interest of national security, limited photographs are presented of security agents mentioned in the context of The Graham Report.

Copies of this CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY REPORT, or similar report, were Mailed, FedXed, FAXed, Hand-Delivered, or presented Orally by Graham to the following:

  1. Shreveport FBI Agent Steve Hayes: 1 Nov 2000 1-hour Oral Graham Report at Graham’s dental clinic: 512 E.Kings Highway, Ste 1, Shreveport, LA 71105
  2. Shreveport U.S. Secret Service Agent Ron Lewis: 15-Minute Oral Report on or about 7 Nov 2000 by Graham at Graham’s aforementioned dental clinic
  3. Graham called the FBI TV Hotline on or about September 28, 2001, presenting an Abbreviated Oral Report; Hotline “agent” suggested an FBI Interview
  4. Shreveport FBI Agent Ray Spoon: On 2 Oct 2001, One-Hour Oral Report (with Graham’s Handwritten Notations) presented by Graham at Graham’s dental clinic
  5. 5 Oct 2001: Graham reported to Shreveport FBI Agent Ray Spoon that Graham positively identified Nawaf Alhazmi (from the terrorist line-up in the 5 Oct 2001 issue of USA Today) as being the man Graham reported in Graham’s 1 Nov 2000 Graham Report to Shreveport FBI Agent Steve Hayes (Graham was eyewitness)
  6. On January 31, 2002, Shreveport FBI Special Agent-in-Charge Mike Kinder and FBI Agent Steve Hayes are given 96-page report by Graham,

Hand-Carried to Agents Kinder and Hayes at Shreveport FBI Office, followed by FBI Agent Spoon receiving Summary Version from Graham several days later at the Shreveport FBI Office

  1. Attorney General John Ashcroft: Report by Unreg. Mail: Spring, 2002 to the Department of Justice, Washington, DC
  2. May 22, 2002 Shreveport FBI Agent Ray Spoon at Graham’s clinic
  3. June 4, 2002: Joint Select Committee on Intelligence Counsel Steven A.

Cash is Hand-Carried the Graham Report by Graham in the Hart Building, Washington, DC. On 8 Jun 2002, Steven A. Cash calls Graham to confirm that the Graham Report is accepted into Joint Select Committee on Intelligence studying events leading to September 11, 2001.

  1. Senator John Breaux (D-LA): Graham Faxed his Report on or about 6-6-02
  2. Senator Mary Landrieu (D-LA): Graham Faxed his Report on or about 6-6-02
  3. On July 2, 2002 Graham hand-carried to FBI Agent Ray Spoon the “Graham-Habeeb Corroborating Videotape of 24 Jun 2002” at Shreveport FBI Office.
  4. The Honorable Jim McCrery (R-LA): Personal Interview. On Aug 16, 2002 McCrery given Report & aforementioned 6-24-02 Videotape at Bossier City Civic Center, with McCrery then presenting said Report-Videotape to The Honorable Saxby Chambliss (R-GA) of Joint Select Committee on Intelligence, who,

in turn, contacted the Federal Bureau of Investigation as well as The Honorable Porter Goss, Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

  1. President George W. Bush: Graham FedEx Report on or about Sept 30, 2002 to The White House
  2. FBI Director Robert Mueller: Graham FedEx Report on or about Oct 28, 2002 to the Department of Justice in Washington, DC
  3. March 8, 2003: Graham sent his Internet report of “Graham-Khan Corroborating Videotape of 8 Mar 2003” to www.ifccfbi.gov
  4. On or about March 10, 2003, Graham Hand-Delivered to Shreveport FBI Agent Cliff Bland a copy of “Graham-Khan Corroborating Videotape of 8 Mar 2003” at the Shreveport FBI Office.
  5. On or about March 11, 2003, Graham reported to www.cia.gov a report of
  6. Graham Over-Nighted to CIA Headquarters
  7. Barksdale Air Force Base OSI Agent Jeff Bruce, on April 8, 2003 was Hand-Carried an updated Graham Report at Graham’s clinic.
  8. On June 13, 2003, an 80-page Graham Report is Hand-Carried by Graham to Asst. U.S. Attorney Kevin Zolot of US Dept of Justice,

300 Fannin Street, Suite 3201, Shreveport, Louisiana 71101 in presence “Graham-Khan Corroborating Videotape of March 8, 2003” including but not limited to details about Jamal’s father’s location in Matta, Pakistan and Jamal’s father’s business located in Karachi, Pakistan, and additionally Jamal’s uncle’s home in Pakistan(Jamal’s father visited bin Laden in 2000) On or about March 11, 2003, a copy of “Graham-Khan Corroborating Videotape of March 8, 2003” for their first-hand evaluation of Jamal discussing relatives on map of Pakistan of Shreveport FBI Agent Ray Spoon and FBI Agent Michael A.

Dubravetz, Jr. at the Shreveport FBI Office.

  1. On or about June 15, 2003, an 82-page Graham Report is given Shreveport

FBI Agent Michael A. Dubravetz, Jr. at Graham’s aforementioned clinic.

  1. On September 26, 2003, Graham presented The Graham Report to: Dr. Michael M. Baden, Director, Medicolegal Investigations Unit

New York State Police, Bureau of Criminal Investigation; 1220 Washington Ave. Building 30; Albany, NY 12226-3000, immediately after Dr. Baden spoke at the 2003 New Orleans Dental Conference in New Orleans, LA

  1. Louisiana Governor Mike Foster was presented an Updated Graham Report on or about January 9, 2004, Hand-Carried by Dr. David M. Graham
  2. LA Caddo Parish Sheriff Steve Prator is presented an Updated Graham Report on or about February 22, 2004 hand-carried by David M Graham, DDS
  3. LA Bossier Parish Sheriff Larry Deen is presented an Updated Graham Report on or about February 22, 2004 hand-carried by David M Graham, DDS
  4. On March 12, 2004 Graham hand-carried a 189-page Updated Graham Report to Department of Homeland Security (Oakdale, LA) INS Counsel Jerry A. Beatmann, who delivered the Graham Report to New Orleans’ Immigration Appeals Board Chief Counsel Joseph Aguilar, who, in turn, faxed the Graham Report to the Department of Homeland Security’s National

Security Law Division in Washington, DC.

  1. On or about, March 12, 2004 Graham shipped Graham Report via Certifed Mail to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission).
  2. On 16 Mar 04 and on 12 May 04, Graham shipped Updated Graham Report(s) to President George W. Bush at The White House; the 16 Mar 04 report included: “Graham-Habeeb Corroborating Videotape of June 24, 2002” and the “Graham-Khan Corroborating Videotape of March 8, 2003.”
  3. On various dates, several other Graham Reports were provided at Websites www.fbi.gov , www.cia.gov and to Homeland Security by logging on to www.whitehouse.gov

As an update, a concerted attempt will be made to deliver a copy of this current report, or book, to all aforementioned individuals, each of whom has a high priority for the security of the United States of America.

Even though the original Graham Report was reported to Shreveport FBI Agent Steve Hayes on November 1, 2000, Graham had no confirmation whether or not the following three (3) individuals personally received the Graham Report(s):

1. FBI Director Louis Freeh 2. U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno 3. President William Jefferson Clinton SECTION 38 SWORN AFFIDAVIT and AGREEMENT TO TESTIFY

After careful thought, and with clear mind, I, David M Graham DDS, do hereby solemnly swear that I have told the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help me God, in every aspect of the following: (1) herein Graham Report and (2) to statement(s) made by me to security agents of the U.S. government, such as Shreveport FBI Agent Steve Hayes, Shreveport FBI Agent Ray Spoon, Shreveport FBI Agent Cliff Bland, Shreveport FBI Agent Michael Dubravetz, Jr., Shreveport FBI Agent David Hudson (now retired), Shreveport FBI Agent-in-Charge Mike Kinder, U.S. Secret Service Agent Ron Lewis, and Asst. U.S. Attorney Kevin Zolot, and (3) to Internet reports sent to Homeland Security, www.ifccfbi.gov and www.fbi.gov and www.cia.gov, (4) to hardcopy reports either hand-carried, mailed, Fed X-ed, faxed, or emailed to U.S. Senators, U.S. Congressmen, and and (5) statements made in the personal videotape of David Malcolm Graham and presented personally (Hand-Delivered) in the Hart Building, Washington DC, along with a copy of Graham Report, to the Joint Select Committee on Intelligence (JSCI) Counsel Steven A. Cash on or about June 4, 2002, and (6) the later Updated Graham Report(s), including but not limited to, the “Graham-Habeeb Corroborating Videotape filmed on June 24, 2002” provided to U.S. Congressman Jim McCrery, who presented said report to U.S. Congressman Saxby Chambliss, a member of JSCI, for said report to be officially submitted to JSCI, and (7) “Graham-Khan Corroborating Videotape of 8 Mar 2003.”

Additionally, I, David M Graham, DDS after careful thought and with clear mind, do hereby state that I agree to testify, under oath, in any Court of Law, including Tribunal Court or Military Commission, as to the validity of any and all statements herein made in said Graham Report(s) and, additionally, to the validity of any and all statements to the aforementioned individuals and/or security entities (including, but not limited to, any and all follow-up Corrections when applicable). I hereby additionally give my permission for state/federal authorities to use any or all of the Graham Report(s) in any Court of Law, or Tribunal or Military Commission, for prosecution of any and all potentially indicted individual(s). If any portion of a Graham Report shall be proven invalid, the remainder of Graham Report(s) remains valid and enforceable to the full extent of the law.

WITNESSES: SIGNED:

____________________________

______________________________ ____________________________ David M. Graham, DDS

(Fully Executed to the U.S. Department of Justice) REFERENCES and RECOMMENDED READING:

“A Year to Remember ~ Commemorative Edition” Time Magazine: 2002. (reviews tragic events surrounding September 11, 2001 - pictorials and comment)

AGAINST ALL ENEMIES ~ Inside America’s War on Terror by Richard Clarke. The Free Press: 2004 (presents a good account of failures preceding the 1 Nov 2000 Graham Report).

AMERICAN JIHAD The Terrorists Living Among Us by Steve Emerson. The Free Press: 2002. (frightening coverage of terrorist organizations in the U.S.)

“Before 9/11 ~ and After” by Louis J. Freeh. The Wall Street Journal: April 12, 2004.

“Can a Trial Lawyer...Terrorism” The New York Times Magazine: March 14, 2004.

“Gorelick’s Wall” The Wall Street Journal – Review & Outlook: April 15, 2004.

HOLY WAR, INC. ~ Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden by Peter L. Bergen The Free Press: 2001.

“Judge indicts Madrid suspect on charges of planning Sept. 11 attacks” by Maria Jesus Prades (AP). The Times: April 29, 2004.

LOSING BIN LADEN ~ How Bill Clinton’s Failures Unleashed Global Terror by Richard Miniter. Regnery Publishing: 2003.

MASTERMINDS OF TERROR by Yosri Fouda and Nick Fielding. Arcade: 2003.

“New details on 9/11 Plot” and “Interrogation reveals how 9/11 developed” USA Today: September 22, 2003 (provide details of the AP release of so-called 9/11 Mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed’s testimony of Alhazmi and Almihdhar).

“Borders...“ by Linda Vester. Fox News Channel: Feb, 2004. (disturbing facts dealing with both U.S.-Mexican and U.S.-Canadian borders)

NEWSWEEK: June 24, 2002. (details an Iowa U.S. Senator’s concern over an FBI supervisor involved with Ruby Ridge and Waco being on the Joint Select Committee on Intelligence studying the events leading to 9/11)

1000 YEARS FOR REVENGE ~ International Terrorism and the FBI – The Untold Story

by Peter Nance. Regan Books: 2003. (provides an outstanding comprehensive history of pre-9/11 terrorist build-up, including a 32-page color Timeline)

“Plot Likely Involved...” USA Today: October 5, 2001. (includes early 9/11 analysis and the airliner hijacker line-ups involved in the 9/11 terrorist attacks) “Post-9/11 reforms haven’t fixed intelligence failures” USA Today Editorial – Our View: Agencies lack access to terrorist watch list. Accountability lags. 16 Apr 2004.

“9/11 Report” U.S. Joint Select Committee on Intelligence: September, 2002.

SEE NO EVIL by Robert Baer. Three Rivers Press: 2002. (true story of a ground soldier in the CIA’s War on Terrorism and what led to the weakening of the CIA)

“Sept. 11 Panel Cites C.I.A. For Failures in Terror Case ~ Tenet was Told of Suspect’s Pilot Training – He Defends Efforts of Agency” by Philip Shenon and Eric Lichtblau. The New York Times Headlines: April 15, 2004.

TERRORIST HUNTER by Anonymous. Ecco: 2003. (the extraordinary story of a woman who went underground infiltrating the radical Islamic groups operating in America and how she was personally responsible for bringing terrorists to justice)

“The 9/11 Terrorists the CIA Should Have Caught” by Michael Isikoff and Daniel Klaidman. NEWSWEEK Coverstory: June 10, 2002. (Missed opportunity - Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar attended an Al-Qaeda meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia with CIA knowledge; not added to Watch List)

THE TERRORIST RECOGNITION HANDBOOK by Malcolm W. Nance. The Lyons Press: 2003. (for security personnel and/or citizens interested in terror prevention)

www.911commission.gov is recommended for readers wishing to view the complete citizen commission’s Statements of events leading to September 11, 2001

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Address: ________________________________________ Street Address ONLY – (No P.O. Boxes Accepted)

City:_____________________State:____Zip:________ Country:______________________

2). PRICING: $15.00 each (includes S/H – all 50 U.S. states) Outside USA: $22.00 each (includes International Ship./Hdl) DISCOUNTS: If ordering 3 or more books, subtract 10% Discount

NUMBER OF BOOKS DESIRED = __________

Your Order TOTAL COST = _________

IF CREDIT CARD Check One: Visa ___MasterCard___Discover___ Name on Credit Card:___________________________________ Card No:_________________________Exp.Date/Mo:__YR:____

OR:

If MONEY ORDER: Make out to House of Honor Publishing

SEND: MAIL ORDERS TO: The Graham Report

House of Honor Publishing P.O. Box 4846 Shreveport, LA 71134 USA

Check your Order: No. of books; Payment; Ship. Address

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